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Abstract

This dissertation is an historical comparative examination of economic
globalization (i.e., global market integration) effects on state political economic
capacities in Québec and Canada. The central goal of the project is to understand how
global market integration has altered the policy capacities of state institutions.
Specifically, this dissertation examines Canadian multiculturalism and Québec
interculturalism as social policy responses to ethno-cultural diversification resulting from
increased global market integration. I argue that increased global market integration
decreases state capacity to enact economic protections, but not the demand for
protections from national populations. The result of these changes (ethno-cultural
diversification and decreased economic policy capacity) is a shift in social policy
capacity toward control and management of national cultural definitions, symbols, and
structures of meaning. That is, as state capacity to meet national protectionist demands
through economic policy decreases as a result of global market integration, the state must
seek out alternative means of meeting national protectionist demands. These means are
found in the management and control of national culture. The dissertation further
concludes that this political re-orientation enables national populations to increases their
relative power with respect to the state. This has placed the state in a precarious position
between the powerful demands of global market proponents and the increasingly
powerful demands of national populations for protections from the adverse affects of
market integration.
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Part I
Methodological Framework and Theoretical Foundations

1

Part I Introduction

Part I, consisting of Chapters One and Two, provide methodological and
theoretical frameworks that guide this dissertation project. The project itself is divided
into three parts: (1) providing a conceptual framework, (2) detailing national historical
backgrounds of both Canada and Québec, and (3) a comparative analysis of global
market integration, demographic change, and state policy responses of Canada and
Québec. The purpose of these sections is to develop a more comprehensive understanding
of how economic globalization (global market integration) has impacted the
contemporary nation-state with the larger goal of understanding what capacities and roles
define the contemporary nation-state. The larger arguments and the development of an
orienting analytical framework is the goal of Part I.
Chapter One defines specific concepts and goals of the project as well as
providing the methodological framework to which the larger project must conform. The
chapter provides a conceptual and methodological foundation on which larger theoretical
and analytical components of the project can be built.
Chapter Two provides theoretical orientation that allows for the analysis of Part
III to be properly contextualized. The state and globalization processes are theoretically
examined and conceptualized in order to understand the experience of Canadian and
Québec global market integration as well as the impact of this process on both respective
national populations and state institutions.
The overall dissertation seeks to answer a central question: what are the
contemporary capacities of the core nation-state? Part I provides the methodological and
2

theoretical framework to begin this analytical project. Part II offers historical background
information on Canada and Québec, respectively. These chapters support the
methodological contention that these two governmental entities have distinct national
histories resulting in distinct state social policy goals. Part III constitutes the analytical
portion of this project. Specifically, the chapters examine global market integration and
the effect of economic globalization on Canada and Québec; examine one of the most
dramatic effects of globalization, ethno-cultural diversification through labor and other
migrations; and an examination of multicultural and intercultural policies as state social
political responses to national demographic changes resulting from globalization.
The dissertation concludes with a brief chapter that discusses the theroretical
conclusions of the project as well as specific methodological conclusions. The final
chapter concludes with a hypothetical thought-experiment designed to promote future
research directions.

3

Chapter One
Conceptualizing and Analyzing the Contemporary Nation-State

This dissertation examines the development and evolution of social policy
responses by Canadian and Québec state institutions in response to pressures to national
cohesion and stability brought by increasing global market integration. Specifically, I
examine the roles of multicultural and intercultural policies in Canada and Québec,
respectively. The main effect of economic globalization (or global market integration)
that I examine is the process of ethno-cultural diversification through labor migration and
other categorical immigration. In this project I view policy as an institutional form of
social practice intended to reconcile national histories, stabilize national populations, and
facilitate economic growth through fully global market participation. In addition, this
project seeks to understand the role of culture, specifically the role and use of local
(national) culture, in relation to nation-state integration within the global market
economy. I will argue that the role of culture must be more sufficiently understood as a
legitimation mechanism given the decreasing capacities of the nation-state to control and
protect national economic interests due to increased global market economic integration.
This dissertation is intent on answering a central question: how has the advanced
capitalist nation-state changed in response to the challenges posed by globalization? This
question is the logical outcome of an extended debate over the continued viability of the
nation-state as a focus of analysis in an era of increasing global market integration,
political interdependence, international non-governmental organizations, and processes of
cultural homogenization. Few state theorists would argue that the power of globalization
4

has not transformed the capacities of the nation-state. The central debate concerns the
extent of these changes and whether or not the nation-state can still be understood as a
central actor with respect to issues of economics, politics, and cultural change. While this
debate is both fruitful and interesting, the contending proponents are largely concerned
with large-scale change. In other words, we know that globalization has impacted the
traditional nation-state, but our deeper understanding of how the nation-state has been
impacted, and more importantly how it has adapted to meet these challenges, is relatively
limited. Little attention is paid to local processes of change, which results in a limited
understanding of the importance or role of nation-states in an era of globalization. This
project addresses this problem through a historical-comparative analysis of nation-state
formation and maintenance in response to increasing transformative pressures of global
economic, political, and cultural processes.
I will argue that the nation-state has lost much of its capacity to control economic
and political outcomes due to the assumption of these responsibilities by globalization
vehicles (a global market economic system and international (IMF, World Bank) and
supranational (G-8, European Union) non-governmental organizations, for instance). The
global market economic system, however, requires stability and locations of both
production and consumption. Nation-states are commonly defined by their
responsibilities for ensuring stable space for productive and consumptive process to occur
(Giddens 1990, 70; Panitch 1994, 75). This project the role of social policy in the process
of creating national stability and facilitating global market integration. If policy is,
indeed, a form of institutional social practice, what can policy analysis tell us about the
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contemporary role of the state? Particularly, what can social policy tell us about the role
of culture in nation-state mechanical functioning as a subordinate economic entity?
This chapter provides a conceptual and methodological framework to examine the
transformation of the modern nation-state as a result of the growing power and capacities
of political and economic globalization processes. The project is a comparative-historical
study examining the evolution of the federal government in Canada and the provincial
government in Québec. This dissertation examines the changing role of the nation-state
through the mechanism of social policy, specifically analyzing the emergence,
motivations, and changes of Canadian multicultural policy and Québec intercultural
policy. The chapter consists of four parts: (1) establishing necessary preliminary
assumptions, (2) conceptualizing and defining the concepts of nationalism and cultural
structure, (3) a justification and description of the comparative methodological approach
and resolving possible comparative problems in the study of Canada and Québec, and (4)
a brief overview of the chapter content comprising the remainder of the dissertation.
1. Founding Assumptions
As previously stated, I examine social policy development and evolution in
political economic and historical context as a mechanism to observe and measure the
actions of the state as an institutional social actor. I believe that the observation of state
actions will be telling in terms of understanding the contemporary role and capacities of
the contemporary core nation-state. In order to begin the process of answering these
central questions I must begin with a series of orienting assumptions.
First, the state has, historically, served as the locus of political and economic
institutional power. The institutional capacities of the state are reflected in the political
6

actions taken by institutional representatives and can be understood through such
mechanisms as the construction and alteration of policies intended to steer the political
economic direction of a respective nation-state.
Second, the nation serves as the power base for each respective state providing
legitimation and granting authority to state institutions. In return for this legitimation of
authority the state is responsible for providing national social protections. These
protections can be as overt as military defense or as intangible as the provision of moral
support to the nation or groups within the nation. In sum, the maintenance of state
authority and power is contingent on its ability to provide adequate social protections for
national populations. Any breakdown in the capacity to protect the social welfare of the
nation can result in a withdrawal of legitimating authority and thus threaten the continued
capacity of the state to control established political economic mechanisms.
Third, the policies that direct political economic action are not static and are
regularly altered, maintained, or discarded as their perceived utility is compromised or if
political economic conditions shift to further reduce the effectiveness of respective
policies. This process of alteration, maintenance, or rejection can be used as a
methodological window to historically observe the political responses of a respective
state to larger socio-economic motivations for change. This assumption implies that the
nation-state is not supreme in its ability to motivate large-scale social, political, or
economic change.
Fourth, the state alters policies and actions in response to external socio-economic
structures that motivate political change within the nation-state. These socio-economic
structures are not conscious manipulators of human action. Instead, they can themselves
7

be altered as understanding of the structures and mechanics governing them is developed
by social actors. In other words, the relationship between social structures and social
actors, in this sense, has the potential to be reciprocal. That is, once an actor has sufficient
knowledge of how structures manipulate and control, that same actor then has the
potential to influence those structures for specific purposes. Given the power and
capacities of state institutions the ability to understand and subsequently influence
structural controls is much greater than that of the individual social actor in any given
society. Alternatively, the effects of such state influence over structural controls can have
adverse effects. In this case state attempts to influence or manipulate external socioeconomic structures in a liberal capitalist society generate a national reaction that must, in
turn, be recognized by the state. As shown in the previous second assumption, the
necessity of national pacification is required to impart a level of legitimate authority to
the state in order for power relationships to be maintained1.
This process of political economic change and nation/state interaction can be
viewed through an historical exemplar. The period of European exploration and capitalist
expansion was largely governed by the political economic structure of mercantile trade
relationships. Briefly, each colonial possession was beholden to trade only with the
parent state and under conditions imposed by the parent state. The 1648 Peace of
Westphalia promoted the emergence and growth of the modern nation-state as an
institutional protector and caretaker of national economic interests. Thus the nation-state
1

This dissertation does not understand this relationship to be egalitarian in any way. The process of state
negotiation with the nation is predicated on hierarchical authority. Only when macro-level socio-economic
structures and state complicity cause broadly negative social outcomes will the possibility of national
resistance threaten the maintenance capacities of the state. My understanding of this nation-state
relationship is based on maintenance of elite position, authority, and control at the expense of the greater
national population.
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achieved a level of supremacy with respect to political economic controls and constructed
policies to support these existing relationships. It should be noted that this period of
autocratic state rule is not indicative of the above assumed relationships between state
and nation. The power of the nation in support of autocratic or despotic rule is,
understandably, limited.
The rise of liberal ideology following the French Revolution in 1789 threatened
the traditional political power structures that, in turn, supported the systemic structure of
mercantilist capitalism. As political power shifted from autocratic to limited forms of
liberal democratic governance, so too did the understanding of the current capitalist
socio-economic structure. The injection of liberal political ideology into systemic
economic understanding shifted the capitalist economic structure away from
mercantilism and toward the promotion of liberal market economic “free trade.” State
institutions and institutional actors as well as non-state actors who stood to profit from
reorientation promoted this shift in political economic ideology (Friedrich Hayek, David
Ricardo, and Adam Smith to name but a few influential proponents). The emergent
relationship of institutional state actors and non-governmental economic actors would
continue through a later period of corporatist change that solidified the dominance of the
liberal capitalist structure over the state.
In sum, the state has, since 1648, been the primary institution of national
economic control. The emergence of liberalism as a viable political economic ideology to
both pacify growing national dissent and (arguably more importantly) increase the
growth potential of capitalist production led to a new relationship between state
institutions and national populations. The emergence of liberal democratic states now
9

required a level of granted legitimacy from national populations. Liberal economic
strategies resulted in increased economic growth but required new forms of promoting
legitimate authority as a result of the extension of liberal (i.e., democratic) ideology to the
national population through national political processes.
As this process of liberal and capitalist integration was completed, the previously
mentioned assumptions became apparent. That is, state control over respective economic
spheres (in the case of mercantile capitalism) was supplanted by the marriage of
liberalism and capitalism (in the case of laissez-faire market capitalism). States were
required to play a larger role in the social welfare protection of the nation, even as
corporatist relationships ensured the acceleration of liberal capitalism at the expense of
the nation. In fact, it was the rapid acceleration of liberal capitalism and its excessively
negative impacts on respective national populations that led to various ideological
reactions, for example Marxism and its political manifestation, communism. While
Marxism and communism provide simply one example of articulated resistance to the
expansion of unrestrained liberal capitalism it is illustrative of resistive national
responses to lack of state social protections. It could be argued that the imposition of
Keynesian economic reforms following the Second World War represented the Western
capitalist alternative to these national demands for increased social protections. This
increase in state involvement in economic policy indisputably demonstrates yet another
shift in state reaction to liberal capitalism.
Respective states attempted to restrain the structure of liberal capitalism to
counter the threat of communist and socialist alternatives to liberal capitalist structures
through the enactment of social welfare provisions and increased domestic industrial
10

production. The expanded social protections inherent in Keynes’ economic strategies
accomplished their intended goal, but at the expense of the unrestrained growth of liberal
capitalism. The decline of the Soviet Union and the increasingly obvious failure of the
Soviet communist socio-economic model in the late 1970s worked in concert with the
successful exportation of capitalist ideology to the developing world accompanied by
massive foreign direct investment. Increased ability to promote industrial capitalist
development in the developing world was coupled with a resurgence of liberal
democratic ideology that served specific political purposes for respective state leaders,
but also provided ideological justification for the ubiquitous application of liberalism
across political and economic spheres.
These conditions resulted in respective states dismantling the social protections of
the Keynesian period and rapidly expanding liberal market economics on an increasingly
global scale. This historical process formed the current era of globalization and provides
the structural backdrop for this dissertation project.
The purpose of this excursus is to provide an illustration of the relationship
between state and nation. Clearly, this relationship shows a level of power inherent in
state controls and capacities as well as national power largely through the process of
granting legitimate authority to the state. This relationship indicates an ebb and flow with
respect to state capacities and controls as well as an adaptive ability on the part of the
state to both facilitate economic growth as well as pacify national economic concerns.
This state role, as facilitator of market integration and promoter of pacific domestic
conditions, is the conceptual definition of the state used in this study.

11

1a. A Polanyian Perspective
The role of the state, based on the above assumptions and exemplar, serves as the
mechanism through which liberal capitalism is facilitated and national social protections
assured. This framework is established in Karl Polanyi’s masterwork, The Great
Transformation (2001 [1957]). Specifically, his conceptualization of a double movement
explains the contradictory responsibilities of the contemporary nation-state: to facilitate
liberal capitalism and to provide a level of social protection for its national population.
For Polanyi, the mechanism of human agency is important in understanding the nature of
the double movement through the process of national demands for protection from the
adverse effects of liberal capitalism. The complicity of the state in facilitating liberal
capitalism can be viewed through the political (i.e., policy) actions of institutional agents
and non-governmental proponents2. In fact, the structure of laissez-faire liberal capitalism
is an obvious human construction that requires constant maintenance and political
manipulation to ensure its continued “success” (Polanyi 2001, 145). Thus the structure of
liberal capitalism, while possessing clear levels of transformative ability, is reliant on a
level of state support for its mechanical maintenance.
Conversely, the national protectionism necessary for the state to maintain its
legitimated authority within a liberal democratic political system is relatively organic.
While laissez-faire economy was the product of deliberate State action,
subsequent restrictions on laissez-faire started in a spontaneous way.
Laissez-faire was planned; planning was not (Polanyi 2001, 147).

2

In Polanyi’s view the emergence of economists such as Hayek and Smith as well as liberal theorists such
as Spencer and Sumner provided intellectual and scientific legitimacy for the expansion of liberal
capitalism after the 1930s. This expansion is viewed through the mechanism of policy actions on the part of
Pitt and Peel in England during the mid-Nineteenth Century (Polanyi 2001, 143-144).
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Thus, a Polanyian understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the modern nationstate would be that it is primarily concerned with facilitating the growth and expansion of
the liberal market economic system. These efforts cannot be undertaken and
accomplished without restraint as demands of the national population require that the
state engage in some form of protective or pacific behavior to regain the legitimate
authority granted by the national population. This is a modern historical condition that is
completely reliant on the ideological and practical requirements demanded by the
synthesis of liberalism and capitalism.
2. Conceptualization and Preliminary Definitions
The purpose of this introduction is to provide a conceptual foundation based on
consistent definitions. My stated assumptions and Polanyian orientation work to
conceptualize the modern nation-state as a location of interaction and conflict between
those profiting from liberal capitalist social structure and those adversely affected by
these same structural conditions and demands. This is not to establish a false dichotomy,
but to orient the reader to my understanding of the agency inherent in the process of
structural alteration. Two issues arise from this series of assumptions and orienting
statements: (1) the concept of the nation-state includes a necessary division between
national populations and state institutions of elite control and (2) that social structure
must be understood as a mutable concept that both motivates human agency as well as
being subject to the desires and alterations of resourceful agents.
2a. Nationalism
The division between the nation and the state is a relatively new conceptualization
of a much longer tradition of subsuming the nation under the auspice of the state
13

exemplified in the work of Hobsbawm (1990), Kedourie (1960), Smith (1971), and many
others. The conceptual division between nation and state is largely derived from two
sources: studies of civil society and the premise of Anderson’s (1983) “imagined
communities.”
The development of civil society is commensurate with the emergence of liberal
democracy. As political rights expand, so to do political responsibilities. Sociological
examinations of civil society engaged in several intellectual projects including Gramsci’s
(1999) attempt at understanding the hegemonic processes that subjugated civil society to
the whims and desires of the capitalist class, Ferguson’s (1966 [1767]) efforts to
understand civil society as complementary institutions that provided protectionist
services in support of liberal capitalism, and the current understanding of a more
autonomous civil society that is able to challenge existing state authority (Alvarez et al.
1998; Kaldor 2003; Waisman 1999).
The nationalist interpretation of the civil society distinction has largely relied on
the work of Anderson (1983), Gellner (1983), and Renan (1882). These theories rely on
subjectivist understandings of the nation as being a largely reactive and nativist response
to external challenges or the internal manipulations of charismatic actors. These
“imagined communities” are reliant on common meanings and symbolic interpretation
often disseminated through communications technologies and thus able to be controlled
and manipulated by resourceful agents. This susceptibility to manipulation is evident in
the work of Hobsbawm (1990, 1992) and Gellner (1983) and has contributed to a
negative view of nationalism as a “top-down” effort on the part of interested elites to
ensure systemic maintenance or engage in a process of power consolidation.
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This negative view of nationalism and national projects in general has prompted a
critical response from those who view the purely ideological orientation of Anderson and
Gellner as being analytically impotent. Castells (2004), for one questions the utility of a
theoretical orientation that relies solely on ideology and a subjectivist view of culture:
But if the meaning of the statement is, as it is explicit in Gellner’s theory,
that nations are pure ideological artifacts, constructed through arbitrary
manipulation of historical myths by intellectuals for the interests of the
social and economic elites, then the historical record seems to belie such
an excessive deconstructionism (Castells 2004, 32).
Indeed, it is the twin dangers of assumed manipulation and pure subjective existence that
scholars such as Castells, Keating (1995), and Renault (1991) argue against. Through
traditional perspectives on nationalism, we find very little evidence of active agency on
the part of the nation to resist these manipulative efforts on the part of elites. Any cursory
glance at the history of social movements and subaltern resistance would lead most to
question the assumption that nationalism is neither tangible nor devoid of independent
agency. Indeed, many movements of colonial liberation and revolts against autocratic
rule have utilized a nationalist context and rhetoric to mobilize effective resources and
support. Aside from embracing a critique of traditional theories of nationalism, this
project is concerned with establishing justification for the analytical division between the
nation and the state. Recent work on the nation as a viable social actor with the power to
influence and motivate state action has been a central feature of the research performed
by the previously mentioned Castells, Keating, and Renault along with others such as
Brubaker (1992) and Pincus (1999).
This analytical distinction between the nation and state, as well as the
understanding that the nation is not simply an amorphous mass responding to the
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commands of elite masters, provides important conceptual support for the remainder of
the project. A Polanyian perspective of the nation-state implies this type of reciprocal
relationship between nation and state. The use of the “double movement” as a
methodological tool or framework enables state analyses to transcend the divisions
among theorists of nationalism. Therefore, this project recognizes the contributions of the
debate on nationalism, but circumvents the issue methodologically by incorporating an
established Polanyian concept, the “double movement.” Using this concept to inform a
primary conceptual framework also enables the analysis to extend beyond the traditional
view of the nation-state as an autonomous or insular entity. This is particularly important
as economic globalization processes become dominant in their ability to dictate national
economic production and capacities for economic controls. This point will be discussed
at length in the following chapter.
2a1. A Note on the Comparability of Québec and Canada
A brief note on the use of Québec as a comparative example of a nation-state is
required. A cursory glance would show a methodological level of analysis problem that
works to undermine any theoretical conclusions before the analysis has even taken place.
This need not be a problem either on an empirical level or in terms of generating a
theoretical understanding of nation-state construction and transformation. I argue that the
unique history of Québec, including the cultural process of nation-building that has
occurred concurrently with the Canadian nationalist project, as well as the development
of autonomous governmental controls and authority make it relatively simple to show
that Québec operates as a limited but functional nation-state both domestically and
internationally. Castells makes a similar conceptual leap with his term “national quasi16

state” to describe the experience of Québec as exemplary of “the development of nations
that stop at the threshold of statehood, but force their parent state to adapt, and cede
sovereignty…” (Castells 2004, 55). While this articulation of Québec as a limited nationstate is helpful, his understanding that the province “stop[ped] at the threshold of
statehood” is limiting but not surprising. Castells’ project is clearly focused on an
understanding of the nation as a concept of increasing importance. His project is centered
on the proposition that nations have increased in importance while states have
simultaneously declined in their capacity as institutions of power. This proposition is
supported by the established understanding that the nation is implicitly distinct from the
state and thus enables the dual motions of national ascendancy and state decline in this
contemporary era.
This perspective ignores the historic increase in autonomous state authority
granted to Québec by the Canadian government in the fields of education, diplomacy,
immigration, and trade. Granted, this autonomy is limited and any statement that
understands Québec as a fully autonomous nation-state would be erroneous. Analytically,
however, the increase in Québec state autonomy is undeniable and has created a situation
in which the authority of Québec supersedes that of the Canadian federal government in
many situations. Of course, the converse is true as Québec must defer to Canadian
authority in many more instances. I would argue that the autonomy of the Québec state,
particularly with respect to immigration and culture, in conjunction with a strong
nationalist project creates a situation in which the nation-state designation can be
analytically applied to both Canada and Québec. As I will show in subsequent historical
background chapters, both Canada and Québec have struggled to construct viable nation17

states since the mid-1700s and a superficial assumption that Québec cannot be defined as
a form of nation-state due to its subsumed provincial position within Canada is incorrect
and belies a limited view of both nation and state.
I would argue that the realities of global interdependence weaken full and
complete autonomy on the part of a respective state and can no longer be used as a
definition of a nation-state. Between nation-states, power and influence play significant
roles in establishing state hierarchies, but more to the point the global market economic
system has assumed a larger role in dictating economic and social policies in all nationstates. The ability of a nation-state to adapt and survive in this accelerating era of
globalization becomes a more useful definitional tool. I will show that Québec has
performed on par with Canada in its response to the challenge of globalization and thus
must be considered, at some level, a nation-state.
In addition to previous arguments for the comparability of Canada and Québec as
nation-states, this analysis raises the possibility that conventional definitions of the
“state” and “nation-state” may be inadequate. Recent discussion of the demise of the
nation will be elaborated in the following chapter; however, shifting state capacities raise
the possibility that defining the state has become a much more ambiguous process. My
general definition of a state-as a social institution that is able to function with some level
of political autonomy in decision-making and policy-construction through the process of
national legitimation-must include exemplars such as Québec that previously would not
be formally defined as nation-states. The question of level of political autonomy must
also be considered a weak criterion in defining what is and is not a state. The simple fact
that globalization institutions and processes have usurped many of the political economic
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capacities that were traditionally the responsibility of respective states requires a more
broad understanding of “autonomy” with respect to the policy-making process.
For example, Canada is subject to the judgments of the NAFTA Binational
Adjudication Panel as well as the WTO Dispute Settlement Body with respect to national
economic protections such as tariffs and subsidies. Does this reduction of political
autonomy make Canada less of a state? Does the fact that Québec has been able to
establish state-owned utilities (Hydro-Québec, for example) and enact autonomous
immigration and cultural policies, often against the wishes of Ottawa, make Québec more
of a state? Clearly, my definition of the state is inclusive of both realities due to its focus
on autonomous policy-making and not on a higher-level of overall political autonomy.
3. Culture, Structure, and the Methodological Utility of Social Policy
This project argues that culture must play a much more central role in analytical
studies of the interaction between the state, globalization processes, and national
populations. As such we must engage in a brief discussion of how culture has been
understood, particularly with respect to its epistemological foundations. Debates over
these epistemological assumptions have engendered a useful literature that attempts to
integrate conflicting epistemological views of culture and make the concept more
sociologically useful.
Recently, scholars have shown considerable interest in examining the concepts of
social structure and human agency. While most of these analyses have been in the form
of isolated examinations of one or the other exemplary work has been done on the
interactive relationship between structure and agency. The work of Bourdieu, Giddens,
and Habermas has generated relatively complementary approaches to the theoretical
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integration of structure and agency. Common to these (and other) integrative approaches
is an analysis of culture as a significant force shaping human interaction.
The fact that culture surfaces so commonly in integrative theories of structure and
agency should surprise few. A common (but by no means conclusive) definition of
culture as “systems of meaning and the practices in which they are embedded”
(Steinmetz 1999, 7) shows the ability of the concept to incorporate systemic or structural
elements that possess ability to pattern human action. Conversely, the subjective
elements inherent in the word “meaning” attribute some level of individual control over
the definition and understanding of such “meanings.” Clarity has never been a term used
to describe any conceptual understanding of culture. What is clear though is that
investigations of culture show a level of disagreement over the ontological location of
culture. Does our definition of culture empower the individual human agent or attribute
causal authority to structures that undergird systems of meaning? This is particularly
important in understanding the potential role of culture with respect to national social
policy. That is, in order to view culture as having the potential to be used to influence or
facilitate larger structural conditions, we must be able to move beyond traditional (strict)
subjectivist approaches to the concept.
The purpose of this section is to articulate an understanding of culture that will be
useful in establishing a defensible position in the debate concerning the interaction of
social structure and human agency. The goal of clarifying these concepts is to establish a
clear methodological framework that is able to incorporate the dynamic nature of culture
as both enabling and constraining human action. In other words, can culture motivate
human action as well as be influenced or manipulated by human agents?
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3a. Culture: A Structure/Agency Approach
The concept of culture succeeds in deflecting any effort toward developing a
consensus definition. The oft-cited Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) classic, Culture: A
Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions, identifies more than 150 distinct definitions
and uses of the concept. Given their efforts were published in the early 1950s, one can
safely assume that the remainder of the Twentieth Century added more than a few
definitions and applications to the list. This project is not interested in contributing to
culture’s problem of over-definition (however, defining an operational variable is
unavoidable), nor is the purpose to clarify one of the myriad conceptualizations of
culture. This project is concerned with the implications of how culture has been used in
the process of nation-building and in the process of nation-state reaction to encroaching
globalization forces. Thus, the empirical and theoretical “how” of culture is much more
important to this work than any definitional or conceptual “what.”
In order to answer the question of how culture relates to the contemporary nationbuilding process I must first state a definition then operationalize that definition within
some sort of methodological framework. The former is the task of this section, and the
latter will be accomplished in the following section.
This project views culture as the active and passive manifestation of collective
understandings of norms and beliefs. In other terms, culture can be viewed through
normative behavior and actions. In addition, the concept of culture must itself incorporate
an element of action as cumulative norms pattern present and future human action
through their very being. Thus, an operational definition of culture can be stated as a
collective systemic understanding of normative behavior that relies on human agents for
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dissemination and maintenance. This definition is heavily reliant on the understanding
that ideology and culture are inexorably connected. In a practical sense, the promotion of
a dominant ideology, in this case Canadian and Québécois nationalism, is linked with
cultural symbols and structures of meaning. In the words of Sutton, “ideology is the
pattered reaction to the patterned strains of a social role (1956, 307-308).” In this sense
we can understand the process of nation-building as partly a process of ideological
conditioning (patterned reaction) through the construction and manipulation of national
cultural symbols and definitions. Nationalism is a monolithic project, which is reflected
in the promotion of a singular culture through ideological means. In other words, the
ideology of nationalism drives the manifestation of national cultural symbols and
definitions.
Culture itself cannot be understood as a social actor – for instance, in the same
way that an economic market can retain no level of human agency – however, the human
manipulation or maintenance of culture attributes the appearance of action on the part of
culture.
This definition does sublimate culture to a position of subservience to human
agents, however the definition also attributes a level of causal efficacy to culture – it also
patterns human action – and thus, must be understood as a dynamic and dialectical
concept. Clearly, this definition of culture incorporates conventional understandings of
normative, ideological human agency. It also understands culture as being inherently
structural in its ability to guide human action. Traditional sociological and philosophical
approaches to the study of culture have largely recognized both conceptual positions, but
have also shown a tendency to pick one position over the other. These tendencies are
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reflected in the historical rise and fall of subjectivist and positivist approaches in the
social sciences. This cyclical pattern of intellectual inquiry is eloquently described in
Thomas McCarthy’s exhaustive introduction to the English edition of The Theory of
Communicative Action (Habermas 1984, ix-xiv).
Briefly, the initial Cartesian empowerment of the individual served the
Enlightenment ideal of empowering individual human agency and ability over the
empirically constraining forces of political and cultural structures of oppression (i.e.,
Church, monarchical political systems, etc…). The dominance of the subjectivist
approach to understanding human nature was challenged by more structuralist and
positivist approaches to socials scientific inquiry. From Marx’s historical materialism to
Compte and Durkheim’s positivism provided structured critiques of the impact of both
the Enlightenment and subjectivist idealism on traditional social conditions. In dialectical
fashion, the dominance of structural approaches to social theory took an antithetical turn
with the emergence of phenomenological and existential approaches in the Twentieth
Century. McCarthy argues that social scientific inquiry has reacted yet again to this
subjectivist turn with increased emphasis on structural variables and a structuralist bias in
social theoretical development.
The purpose of this discussion is two-fold. First, a look at the intellectual history
of subjectivist and structural dominance in social theory shows a larger problem of
dichotomous reasoning that ultimately endangers the theoretical utility of any perspective
that fails to incorporate both in understanding the interactive dynamics of the social
world. In addition, the theoretical promotion of either subjectivist or structuralist
perspectives may be more indicative of the historically temporal world from which the
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theory emerged which in turn complicates theoretical utility. This is commonly illustrated
in the historical development of sociology as an academic discipline. The subjective
ideals of the Enlightenment found their most dramatic personification in the French
Revolution. The conservative reaction to such wholesale social change resulted in an
epistemological shift in social scientific inquiry.
Second, the attempt to link individual agency with social structure requires a
common denominator. In this study that denominator is, of course, culture. Culture is a
conceptual common thread throughout the historical cycle of subjectivist and structuralist
theories. All general social theorists are required to address the role of traditions,
common language, religion, symbols (both material and ideological), and systems of
belief in order to provide a full understanding of how society functions. The concepts of
alienation and anomie are, in fact, attempts to address the problem of culture in the
emergence of a modern liberal capitalist society. More specifically, as material
conditions and structural shifts impact the occupational and material lives of individual
actors, those actors will seek alternative means of social comprehension, largely through
the development of common meaning and group identification. In other words, as
individuals become more alienated their desire for social interdependence increases. This
search for meaning and cohesive membership is a largely cultural process.
My conceptual use of culture in this project is as a vehicle to understand how the
nation-state has changed in response to the emergence of a global market political
economic system. This conceptualization is clearly centered on incorporating a
structurally-sensitive understanding of culture. My position is informed by the work of
Robert Wuthnow (1987; Wuthnow et al. 1984). I am particularly indebted to Wuthnow’s
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methodological approach examining observable practice as distinct from a purely
subjectivist conceptualization of culture:
Rather than it consisting of attitudes, beliefs, and values, it is characterized
by boundaries, categories, and elements. In the structural approach, culture
is portrayed as an object amenable to observation. It consists of discourse
that can be heard or read or other kinds of gestures, objects, acts, and
events that can be seen, recorded, classified, and so forth. It does not
consist of or ultimately reflect subjective states of the individual
(Wuthnow 1987, 12).
Wuthnow’s major contribution is the justification for analyzing culture through patterned
action, or structure. This position assumes that culture is able to structure human action
as well as be shaped and altered by a variety of social actors, both subjectivist and
structural qualities that will be integrated into this project. The theoretical implication of
this position will be examined later in this project. What is required now is the provision
of a methodological mechanism that will allow this dynamic definition to be applied to
empirical cases.
3b. Methodological Precedent and Framework
As I have consistently stated, this project is built on the work of others. My
reliance on a Polanyian understanding of state and national interaction, my embrace of
the subjectivist-structuralist philosophical debate, and the problems inherent in
incorporating a dynamic view of culture all rely on existing concepts, interactive
understandings, and theoretical frameworks. Methodologically, this project is no
different.
This project utilizes social policy as a methodological mechanism to observe and
illustrate the historical change that has occurred with respect to (1) the state’s capacity to
control economic, political, and cultural processes and (2) to illustrate the double
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movement between the state’s promotion of the global market economic system and the
nation’s demand for social protections from that same economic system. The work of
Giddens (1984), Habermas (1998; 1984), and Bourdieu (1977) will be most helpful in
achieving these ends, however my use of each of the theorists will be purely
methodological, as the point of this project is not to resolve the structure/agency debate,
but to gain a more clear understanding of the contemporary nation-state. I will briefly
illustrate the utility of each before stating my methodological position.
3b1. Structuration, Habitus/Field, and Communicative Action
While the theoretical positions of Giddens, Bourdieu, and Habermas are unique in
their details, they all utilize a common methodological position. In all three theories,
social practice is used as a tool to observe and measure the level of social action and
influence on the part of social structures and human agents. This position is entirely
consistent with Wuthnow’s (1987) requirement that culture must be observed in order to
be analytically viable. I argue that social policy will tell us how the state mediates
between global political economic forces and national social protections. The medium of
social practice is the methodological tool that makes this type of analysis possible.
Specifically, I will examine multicultural policy in Canada and intercultural policy in
Québec as indications of state practice. That is, the development and evolution of social
policy, specifically multicultural and intercultural policies, is indicative of actions taken
by the state as an institutional actor. We can observe and analyze the actions and abilities
of the Canadian and Québec states through their promotion, adaptation, and reduction of
these social policies. More to the point, I argue that examination of these policies will tell
us a great deal about how the Canadian and Québec states have adapted to the emerging
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global market economic system. The previously stated emphasis on the work of Giddens,
Bourdieu, and Habermas is detailed here in support of my connection between social
policy and social practice.
Giddens’ theory of structuration understands practice as being the observable
reality of human societies. Analytical approaches that locate causal authority to either
structures or agents are missing the reality of interactive processes.
The basic domain of the study of the social sciences, according to
the theory of structuration, is neither the experience of the
individual actor, nor the existence of any form of social totality,
but social practices ordered across time and space (Giddens 1984,
2).
Giddens attributes a high level of power to agency and human agents in his work (too
much power some, such as Craib (1993), have argued), but the basic intent of his position
is to emphasize the duality of social structure as having the power to both constrain and
enable human action. That Giddens seems to often favor agency in his analyses is a
critique better suited to a theoretical discussion of structuration. Of specific importance
here is the dual nature of structure and agency in Giddens’ methodology. The
methodological utility of structure is viewed as offering opportunity as well as oppression
while human agency is able to manipulate structural controls as well as be controlled by
those same structures. This methodological position offers a dynamic framework on
which to build a larger study of interaction between the nation, state, and globalization.
The emphasis on practice as an analytical mechanism allowing for the observation
of social interaction is echoed in Bourdieu’s work. If possible, Bourdieu seems even
more adamant about dismissing the division between structure and agency than Giddens.
His extensive reviews of structuralist and subjectivist excesses ensure that the only
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logical outcome of his work is a methodological position focused on a dynamic
relationship between structures and agents. This position shapes his approach to practice
as being central to an empirically-informed understanding of human society (Bourdieu
1977; 1990).
Bourdieu believes that practice is the empirical result of the interaction between
social structures and human agency and thus becomes the logical methodological lens to
observe this interactive process. This position is quite similar to Giddens’ and aids in the
contribution of a useful methodological framework for the current study. Major
differences between Bourdieu and Giddens become apparent if one moves beyond the
limited methodological similarity of practice as an analytical tool. While Giddens
emphasized the importance of human action, Bourdieu’s twin concepts of habitus and
field show a structuralist tendency. Superficially, habitus can be understood as the
conceptualization of human agency, while field represents more traditionally understood
social structures. A deeper look, however, highlights structural tendencies in Bourdieu’s
concept of habitus. Bourdieu implies a latent subordination of agency due to habitus
being “the product of the internalization of the structures [represented by his concept of
fields]” (Bourdieu 1989, 18). This is simply an observation of Bourdieu’s differing
theoretical conclusions and biases when compared to those of Giddens. His
understanding of habitus and field is informed by a study of social practice, which again
shows its methodological utility in transcending the problems of structure and agency and
particularly as a methodological tool useful in the investigation of the dynamic
relationship between actors and structures of control.
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Habermas views the problem of structure and agency as a similar analytical
problem, but does more than either Giddens or Bourdieu in putting his theory to an
empirical test. The theory of communicative action is best summed up by Habermas:
If we assume that the human species maintains itself through the socially
coordinated activities of its members and that this coordination is
established through communication-and in certain central spheres through
communication aimed at reaching agreement-then the reproduction of the
species also requires satisfying the conditions of rationality that is inherent
in communicative action (Habermas 1984, 397).
We see, again, twin concepts being used to conceptualize human agency and social
structure: the lifeworld and the social system. Both work to shape the social world and
both maintain a level of autonomy and causal efficacy. As was the case with Bourdieu
however, Habermas attributes a level of supremacy to social structure with his extended
discussion of the process of social system colonization of the lifeworld in which human
agency is becoming increasingly controlled by the formal rationality of the social system
(Habermas 1987).
The methodological approach that Habermas uses to understand the lifeworld and
social system is discourse, or communication. Discursive interaction between actors and
groups patterned by the social system becomes the lens through which these processes of
colonization and integration can be observed. As a methodological framework, this is
nearly identical to the approach used by Giddens and Bourdieu – albeit in the
construction of divergent theoretical conclusions. Habermas attempts an application of
his communicative action theory in Between Facts and Norms: Contribution to a
Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (1998).
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In this work, Habermas seeks to bridge the structural system (facts) and the
subjective lifeworld (norms) by analyzing the discursive process of negotiating, creating,
and altering law and the political process of democracy. He agrees with the common
contention that the structure/agency divide is useless, but also implies that this is not only
a theoretical evolution but also historical:
…modern societies have become so complex that these two conceptual
motifs-that of a society concentrated in the state and that of a society made
up of individuals-can no longer be applied unproblematically (Habermas
1998, 1-2).
The premise of the text is, in part, an examination of the dual nature of law in modern
societies. One could argue that Habermas makes the case that law serves dual purposes
by enforcing central authority (of the state, for instance) through retributive punishment
and also gleaning legitimate authority from those over whom it maintains control. For
Habermas, this process of “Law as Social Mediation between Facts and Norms” occurs
through communication and, if participating groups have sufficient power, negotiation.
The issue at hand is Habermas’ utilization of law as a methodological tool to examine the
process of political adaptation and change (as implied in the previous quote on the
increasing complexity of modern societies).
Habermas views law as the logical outcome of the process of discursive
interaction between the state and the nation. In this way, his methodological approach is
consistent with the methodological responsibility Giddens and Bourdieu place on social
practice, albeit in a more explicit and applied manner. These approaches assist in the
construction of a methodological framework that will be incorporated into this
examination of the contemporary nation-state.
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3b2. Methodological Framework
This project seeks to understand the capacities and role of the contemporary
nation-state and how those capacities and roles have changed as a result of accelerating
globalization processes. I will argue that the modern nation-state has, in fact, reduced
abilities to affect economic policy or substantive political change. Its reconceptualized
role is to maintain stable social conditions to ensure productive and consumptive growth
in accordance with market economic requirements. The modern nation-state must rely on
its ability to manufacture, control, and maintain structures of culture in order to ensure
such stability. Culture has become the focal arena of state control efforts due to the
reduction in authoritative capacity with respect to economic and large-scale political
policies.
I propose to examine the validity of these claims through a comparative-historical
analysis of changes in state capacities, ultimately resulting social policy outcomes, from
1944 through the present. I will compare the nation-states of Canada and Québec relying
on the previously stated justification on comparability. My specific focus on social
policy, in this case federal multicultural and provincial intercultural policy emergence,
development, and change, serves as the methodological tool allowing the project to
illustrate the dynamic relationship between national actors, state institutions, and global
political economic structures. In other words, this project utilizes policy as a mechanism
that illuminates the active interaction and mediating processes of the state in accordance
with the Polanyian concept of the double movement between market economic predation
and national social protection.
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This project will be able to show not only the current capacities and abilities of
the state to maintain effective legitimate authority, but more importantly how these
capacities have changed through the examination of general political economic change
over time and the use of social policy evolution as a tool to view state action in response
to those general political economic changes. Changes in state policies over time are
juxtaposed with the emergence and rise of globalization processes to show the process of
change and the transitioning of power from the nation-state to global institutions and
processes. An historical approach allows for the application of the study of social practice
as exemplified in the work of Giddens, Bourdieu, and Habermas. By combining
historical-comparative and social practice methodological approaches the mechanism of
social policy is able to be used to illustrate and understand the dialectical relationship
between globalization processes and national populations – with the express intent of
understanding the mediating role of the state and developing a more precise theoretical
understanding of how the nation-state has been affected by expanding and empowered
globalization institutions and processes.
3b3. Data Collection and Sources
This project is a large-scale comparative policy analysis that requires significant
contextual understanding with respect to economic and demographic development. In
addition to multicultural and intercultural policy development analyses, the project
required an understanding of historical national development/experience in relation to
increasing global market integration of both Canada and Québec.
Data for this project are from two primary sources: policy development
documents and statistical economic and demographic data. Policy development materials
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are largely research studies, inter-departmental correspondence, and evaluation
information concerning economic development strategies, international trade, domestic
economic protection, demographic change, and social policy responses to both economic
and demographic change. Much of this historical policy development information was
obtained at the National Archives of Canada in Ottawa as well as the Archives nationales
du Québec in Montréal.
More contemporary information was obtained at federal government institutions
such as the Canada Economic Development for Québec Regions, Heritage Canada,
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, International Trade Canada, and Foreign Affairs
Canada. Provincial government sources of information included the Ministère de la
Culture et des communications; Développment économique, Innovation et Exportation;
Ministère de l’Immigration et des Communautés culturelles; Investissement Québec;
Hydro-Québec; and the Ministère des Relations internationales.
Statistical data on economic and demographic conditions and change was
obtained from Statistics Canada and Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Additional
secondary data and analyses were obtained from researchers at McGill University,
Université de Montréal, Université de Québec à Montréal, the University of Ottawa, and
Carleton University.
4. Dissertation Structure
The present chapter is designed to offer a brief introduction to the intent of the
study and to offer operational definitions of concepts and positions taken by the author.
The extended discussion of methodology is also intended to provide a conceptual
foundation upon which a cumulative theoretical position can be built.
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Chapter Two offers that cumulative theoretical position as well as providing a
review of relevant theories of the state and globalization processes. This theoretical
review is designed to both support the presented hypothetical theory of the author and
also to point out weaknesses in existing perspectives on the state and globalization. This
chapter also focuses on the debate concerning multiculturalism and its conflict with the
liberal democratic ideology that supports both nation-states and globalization processes.
Chapters Three and Four offer brief historical background information on both
Canada and Québec, respectively. Both histories are designed to highlight the nationbuilding process in each example and thus are written from a more subjectively-informed
nationalist perspective. The narrative of both Canadian and Québec national development
and state formation depict a process of continual adaptation and struggle to construct and
maintain cohesive national identities as well as construct state institutions that adequately
reflect national impulses and requirements of each respective nationalist project.
Chapter Five describes the development and emergence of a global market
economic system beginning with the Bretton Woods Agreements in 1944 and continuing
through the post-NAFTA present. The chapter deals exclusively with the impact of
globalization’s acceleration on both Canada and Québec, but also must address larger
macro socio-economic developments that drive nation-state level conditions and change.
Chapter Six adds a level of specificity in discussing the ethnic diversification of
Canada (as an exemplar of the Western World) as a result of accelerating globalization
processes and the solidification of liberal market economics as the dominant political
economic paradigm throughout the latter half of the Twentieth Century. The
diversification of socio-cultural national demography plays a significant role in
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determining the state’s response to the requirements of globalization and works toward
understanding the impact of globalization processes on the nation-state, particular with
respect to culture.
Chapter Seven is the analytical culmination of the dissertation. This chapter
chronicles the development and evolution of multicultural and intercultural policies in
Canada and Québec, respectively. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the
interactive role of policy in the state’s current responsibilities within the global political
economic system as well as illuminating the capacities of the contemporary nation-state
in both promoting the globalization project and maintaining the stability and complicity
of national populations.
Chapter Eight provides a conclusion intended to complete the theoretical project
of developing a more empirically-informed theory of how modern democratic nationstates have changed as a result of globalization processes as well as clarifying the current
capacities of the nation-state with respect to ensuring legitimate authority over respective
national populations. This chapter also addresses future possibilities with respect to the
relationship of the state to globalization and the future roles of the nation-state in an
increasingly global world.
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Chapter Two
Toward an Embedded Analysis of the Nation and State in Globalization Studies

The current historical epoch is conventionally understood as a shrinking world in
which communications, production, conflict, and even culture are being brought closer
and closer to a singular norm. Phrases such as “globalism,” “global community,” and of
course “globalization” imply some sense of a singular and interdependent world. These
notions are continually challenged by instances of ethno-national conflict, inter-national
conflict, and the persisting reality that the nation-state remains a singular institution
capable of autonomous action that does not always conform to dominant global political
economic demands. The ascendance of socialist and ethno-nationalist political parties in
Latin America and the election of Hamas in Palestine are just two of many contemporary
examples demonstrating the continued importance of the nation-state as a local institution
of power.
The purpose of this chapter is to understand the effect of economic globalization
on the Western, advanced capitalist nation-state. This chapter examines various
perspectives attempting to understand the nation-state and how this institution has
adapted to the apparent rise of global economic processes and forces of political
economic dominance. Before the process of answering the overall question can begin, the
project must first establish a basic theoretical understanding of (1) the nation-state and (2)
the nature of economic globalization and its complementary projects of ideological and
cultural integration.
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In order to answer these questions two main issues must be resolved. First, it is
assumed that a change in the capacities of the nation-state has already occurred due, in
some part, to the many processes defined as “globalization.” Any relevant discussion of
the contemporary nation-state or globalization must first address these shifts in power. If
we claim to be looking at a new form of nation-state as an evolved form of state
institutions, a component of an emerging global system of social authority, or even some
combination of other less apparent changes we must first demonstrate that the nationstate has, in fact undergone substantial change.
Second, an understanding of how the nation-state has changed due to increasing
globalization forces is required. Any observation on socio-political, socio-economic, or
socio-cultural change that simply demonstrates the occurrence of change without
analyzing the (multiple) causal motivations and outcomes of said change is doomed to
remain superficial in its analytical utility. This chapter will address the question of what,
in terms of nation-state capacities and roles, has changed as a result of globalization
processes. The chapter will also provide further justification for the positions taken and
concepts formulated in this dissertation project. The question of how the state is impacted
and altered by globalization processes and how the state, in turn, adapts to these changing
conditions is the analytical project of Part Three.
Specifically, this chapter will (1) propose a theoretical position with respect to the
role of culture in the contemporary nation-state; (2) justify this theoretical position
through the use of existing studies of (a) state theory and (b) globalization theories; (3)
provide an exemplar that illustrates the conflictual nature of the “double movement,”
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specifically focusing on the problems of implementing multiculturalism in a liberal
society.
1. Theoretical Foundation
As stated in the previous chapter, this project uses policy development and
evolution as a mechanism for observing and analyzing state adaptive processes. This
project is designed to examine the questions of: (1) how economic globalization impacts
the political economic capacities of the Western, advanced capitalist (core) nation-state,
(2) how global market integration impacts and affects national populations of core nationstates, and (3) how states respond to the dual requirements of global market integration
and maintaining national social cohesion and stability.
The argument put forth in this project is that the process of global market
integration is desirable for core states, yet requires a level of labor migration that is
increasingly diverse in its ethno-cultural composition. This requirement of an ethnoculturally diverse labor pool contributes to rapid ethno-cultural diversification of core
national populations. The challenge of diverse cultural norms and traditions to preexisting cultural and social institutions of control (nationalist culture, religious
hegemony, etc…) creates strain and the potential for social destabilization. States must
respond to dual pressures of systemic global economic integration and national
population demands for stability.
Specifically, this project compares the global market integration experiences of
Canada and Québec. Both states desire global market integration, both states have
experienced commensurate ethno-cultural diversification as a result of this integrative
process, and both have responded to these changes through social policy solutions
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advocating multicultural and intercultural (Canada and Québec, respectively) solutions to
these challenges motivated by economic globalization.
1a. Culture as a Mechanism of State Control
The original purpose for nation-state organization in a traditional Westphalian
context was for national economic protection and inter-national trade support. As many
scholars have stated, and as we will see shortly, globalization processes have reduced the
ability of the nation-state to fulfill its traditional purpose. The nation-state, however,
continues to maintain a significant role as an institutional of legal, political, and cultural
authority. I argue that the decline of state capacity to control or protect nation economic
interests has resulted in a commensurate shift in political attention to the control and
management of national cultural symbols, ideology, and structures. Specifically, the state
must now rely on the management of cultural structures in order to pacify national
populations. The work of Ulf Hannerz contributes to this perspective:
The second framework of cultural process is that of the state, not as a
bounded physical area but as organizational form. The state is engaged in
the management of meaning in various ways. To gain legitimate authority
state apparatuses nowadays tend to reach out with different degrees of
credibility and success toward their subjects to foster the idea that the state
is a nation, and to construct them culturally as citizens. This involves a
degree of homogenization as a goal of cultural engineering. On the other
hand, the state also takes an interest in shaping such differences among
people as are desirable for the purpose of fitting categories of individuals
into different slots in the structure of production and reproduction
(Hannerz 1997, 112-113).
This statement raises several interesting points, the first being an apparent compatibility
with this perspective and Wuthnow’s integration of structure and culture through the
production of meaning (see the previous chapter). “The management of meaning” for
Hannerz is a primary goal for the contemporary state and thus implies a capacity to
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construct and alter structures of control - at least to the extent that these structures are
defined as cultural. For both Hannerz and Wuthnow, “meaning” serves as a method to
investigate these structures; in other words, normative meaning and symbols are the
outcome of the process of structural construction on the part of concerted social actors
(for Hannerz, the organizational state). In understanding “meaning” as a construct of
larger cultural structures, we are able to move beyond limited subjectivist determinations
of culture and understand the potential of culture to be used as an institutional mechanism
of larger control structures.
By examining structures or systems of meaning as causal outcomes, we are able to
view the process of this construction or investigate the (potentially) multi-causal
processes that led to this process in the first place. The examination of practice, in this
case through the construction of social policies designed to construct or alter structures of
culture, illuminates the process of meaning creation, including the motivations and
purposes of such political action. It is here that Hannerz’ comments can be most
effectively tied to the methodological focus on practice.
Hannerz comments that homogenization and diversity are twin requirements of
the construction of social controls and labor market management. In effect, by focusing
on the issue of cultural homogenization or targeted diversification for labor purposes we
are left with a very focused view of the state’s relationship with structures defining
meaning (read: culture), however that is all we are able to discern. By ignoring the
motivations of state manufacturing and maintenance of cultural structures, Hannerz is
unable to fully integrate his analysis with larger political economic and structural
processes. To be fair, his analysis is intended to do exactly this and provides an excellent
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theoretical overview of the processes of cultural change that drives the process of
creolization of peripheral culture that informs better-known theories of “glocalization”
(Escobar 2001; Robertson 1995; Roudometof 2003). I would argue that Hannerz offers a
very interesting and potentially promising beginning, but his interests lead him away
from exploring this contention that states are active in the construction of cultural
structures of control. I believe that investigating the question further is essential in
understanding the contemporary role of the nation-state.
An older conceptualization of state control over culture and meaning can be found
in the work of Louis Althusser. His concept of an ideological state apparatus (ISA)
serves as the structural mechanism that enables the Gramscian concept of hegemony.
Gramsci (1999) developed the concept in order to understand the process of consensual
domination, or why those being exploited by the same system so readily reproduce the
social conditions of capitalist class domination. The two concepts were meant to be
complementary, however a significant methodological difference can be identified.
For Gramsci, the centers of societal reproduction and hegemonic maintenance
were located within the confines of civil society and distinct from that of “‘political
society’ or ‘the State’” (Gramsci 1999, 12). Althusser, while implicitly agreeing with the
concept of hegemony and the process of hegemonic authority, differed with Gramsci on
the mechanical nature of social reproduction necessary for the continuation of a systemic
capitalist project. For Althusser, both Marx and Gramsci underestimated the ability of the
state to control ideology for the purpose of reproducing conditions favorable to capitalist
production (Althusser 2001).
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Althusser’s description of state control over cultural institutions of control is, for
the purposes of this project, overly focused on state structures. There is relatively little
motivation for agent centered change in Althusser’s thinking and therefore an
incompatibility with the central framework of this essay; namely, the national
protectionist impulse inherent in the “double movement.” Critics of structuralism in
general and Althusser in particular have made similar critical claims that his perspective
suffered from both structural determinism and ahistoricity (Schmidt 1981; Thompson
1978).
This project focuses on the dual responsibilities of the contemporary nation-state:
to facilitate globalization (or global market integration) and to ensure domestic stability
by responding to national protectionist demands resulting primarily from this process of
global market integration. Theoretical perspectives that limit themselves to isolated issues
of structural control or subjectivist conceptualization of “meaning” are incapable of
generating the holistic perspective optimal for answering the question of how the
contemporary nation-state has changed as a result of global market integration.
This project is designed to understand the role of culture in a contemporary state
impacted by globalization processes. There exists a scholarly tradition examining the role
of culture as constitutive of state controls over nation populations. This dissertation seeks
to understand the contemporary nature and role of culture in nation states that are
increasingly subordinated to global political economic interests.
The following section focuses on the state as a socially embedded institution
requiring attention to national social concerns/demands and global economic demands.
The review of both state theory and theories of globalization will illustrate the necessity
42

for a more dynamic approach to understanding the nation-state as an institution that is
increasingly subjected to dual pressures of external global economic demands and
internal national population demands. The issue of culture will also be examined with
respect to its complementary position as a facilitator of economic globalization processes.
2. Theories of the State and Globalization
Theories of the Western, advanced capitalist state have largely adhered to two
dominant perspectives: Marxian state theory and Weberian-inspired, state-centered
theories. This dissertation employs a variant of state-centered approaches, social
embeddedness, in conceptualizing the contemporary nation-state. This approach is
superior in its ability to incorporate national population demands into a theoretical
understanding of the state. A more detailed explanation of the theoretically affinity of a
social embedded approach to this project follows, but first a brief discussion on the
development of state theory is required.
2a. Marxist and State-centered Theories of the State
Contemporary Marxian theories of the state emerged during the same period
(1960s and 1970s) that saw the rise of conflict theory as a response to the dominance of
structural-functionalist theorizing. In fact, variants of Marxian state theory largely
emerged as a response to the dominance of pluralism as a theory of political society in
democratic states. The acquiescent position of the repressed and exploited in Western
capitalist society was, in the view of pluralist theories, a function of the “basic idea of
normative consensus” (Vincent 1987, 182). This consent was managed through a
diversity of groups that were accorded the ability to negotiate for power and resource
allocation through the institutions of modern democratic processes. The ideal of political
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pluralism, particularly with respect to the state, is similar to that of ethnic or cultural
variants of pluralist thought as “political pluralism recognizes the existence of diversity in
social, institutional and ideological practices, and values that diversity” (Dunleavy and
O’Leary 1987, 13). In fact, the development of pluralist political theory occurred as a
result of elite theorizing that was seen as leading “to the systematic misreporting of facts
and the formulation of vague, ambiguous, unrealistic, and unprovable assertions about
community power” (Polsby 1960, 475; see also Dahl 1961; 1958; Long 1958; Long and
Belknap 1956). The apparent reactionary position of pluralist theory in the defense of the
status quo was consistent with some functionalist analyses of the time and served as a
theoretical alternative to the “stratification” approach of radical elite theorists such as
Hunter (1953), Mills (1956), and Warner (1943).
The seemingly benign ideals of plural democracy hid, in the eyes of many critics,
a conservative bias that was designed to hide conditions of domination and exploitation
through the promotion of a pluralistic façade. The pluralist proposition that has proven
most contentious is that the potential influence (monopolistic or unified group control, as
emphasized in elite theory) of a single group over the interests of others is negated by the
diversity of intra-group interests thus resulting in minimal net influence. This system of
empirical checks has been called into question by those who examine influence and
oligarchical control (Clawson, Neustadtl, and Weller 1998; Domhoff 1967; Dye 2002).
These debates between elite and pluralist theorists partly motivated the development of a
more explicit Marxist response to these theories of the state.
Marxist state theory is understood as having a single methodological division
between those who view the state as an instrument of a dominant capitalist class
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(instrumentalist) and those who view the state as providing a structural function in
support of the system of capitalism (structuralist). Both view the state as a subordinate of
larger class interests and not capable of manufacturing large-scale social change contrary
to capitalist class interests.
The instrumentalist critique of the state examines the relationship between the
capitalist class and state institutions. In simplest terms, the state is the “instrument” being
played or controlled by an active and resourceful capitalist class (Miliband 1968; Barrow
1993; Domhoff 1987). This condition of complete control is weakened by an historical
record that illustrates dissent and conflict that does not seem to support a thesis of
instrumental control by a single class. The relationship between state institutions
(administration, military, judicial, executive, etc…) does allow for some forms of state
power to be diversified, thus creating limited autonomy within the state due to competing
or conflicting institutional interrelationships. The dominant class must ensure these
relationships, as well as the reproduction of positive conditions for capitalism, through
active mechanisms of control.
This view is countered by structuralists who understand the state as having limited
or “relative autonomy” from the capitalist class that allows for a state that is
institutionally responsible for addressing two major problems with any capitalist system:
1) economic crises and 2) labor insurgency. Thus the state is required to periodically
maintain the primacy of the capitalist class and socioeconomic system, but is not
implicitly tied to the class in any instrumental manner. Systemic maintenance is essential
due to the “contradictory class practices, dislocations, and crisis tendencies” of the
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capitalist mode of production and thus requires a functional requisite in order to maintain
itself (Poulantzas 1978; Abraham 1977; Jessop 1990).
State-centered theories of the state emerged in response to a perceived inability of
Marxist state theories to adequate explain state actions in contradiction to dominant
capitalist class interests. Dissenting scholars found support for an alternative thesis in the
larger work of Max Weber, specifically his conceptual understanding of bureaucratic
institutions and emphasis on interpretive methodology.
Weberian state theorists base their assumptions of the state on the concept of a
rational bureaucracy that acts in a manner, at times, fully autonomous of any class
controls. The perception that the state is autonomous serves to explain state actions that
may be counter to capitalist class interests thus providing a powerful corrective to a major
perceived weakness in Marxian analyses. In fact, it is this criticism of Marxian state
theory concerning the perceived autonomy of the state that forms the crux of Weberian
state-centered approaches:
…virtually all neo-Marxist writers on the state have retained deeply
embedded society-centered assumptions, not allowing themselves to doubt
that, at base, states are inherently shaped by classes or class struggles and
function to preserve and expand modes of production. Many possible
forms of autonomous state action are thus ruled out by definitional fiat
(Skocpol 1985, 5).
This “orthodox” state-centered view of the state provided an immediate corrective to
weaknesses in existing Marxist state theories. The corrective was, in turn, subjected to
increased scrutiny as some of its original proponents began to retreat from the proposition
that states maintain full bureaucratic autonomy from capitalist class controls.
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The concept of embedded autonomy is an attempt to transcend the limitations of
an “isolated autonomy” approach to state theory. The foundational work of Peter Evans
(1995; 1989) is most applicable to this discussion. His original formulation of the concept
was designed to highlight the necessity of bureaucratic autonomy in conjunction with
complementary levels of embeddedness within strategically identified institutions within
any respective social systems. Thus, states are both autonomous in the sense that their
bureaucratic functions and decision-making are relatively isolated from any special
interests of the national population and “embedded in a concrete set of social ties that
binds the state to society and provides institutionalized channels for the continual
negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies (1995, 12).”
The incorporation of an embedded approach to the state is welcome; however,
with respect to this project it is also problematic. The focus of Evans (and later, Weiss
1998) is to explain the economic interdependence necessary to create “developmental
states.” As Seabrooke (2002) states “the key point here-and one that produces a clear
common ground between Weiss and Evans-is the notion that embeddedness must occur
between the state and the dominant economic class, specifically, the capitalist class (p.
12-13).” A critic of the embedded autonomy approach could make the claim that, outside
of serious methodological differences, proponents of this neo-Weberian approach provide
some level of affirmation for the relative autonomy thesis of structural Marxian state
theory.
For the purposes of this project, however, this observation is extraneous. While
the issue of autonomy forms a link between Marxian and Weberian variants of state
theory, neither is able to adequately understand how national populations play a role in
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motivating state actions and policies. Taking a “vulgar” look at both perspectives would
yield the conclusion that national populations have either no, or relatively little, impact
on the functions of the state, exclusive of a vast minority of powerful capitalists. To this
point, it seems that the only perspectives allowing for any sensitivity to the role of
national populations have been pluralist in nature. Given the serious theoretical problems
with pluralist approaches already mentioned, it seems that an alternative
conceptualization is necessary if we are to grant any social power to general populations.
2b. Social Embeddedness and the Polanyian Link
My criticism of orthodox approaches to state theory is echoed by those that
advocate a social embeddedness approach to the study of the state. This perspective
questions the theoretical limitations imposed by simply viewing state power and capacity
as being controlled by a dominant capitalist class. Proponents of social embeddedness
offer evidence that such class reductionism (ironic for Weberian theorists) ignores an
obvious and important relationship between the state and inclusive national populations
(Hobson 2000; 1997; Ikenberry 1986; Migdal 1988). For Hobson particularly, the main
issue ignored by state-centered theories is that national populations grant state legitimacy
and that this process of legitimation must be continually reproduced to maintain stability.
This process creates a condition of interdependence between state and nation that is not
addressed in existing Marxian or Weberian theories of the state (Hobson 1997, 237).
The perspective of the social embeddedness approach illustrates the dangers of a
simple focus on autonomy or social class in theories of the state. Original state-centered
approaches engage in a sort of “political reductionism” by focusing on the ‘full’
bureaucratic autonomy of the state to refute class reductionism in Marxian theories of the
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state. Weberian state theorists are correct in that Marxian state theory is unable to
adequately explain state action contrary to capitalist class interests. Conversely, Weberian
state theorists have neglected the external (to the state) influence of national populations
on state policy and the importance of national populations on state composition itself.
Social embeddedness proponents would argue that both “orthodox” state-centered theory
and embedded autonomy approaches to state theory incorporate an inherent functionalist
bias (Seabrooke 2002, 18). This bias is the main reason that such approaches are unable
to move beyond either issues of autonomy (in the case of Skocpol) or issues of class
reductionism (in the case of Evans) (Hobson 2000, 174-175). Social embedded
perspectives offer the opportunity to examine the interactive relationship between nation
and state in a way not always possible using more traditional state-centered approaches.
Hobson is much more concerned with establishing an understanding of power
relationships in his theory of social embeddedness:
In order to maximize their capacity, states need to gain insulation from
private demands (institutional autonomy) and simultaneously engage in
competitive-cooperation with key social actors (interactive embeddedness)
(Hobson 1997, 240).
Interestingly, we again are confronted with the lingering impact of pluralist thought in
that the evolution of state theory is increasingly concerned with understanding levels of
national autonomy from the state. In other words, national populations retain a level of
power that is exclusive of state control. This question of national political capacity,
however, is rarely addressed even in social embeddedness approaches due to the manifest
focus on the state. Hobson has been the most adamant in addressing this problem,
particularly with his structuration-inspired theory of the state in which he attempts to
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blend state-centered and society-centered approaches in order to transcend the theoretical
limitations of both (Hobson 2000, 217-218).
Hobson (and other scholars focused on the issue of social embeddedness3)
understands the central purpose of the state as managing economic relationships and
setting policy that is nearly exclusive in its emphasis on economic issues. This view of
the state as being an institution designed to control and manage a national economy is
one rooted in history. A question that must be raised, however, is also an historical one:
has the state changed in its role and specific responsibilities in stabilizing national
populations? I would argue that social embeddedness, while useful in resolving a number
of significant theoretical problems, should be focused on answering this question. It
would seem that attention to the mechanical relationship between state and society
singularly based on economics is premature given the large-scale historical changes
wrought by the acceleration of globalization following World War II. In this sense, the
current project does not refute social embeddedness approaches to state theory, but seeks
to provide a deeper historical analysis of the nature and role of the nation-state that could
augment such holistic attempts at developing a theory of the state.
Understanding the mechanics and capacities of the state is clearly important;
however state theory has been criticized for its limited ability to locate the state in an
increasingly dominant global market economy. Hobson’s (2000) synthetic approach
illustrates the fact that theories of the state and even the concept of the state itself are
increasingly questioned in light of the emergence of a global socio-economic system.

3

For example see Hobson and Seabrooke 2001; Block 1990; and Granovetter 1985 for orienting examples
of this perspective that seeks to view economic relations through a socially embedded lens.
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While state theorists are acutely aware of the influence of globalization and its ability to
restructure and reorient state capacities, their response has been largely to retrench
arguments in defense of the state as an analytical concept (Hobson 1997; 2000; Levi
1988; Weiss 2003, 1998).
This response has resulted in two general outcomes: (1) a reactionary statecentrism and (2) a return to economic determinism. The issue of state-centrism is not
necessarily fatal to state-theory; however I would advocate an approach that is more
responsive to issues and conditions of globalization. Globalization has affected the
structure and capabilities of the nation-state, but the nation-state remains an empirical
institution of social power. How can we reconcile a seemingly contradictory process of
adaptation that sees a decline in economic capacity and a retention or even growth of
other powers and authorities?
The second issue of economic determinism is largely due to the massive number
of analyses focused on the trans-nationalization of capital, internationalization of
production, and dominance of global financial institutions. In other words, the emphasis
on processes and mechanics of economic globalization has predictably generated a like
response from state theorists who seek to defend the theoretical and empirical concept of
the nation-state. This project seeks to move beyond these debates and develop a more
historically informed view of how the nation-state has responded to the challenge of
globalization, how its maintaining structures have been adapted to maintain power, and
how to understand the contemporary role and nature of the nation-state in proper
historical context, not necessarily contingent on economic capacities.
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As a general theoretical framework, the social embeddedness approach is
complementary to this project. It is possible to utilize this approach in a way that will
illuminate historical changes in economic structures, but caution is needed to avoid
becoming overly deterministic. Take for example the work of Fred Block. His socially
embedded analysis of postindustrial theory and societies “rests on the claim that the
international economy represents a less important constraint on the structure of the
domestic U.S. economy than is generally believed” (Block 1990, 19).
Block understands this claim to be true due to the postindustrial shift in the U.S.
to a service-based economic system. Thus, while industrial production has undergone
massive transnationalization, service industries have replaced them as domestic bases for
consumption. In addition, this decrease in demand for manufactured goods has created
stronger domestic economies that are less dependent on international trade as commonly
thought (Block 1990). He uses this foundation to build a general critique of neo-classical
economics and advocate an approach that is sensitive to the social costs of economic
growth and capitalist expansion4.
Despite the desire to socially embed economic analysis, Block and other theorists
remain staunchly focused on the realm of economic relations. I believe social embedded
approaches should have the ability to go further in their investigation of historical social
change. This, of course, includes economic change, but cannot ignore the fact that to be
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This understanding that national economic interests are not qualitatively constrained by the global
economy is increasingly problematic given the institutionalization of both regional and global economic
controls. For example, trade agreements such as NAFTA and international institutions such as the World
Trade Organization have emerged in the 1990s as significant constraints on state capacities to protect
nation economic interests. I would argue that in light of contemporary global economic expansion and
institutionalization the claim that respective states can protect national economic interests is greatly
weakened.
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truly embedded in a Polanyian sense we must also embed economic analyses in a more
holistic social contextual framework. This is a difficult line to walk and Block’s work
shows us why. While social embeddedness is the goal, empirical evidence and analyses
point to the primacy of economics in contemporary social relations. Giddens (1990) even
points to the disembedding of the economic from the social world as being one of the
defining conditions of modernity. We cannot escape this fact, but we can be cognizant of
its problematic nature.
This project recognizes the dominant position of economic relations in
contemporary Western society. It also argues, however, that national populations have the
ability to affect pressures on state institutions and policy development processes. This
emphasis on national populations is directly derived from the Polanyian “double
movement.” For Polanyi, the double movement represented an explicit process:
For a century the dynamics of modern society was governed by a double
movement: the market expanded continuously but this movement was met
by a countermovement checking the expansion in definite directions. Vital
though to such a movement was for the protection of society, in the last
analysis it was incompatible with the self-regulation of the market, and
thus with the market system itself (Polanyi 2001, 136).
It is this explicit definition of the “double movement” that this dissertation calls into
question, although not in a way critical of the concept itself. If, in fact, we are seeing an
adapted state – a state subordinate to an institutionally governed global economic system
– then the concept of the double movement must be similarly adapted to provide any
analytical viability.
The project of adapting the “double movement” to a new conceptualization of
nation-state capacity is best saved for the conclusion, however it is important to note,
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once again, the methodological framework focusing on the reciprocal relationship
between the state and both liberal economic forces and national protectionist forces. It is
the “movement” that is important at this point, particularly in its ability to provide
methodological orientation with respect to the state. Without legitimating processes
occurring between the nation and the state as well as between the global economic system
and the state, the potential for state destabilization increases. This basic theoretical
understanding is consistent with a social embedded approach to the state. The project
now must turn to a review of globalization theories, particularly of an economic and
cultural nature, in order to fully understand current perspectives on how the state is
understood within the context of a globalized world.
3. Theories of Globalization
Theoretical perspectives on the complex and diverse processes that form the
process of globalization are generally broken down into three general categories:
economic, political, and cultural. Economic globalization is generally viewed as an
expansion of liberal capitalism. As such the theoretical orientation of this project focuses
on theories of trans-national capitalism (TNC). The founding assumptions of worldsystem theory play an important role in the development of TNC, however the ability of
TNC to adequately explain current trends in economic globalization and its impact of
individual nation-states is most appropriate for this project.
This project also seeks to address the role of culture in the contemporary nationstate. This section will also examine cultural globalization theory as a complementary
project in support of the global market economy. Cultural globalization theories are
dominated by the question of cultural homogeneity. The process of ideological
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“colonization” has prompted several perspectives that examine (1) the process of
homogenization and its many alternative possibilities and (2) a theoretical shift toward
theories of consumption that seek to understand why cultural homogenization is a
desirable goal. These perspectives typify macro-sociological analyses of cultural
globalization, although the bulk of work examines the effects of globalization on identity
formation in micro-level analyses. As this project is focused on explaining macro-level
change the previously stated bias should be self-explanatory.
Perspectives on political globalization largely center on the twin process of
democratization and liberalization, primarily on their ability to both create a common
political discourse and to facilitate processes of economic globalization. This project
understands political globalization processes as also complementing the larger project of
global market integration. That is, the project of neoliberalism, as a political ideology
with tangible political economic demands (reduced state spending and tariff reduction
being most apparent), actively facilitates global market integration by providing “rules”
to which participating states must adhere.
Polanyi argued, “economic liberalism was the organizing principle of society
engaged in creating a market system” (Polanyi 2001, 141). It is difficult to argue that
Western societies are “creating” a market system, but economic globalization theorists do
tell us that the expansion of market (read: liberal) capitalism is the quintessential feature
of globalization. I agree with this point. As such, this project views cultural
homogenization and liberalization processes as similar complementary processes
intended to facilitate economic globalization. I will return to the issue of liberalism as a
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tool for ideological organization, but I will apply it specifically to the debates over the
compatibility of liberal economic and multicultural ideologies.
It should be noted that these theoretical divisions are not viewed as an entirely
positive project. Scholte (2000) argues for a more general definition of globalization
following the conceptualization of Giddens (1990) and Held et al. (1999) that focuses on
the territorial breakdown that the process of globalization engenders. A focus on the
breakdown of territorial affinity encompasses economic, political, and cultural spheres,
which allows analyses to focus on the process of interconnectedness and linkages that
form as a result of globalization processes (Scholte 2000, 46). This process would be
congruent with Castells’ (1996) larger emphasis on network development as a
methodological vehicle for his theory of globalization.
The danger of such an approach lies in the tendency to view globalization as a
consistent and universal process. It is difficult to argue against the deterritorialization and
linking definitions of globalization, however we cannot assume that globalization is
either applied or felt in any sort of similar fashion. Instead of critiquing the
universalization/deterritorialization perspective, this project seeks to develop a deeper
analytical understanding of how globalization has impacted national populations with
distinct histories. This can be more effectively accomplished by viewing globalization as
made up of component parts and projects.
Empirically, evidence has been elusive in showing that the active and intentional
promotion of liberal market economics is connected with similar intentional efforts to
transform traditional cultures. It does seem likely that these processes are happening
simultaneously regardless of intent. How are we then to understand the multifaceted
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nature of these economic, political, and cultural processes as a comprehensive whole?
This project will show that while definite trends toward increased global linkages and
networks are obvious, divergent histories require finite focus and specificity. Declarative
attempts to identify some form of dialectical (in the Hegelian sense) globalization seem
premature before we completely understand the transformative ability of these intricate
processes. It is through the power of comparative methodology that the ground-level
effects of this seemingly ubiquitous process of globalization are made apparent and clear.
3a. Economic Globalization
The focus on globalization as a primarily economic phenomenon should not be
surprising. Political economic analyses of global capitalism inform and inspire many
contemporary critical examinations of globalization. Beginning with Marx’s (1955) belief
that capitalism would eventually develop into a truly global system before its inevitable
demise, economic functions and systemic mechanics provided the primary focus of
analysis. Lenin’s (1939) understanding that capitalist expansion through imperialism
gave new life to a doomed system and staved its eventual demise provided an additional
political component to orthodox Marxism, but retained the centrality of Marx’s capitalist
critique. Both world-system and transnational capitalist theories are built on these central
Marxian tenets of capitalist critique and thus necessitate a focus on economic systems
exclusive of other social spheres.
This section describes the development of a dominant global market economy.
Globalization theorists generally view the state as a limited unit of analysis given the
systemic nature of a global (not international) market economic system. With respect to
this dissertation, we must understand the systemic nature and position of the global
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economy and particularly its impact on state capacities to protect national economic
interests and in promoting global political economic interdependence. The central
question of this project is centered on the state, namely on the contemporary capacities of
the nation-state. If we can assume (given the following theories of economic
globalization) that the state is a subordinate economic entity, what are its contemporary
capacities? Of course, answering this question requires attention to the economic
subordination process itself, which is the purpose of this section.
Immanuel Wallerstein developed world-system theory as a systemic approach to
understanding Marx’s global capitalism thesis. The development of a capitalist worldsystem was, for world-system theorists, as realization of the historical-materialist
requirements of persistent capitalist logic. Specifically, that the requisite growth of
capitalism required an ever expanding scope of both material resources and production.
In this way, world-system theory can be largely considered the first sociological theory of
economic globalization. World-system theory provides an understanding that there has
existed, since approximately 1500, a global capitalist system that links nation-states and
provides the structure necessary to pattern the action of those same nation-states.
The debate over the relative “newness” of globalization in our contemporary era
is, for world-system theorists, incorrect. Globalization is not a novelty for world-system
proponents due to the transitional requirements of capitalism. In other words, for
capitalism to continue to function and grow, systemic adaptation has become the
historical norm. Therefore the current period of “globalization” can be understood as yet
another in a long line of systemic adaptations. This is a point of significant contention
between world-system proponents and other supporters (Frank 1998; Hirst and
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Thompson 1996; Sen 2002; Wallerstein 1999) and those who argue that the current era is
fundamentally distinct (Albrow 1997; Robertson 1992; Robinson 2004; 1996).
World-system theory, particularly the use of systems theory to understand
capitalist expansion, provides the foundation on which theories of economic globalization
rest. One of several approaches that could be considered significant in the study of a
global economic system is that of transnational capitalism.
3a1. Transnational Capitalism
Theories of transnational capitalism (TNC) rest on a critical point: while we can
understand globalization as another “stage” of capitalist development, the economic
conditions of globalization constitute a distinct era. This belief is hardly the exclusive
domain of TNC theorists. Other analysts of globalization are often forced to reconcile (at
one level or another) this debate in their own work – to maintain a world-system
approach focused on the Longue durée or recognize a distinct and novel set of conditions
and structures defining a new political economic age of global capitalism. Many that
believe that the current era of globalization is at some level a distinct historical era have
come to be termed globalization theorists. Weiss (2003) provides a succinct
categorization of these globalization theorists as being either radical “hyper-globalists” or
members of a more moderate “constraints school.”
“Hyper-globalists” can best be described as those who understand globalization
processes as being so powerful and transformative that even entrenched socio-political
institutions such as the nation-state cannot survive its surge (Guéhenno 1995; Horsman
and Marshall 1994; Ohmae 1990). Predictably, these scholars have come to be associated
with this “end of the state” predictive capacity and are largely dismissed by both
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moderate globalists and obviously state theorists. I would argue that while the
conclusions of “hyper-globalists” are often quite extreme, maintaining a simple focus on
a single declaration that the nation-state is “dead” allows state theorists to dismiss the
larger arguments for the development of regional economies and the possibility of
“borderless” economic systems. For example, regional liberal economic cooperative
efforts have led to a reduction in ability of respective states to enact trade restrictions to
protect national economic sectors – a point that is endangered by a cursory dismissal of
the “hyper-globalist” perspective.
The “constraints school” is largely defined as being those remaining globalization
theorists who do not hold such an extreme view with respect to the irrelevance of the
modern nation-state.
This constraints view of globalization has many adherents, and although
they disagree about many things, they are united in the view that changes
in the international political economy have radically restricted policy
choice and forced policy shifts that play to the preferences of global
investors and mobile corporations, rather than to the needs of the domestic
political economy and its citizenry (Weiss 2003, 3).
TNC theory can safely be located within the broad confines of the “constraints school”
and shares the common belief that the state, while not irrelevant, is diminished in its
decision-making capacity. It should be noted that this is a theory of economic
globalization and thus is vulnerable to charges of reductionism. Interestingly, it is the
economic reductionism that unites “hyper-globalists” and the “constraints school” much
more than their disagreement on the nature of the modern nation-state divides them. This
perspective (TNC), while not indicative of any unified theory of economic globalization,
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is fairly representative of the perspectives and approaches taken by other scholars of
economic globalization (for example Cerny 1996; 1994; Cox 1997; Falk 1999).
The idea of international economic co-operation and transnational business
practice is not new. Outside of the copious material produced by world-system scholars,
other historical evidence of international economic co-operation is found from the ancient
world through the modern era. The significance and uniqueness of the contemporary era
of globalization is defined, according to TNC theory, by the active and intentional
character of global capitalism based on the interconnected action of a transnational
capitalist class. Robinson refers to this situation with specific reference to the
intentionality of this capitalist class:
TNCs supply “domestic” markets around the world through a growing
web of local factories and offices rather than through exporting from home
countries, which suggests that much of world trade is in fact planned trade.
Contrary to mainstream economic theory, the global economy is decidedly
not a free-market economy…but a planned oligopolist economy
(Robinson 2004, 28).
This view of super-national class co-operation is supported by many scholars who not
only view the contemporary era of globalization as distinct, but also argue that its
distinctive nature is entirely manufactured through economic market and production
relationships (Cox 1987; Gill 1990; Sklair 2001; 1995).
The work of Sklair and Robinson does much to specify distinct political processes
that both motivate and support the globalization process. Their work adds a specific class
component to the study of international business/economic cooperation; namely, that a
transnational capitalist class actively influences the direction of globalization or the
global capitalist system. There are differences between these two leading theorists of
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TNC. Sklair (1995) makes a concerted effort to understand the larger political process of
transnationalist class formation and interaction. He intentionally integrates the
sociological trinity of economics, political, and culture in his understanding of the holistic
nature of transnational class formation. To the obvious economic leadership of a
transnational corporate elite, Sklair adds a global political elite focused on the promotion
of democratization and an accompanying liberal ideology that supports larger economic
goals. His cultural component of the transnational capitalist class is made up of a
“consumerist elite” that uses telecommunications technologies to promote the ideology of
consumption that defines cultural homogenization processes of globalization (see the
later section on cultural globalization).
Robinson begins his development of TNC theory in a similar fashion, specifically
focusing on the political actions and functioning of the transnational capitalist class. He
understands the political mechanics of the larger economic system and the necessity of
fusing political and economic analysis:
The logics of local and global accumulation increasingly coincide. The
central concern of this study is to show how new instruments of political
intervention, originally developed in the United States and then applied
around the world in the name of “democracy promotion,” are aimed at
suppressing the demands of popular sectors in the [Global] South”
(Robinson 1996, 34).
This emphasis on political processes has shifted in recent years to comprise a more
explicitly economic theory of global capitalism. Robinson’s most recent theoretical
project returns to TNC’s Marxist roots, particularly with his emphasis on production as a
response to market-centered critiques of globalization (Robinson 2004, 22).
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TNC theory can be safely categorized as the most currently significant theory of
global capitalism, or economic globalization. Unfortunately, in answering the question of
“what now the nation-state?” TNC theory leaves us wanting. First, the increasingly
economic deterministic position of TNC creates limitations that are not as obvious with a
more inclusive approach, such as Sklair. Even so the focus on issues of economics, while
comprising a significant empirical portion of the social composition of nation-states, tells
only part of the story. Clearly, the state has taken a subordinate role in controlling
national economic capacities. This conclusion, however, returns us to the original
question of what the “globalized state” actually does control. We can see that a process of
economic subordination has occurred but we are still left without an understanding of
how the nation-state has adapted.
The second criticism of TNC is one that is less easily resolved. Robinson and
Sklair, while differing on minor conceptual and methodological issues, are united in their
belief that “state-centric” analyses are misguided and incorrect.
Here we can anticipate the argument I develop in subsequent chapters
regarding the pitfall of what I refer to as nation-state centrism, or the
tendency to take the nation-state as an autonomous unit of analysis and to
gather and interpret data on the basis of this tendency…The problem here
is the use of data collected and registered in nation-state terms to measure
phenomena that are transnational (Robinson 2004, 29).
This concern is methodologically appropriate but stands on the assumption that all
analyses must now focus on the global capitalist system as a primary social
organizational mechanism. Historical and geographic specificity are disregarded in the
face of a reified global capitalist system that functionally imposes structure throughout
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the world. Many have argued that the conclusive and final tone of TNC theory limits
analysis in both theoretical and ontological manners (Block 2001; Went 2001-2002).
The central point of contention is, again, the issue of whether the nation-state
remains a viable unit of analysis. The existence of increasing transnational production,
capital flows, and foreign direct investment cannot be discounted and provide a strong
level of empirical evidence to the claims of TNC theorists. Yet the nation-state serves as
a very real mechanism for social organization throughout the world. The importance of
including economic globalization in any analysis of super-national social change is
obvious. The real question for this project is how to develop an understanding of the
contemporary nation-state that is sensitive to the effects of globalization. Clearly, a focus
on TNC or another theory of globalization is as inadequate as a “nation-state centric”
theoretical foundation. A dynamic alternative is needed.
The remainder of this chapter will begin to build a case for such an alternative by
showing the interconnected nature of global political and ideological processes and
promoting an interactive model that is able to adequately examine the state as a locus of
interaction between global and national-level processes.
3b. Political Globalization
Political globalization can be understood as the promotion of the specific ideology
of liberal democracy in support of liberal economic integration. I would argue that the
promotion of democracy is consistent with the logic of capitalism that undergirds
Marxian analyses of capitalist expansion. In short, the ideological marriage of liberalism
and capitalism are manifested politically in the form of modern democratic institutions.
As liberalism provided necessary ideological legitimation for initial capitalist
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accumulation and expansion (Polanyi 2001; Thompson 1968), so to does the expansion
of capitalism to a global economic system require the ideological structures to generate
conditions for social reproduction.
This contemporary realization is interesting in light of the fact that
democratization was initially threatening to the growth and expansion of capitalism. The
“danger” of liberalism and democracy run amok was clear to elite observers of the
French Revolution (Burke, Maury), yet the necessity of liberalism to classical economic
theory was undeniable. How then to promote the ubiquitous ideology of liberalism while
still maintaining the authority necessary for labor market stability? The solution was the
synthesis of economic, political, and cultural processes forming the socio-political
realities of the modern Western world in the post-Enlightenment era. Wood offers an
excellent description of this historical process and illustrates the modern synthesis of
democracy and capitalism through the process of artificial public division:
The achievement of formal democracy and universal suffrage certainly
represented tremendous historic advances, but it turned out that capitalism
offered a new solution to the age-old problem of rulers and producers. It
was no longer necessary to embody the division between privilege and
labour in a political division between appropriating rulers and labouring
subjects, now that democracy could be confined to a formally separate
‘political’ sphere while the ‘economy’ followed rules of its own. If the
extent of the citizen body could no longer be restricted, the scope of
citizenship could now be narrowly contained, even without constitutional
limits (Wood 1995, 203).
Robinson’s (1996) concept of polyarchy complements Wood’s analysis and represents
the synthetic interrelationship between the political and economic. In fact, the concept of
polyarchy is an active description of the process of political globalization through an
imperialist process greatly inspired by Lenin’s original critique. Specifically, Robinson
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identifies the inherent difficulties of reconciling liberal economic organization with
autocratic political organization. Polyarchy emerged as a political alternative in the
promotion of global market integration while at the same time promoting political and
economic liberalism as ubiquitous ideologies.
We can end this brief discussion of political globalization (i.e., democratization or
the promotion of liberal ideology) with the understanding that an exemplary description
of this process would be more instructive than an extended literature review. Following a
similarly brief discussion of cultural globalization, I will illustrate the interrelated process
of political and cultural processes through a discussion of the debate among political
philosophers on the conflict between liberalism/liberal ideology and multiculturalism.
This exemplar serves the dual purpose of illustrating the necessity for similarly
synthetic/holistic analysis as well as providing valuable theoretical background on the
subject of multiculturalism and debates over its practical application through state policy.
3c. Cultural Globalization
Theories of cultural globalization are dominated by either macro- or micro-level
approaches. Contributions to larger discussions of (1) large-scale processes of cultural
homogenization (Barber 1995; Hamelink 1994; Ritzer 1993) or (2) subjectivist studies of
how these large-scale processes have impacted individual and small group populations
(Tomlinson 2003; Wassman 1998) define this theoretical subfield. Both perspectives are
necessary yet the lack of meso-level analyses is telling in the sense that focus has been on
the globalization of culture and not necessarily on the management of said processes.
It should be noted that many subjectivist studies of globalization’s impact on
identity construction show that this process is often channeled through national identity
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formation. This project mirrors this contention in a certain respect. These studies of
identity construction5 view these nationalist processes as being inherently social in nature
and representative of an organic reactionary process in response to globalization. I argue
that while this may be the case, the actions of the state in promoting a specific national
identity must not be ignored. In this sense, I agree with the subjectivist conclusions, but
argue that a more structural process (the state) assists in the promotion of national
identity construction.
3c1. Cultural Homogenization
The increasingly familiar surroundings in seemingly disparate global locations
have led many to believe that one accompanying feature of economic globalization is the
cultural homogenization, or Americanization (to use a more active term), of the world
(Schiller 1992; 1976; Hamelink 1994). This process of homogenization is intended to
promote a universal culture of consumption designed to match increases in global
production.
Cultural homogenization is the product of the global capitalist system (Ritzer
1999; 1993; Robinson 2004). Logically the expansion of global production and the fact
that most countries are largely moving toward an export-orientation requires a
simultaneous expansion of consumers. The focus of traditional societies, particularly in
the developing world, has not been overly concerned with materialism and more general
issues of consumption. In fact, the very persistent poverty of the developing world serves
as a significant structural reality making materialism irrelevant in the face of more
pressing subsistence needs. As anthropological studies of cultural development have
5

This perspective is best illustrated by the excellent work of Ailon-Souday and Kunda 2003.
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shown, cultural norms and belief systems are largely dependent on material conditions
and practical needs6. It is logically concluded then that institutions of authority (such as
religion) and resource control (for example political and military institutions) are
constructed in conjunction with local cultural norms and beliefs. Therefore, if a local
population has no history of materialism or need for non-subsistence consumptive desire
the chances for capitalist development in these regions is limited.
The process of cultural homogenization, however, is able to reduce the influence
and importance of these traditional cultural objections to materialist consumption.
Through the promotion of political liberalism (democratization) and global market
integration, local culture is confronted with the images and realities of material wealth
and active promotion of material acquisition (consumption) through popular culture and
media. Media influence is exponentially increased as the Internet and accompanying
telecommunications technologies are integrated into formerly traditional societies. The
networking potential and exposure to dominant (i.e., American) popular culture furthers
the project of cultural homogenization (Ess 2002; Lovink 2002) and thus facilitates the
expansion of global capitalism.
The criticism of this approach, of course, is due to the lack of local agency or
resistive capacity granted to respective national populations. In other words, we find
again the inability of a theory of globalization to explain local level anomalies or change
6

Early anthropological perspectives on cultural development were divided between diffusionist approaches
that stressed the similarities of cultural development (Steward 1955; Lévi-Strauss 1963) and those who
stressed a more independent and locally-dependant development of culture (Malinowski 1960; Boas 1940).
In short, cultural anthropology has largely agreed on the fact that both processes can and have occurred –
perhaps best understood as the similarities of human subsistence needs (food, shelter, clothing, etc…) being
driven by the available resources to any respective group. Thus, cultural development can be quite similar
while at the same time producing different material cultures due to environmental, geographic, or other
material conditions.
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outside of change motivated by the global system itself. This criticism has resulted in a
large number of alternatives to the homogenization thesis. These alternatives are more
sensitive to local realities and experiences, but maintain the conventional argument that
cultural homogenization, or at least the motivation for homogeneity, is occurring at some
level. The commonality between homogenization and locally sensitive approaches is the
underlying globalist belief that both processes describe individuals and groups coming to
terms with their own identities in an increasingly integrated world (Robertson 1992, 29).
3c2. Glocalization and Identity Construction
The cultural homogenization thesis was viewed by some as being both
structurally dependent and empirically incorrect. Local resistance to homogenization
processes or even simple local cultural differences in interpretation of dominant cultural
norms showed many researchers that the universal wave of “Americanization” of the
globe was at best uneven (Hannerz 1997). The popular concept of glocalization is one of
many attempts to explain the ability of local populations to either resist or reinterpret
encroaching cultural norms that commonly differ from traditional norms (Robertson
1995; 1992; Meyer 2000).
Briefly, the process of glocalization describes the creolization of a dominant
culture as local groups integrate new cultural norms and symbols with existing traditional
beliefs and symbols. The result is a sort of hybrid local culture that contains elements of
the dominant “colonizing” culture but made palatable to local populations through a
traditional cultural “filter.” Thus, the process of global cultural homogenization is not
nearly as ubiquitous and complete as many have posited.
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The clear debate within “world-culture theory” is centered on the question of local
communities, or national populations. Homogenization proponents argue that the spread
of capitalism and its accompanying rationalization processes quickly usurp traditional
cultural controls and replace them with a set of norms based on materialism and
consumption. This perspective provides a clear and direct link with the expansion of the
global capitalist system by creating new foreign markets for exporting states.
On the other hand, locally sensitive proponents of glocalization (and many other
variants of limited global heterogeneity) theories view the process of cultural colonization
as being an interpretive process that relies on local populations for its dissemination. The
apparent dependence on local populations is limited in that the creolization process is
uneven with respect to the level of promotion of materialism and consumption. In other
words, hybrid culture in one region may embrace materialism and consumption at a
higher level than another hybrid culture in another region.
The distinction between the two is obviously the level of power attributed to
local, or national, populations. I would argue that both do an excellent job of showing
how globalization processes change local realities, but neither adequately address the
ability of the state to shape the form of globalized change and play an active role in
determining the pace of globalization. I would argue that both homogenization and
glocalization theories inherently embrace the “state is dead” ethos by presenting a view
of globalization that is exclusive of state mediation. The problem, it would seem, lies in
the level of analysis. We seem to be back to the desire to construct dichotomies in order
to prove our respective points. In this case “the local versus the global” defines an
analytical debate that ultimately proves limiting in its application.
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Examining the global system, or globalization processes as “autonomous
processes” requires a “specifically global point of view” (Appadurai 1990; Featherstone
1990; Robertson 1992). These statements are accurate, yet however powerful this
approach has proven in illuminating the realities of globalization processes it has been
equally derelict in its ability to explain how national populations and state institutions
have interacted in response to these same processes.
The similarities between political and cultural globalization processes are striking.
Many observers have noted that these processes seem to work in a complementary
fashion with economic globalization by promoting and creating conditions favorable to
global capitalist expansion. The outcome of this process has been viewed as problematic
and inherently contradictory by motivating national populations to seek non-liberal
protections from the liberal market system. These contradictions are reflected in political
debates centered on how to ensure national cooperation for global integration,
particularly in reconciling liberal market ideology with non-liberal social protections. The
following case examines, in limited detail, the debate between political philosophers
concerning the difficulty in reconciling the necessary ideology of liberalism with the
necessity to protect national populations through cultural policy7. This case offers an
excellent view of the conflict inherent in the “double movement” as national populations
seek protection and stability in the face of changes motivated by globalization processes
and states attempt to facilitate the liberal ideology of laissez-faire/free-market economics.
7

The term “policy” is used here in a very loose sense. The official multiculturalism of Canada, Australia,
and New Zealand (to name a few) can be viewed as “official multiculturalism” and thus conforms to a
more traditional definition of policy. Kurien (2004) comments on the “unofficial multiculturalism” of the
United States as promoting an ideological multiculturalism without the explicit support of the state. Both
however function in similar manners by promoting ethno-cultural diversity as a positive aspect of modern
society.
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4. “The Liberal Myth” and Multiculturalism: The Bumpy Process of Ideological
Conditioning
Polanyi contended that the integration of liberalism with capitalism resulted in a
market system that adversely affects national populations. Essential to this process was
the ideological support of liberalism by intellectuals and state institutions. Thus the
project of liberal market capitalism could not succeed without the active support of
“knowledgeable” actors. This point is revived in Richard Falk’s Predatory Globalization
(1999) in which he views the process of global market capitalism as “globalization from
above.” In other words, the active management and promotion of a liberal capitalist goal
is a necessary component for systemic success. Liberalism, however, is not specifically
economic in nature. Its purest definition rests on the ideals of individual liberty and
freedoms – natural rights in their more pristine Lockean understanding. Many would
argue that there is very little that can be termed “natural” or organic in liberal ideology,
particularly in its marriage to capitalism. This section illustrates the double movement of
liberal market promotion with demands for national protection through the analytical
example of multiculturalism.
Polanyi’s critique of liberalism rests solidly on the belief that laissez-faire market
self-regulation is not, and has never been, a reality. Instead, the idea (a self-regulating
capitalist market) is a “liberal myth” perpetuated to privilege an ideological justification
for market capitalism on a global scale. In fact, one could interpret Polanyi’s historical
analysis of the development of this liberal mythology as constructing the ideological
foundations for contemporary neo-liberal hegemonic structures and processes typically
referred to as globalization.
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There was nothing natural about laissez-faire, free markets could never
have come into being merely by allowing things to take their course. Just
as cotton manufactures – the leading free trade industry – were created by
the help of protective tariffs, export bounties, and indirect wage subsidies,
laissez-faire itself was enforced by the state (Polanyi 2001, 144).
Polanyi’s observation can easily be updated to reflect the globalization-state debates
through the substitution of international, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for the
state, however some would argue that the state also remains a facilitating agent for
transnational capital and thus retains some power in the face of the global neo-liberal
economic system (Jessop 2002; Poulantzas 1978). Our focus here, however, is the
supposed conflict between liberalism and multiculturalism and the fact that regardless of
its intentional origins, liberal ideology defines modern capitalist societies.
Liberalism, as is the case with all ideological manifestations, can be defined and
understood in several different ways. In this case we can assume that liberalism, as a tool
of social organization, can be understood as a social ideology that embraces the Lockean
ideal of natural rights, particularly (as noted by Giddens 1990) the right to private
property. This social ideology is then transferred to political and economic spheres in the
form of democratization, which leads invariably to the laissez-faire tenets of market
capitalism embodied in classical economic theory. This is an old story, but the most
recent expansion and exportation of liberalism after the Second World War resulted in
the rapid ethnic diversification of core states, or the Western World8. This diversification
of national populations in countries such as Canada and the United States resulted in
various attempts to manage the diversification process and maintain national stability.

8

This process of ethnic diversification as a function of globalization processes will be explained in detail in
Chapter Six.
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One strategy embraced by states such as Canada, Australia, Sweden, and the Netherlands
was the recognition of cultural and ethnic diversity through state policies of
multiculturalism. This was an alternative to the assimilationist models promoted by
(among others) the “melting pot” model of American diversity management.
Multiculturalism not only recognized difference, but also promoted the belief that cultural
enclaves were essential to the survival of traditional cultures. Thus, the active promotion
and celebration of ethno-cultural differences became a trademark of multiculturalism.
The ideology of multiculturalism has been under attack from its inception.
Criticisms from the political right are obvious and range from racist to assimilationist. Of
concern here is the critique of liberals from the political center and left that view
multiculturalism as an unnecessary intrusion of the state into the realm of cultural
management and control. Thus the ideological conflict concerns states that are oriented
and, in fact, organized by liberal political ideology yet incorporate pressures to recognize
disadvantaged minority groups within increasingly diverse nation-states. These states
must reconcile their liberal political economic structures with the desire to manage and
facilitate ethnic diversification in arguably non-liberal fashions. Of primary concern in
this debate is the idea that classical liberalism advantages the individual and values
individual rights over all else. Of course, multiculturalism is the special recognition of
ethnic and cultural groups for the sake of ensuring their protection. The contradictions are
obvious.
The debate over multiculturalism within liberal democratic societies has forced
some to reconcile the ideological predominance of liberalism with the desire to ensure
cultural survival of certain groups. Charles Taylor’s (1994; 1992; 1989a) contributions
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focus on the desire to protect cultural authenticity as opposed to the individual autonomy
inherent in what he calls “procedural liberalism” (1994, 56). This “procedural liberalism”
can be used to define the socio-political ideology that defines Western democracies.
Taylor views this political ideology as being individualistic to the point of destroying
cultural and traditional distinctions (particularly among immigrant groups) in societies
defined by this type of liberalism. His alternative is a “politics of difference” that seeks to
recognize the differences between ethno-cultural groups in order to ensure that individual
identity construction can continue without interference from the social or cultural norms
of the dominant nation.
Taylor’s conceptualization has been called liberal and communitarian by
supporters and critics of the “politics of difference.” Taylor attempted to critique the
limitations of liberalism and prompted many to classify his work as communitarian
(1989b). This designation has colored many criticisms of Taylor’s work as well as his
later promotion of the politics of difference through official multicultural policies. He
does not dismiss liberalism out of hand, rather Taylor promotes a liberal viewpoint, albeit
a “fighting creed” that seems to promote an active version of liberal democracy that may
or may not “involve substituting some individual freedoms for the collective goal of
maintaining authentic cultural identities” (Seglow 1998, 974). The conflict for Taylor,
and other scholars concerned with social protections, is concerned with reconciling social
protections that may be non-liberal with the liberal democratic and capitalist environment
in which these conditions of cultural degradation exist. While Taylor is specifically
concerned with the effects of ideological liberalism on the ability of minority ethnocultural groups to survive, his difficulty in articulating a viable adaptation of “procedural
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liberalism” is indicative of the challenge facing those tasked with managing the double
movement-how to ensure social continuity in a liberal society while protecting those
victimized by the same liberal structures. His promotion of an active liberalism with clear
protections is quite different from the laissez-faire tradition and is a clear attempt to inject
social protections for those, in Taylor’s view, most vulnerable to liberalisms effects.
Other scholars have attempted to revise contemporary conceptualizations of
liberalism to further their multicultural aims. Most notably, Will Kymlicka’s (1995;
1989) research attempts to establish a “hierarchy of differential minority rights.” In this
hierarchy, certain ethnic and cultural groups are granted a level of autonomy and legal
rights. Certain groups, such as indigenous peoples are at the top of the hierarchy due to
the common historical experience of colonial domination, while immigrants are afforded
no rights due to their conscious and voluntary decision to immigrate (Kymlicka 1989,
170). All groups, however, are required to adhere to the principles of liberalism and those
that seek to subvert those fundamental tenets are likely to be made to conform.
Kymlicka’s understanding of the inherent contradictions between liberalism and
multiculturalism can be overcome (in his analysis) through a process of liberal
hegemonic dominance thus subverting any inherent social contradictions (Kymlicka
1989, 167).
In this conceptualization we see a “front-loaded” liberalism in which the
hierarchy of rights is established prior to any institutional liberal framework is enforced.
In fact it is this enforcement of liberalism that defines Kymlicka’s attempt at
reconciliation. This environment requires a strong liberal framework of nation-state
cohesion, but within this framework exists a pre-established hierarchy of rights that are
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based on cultural group membership, but largely subservient to national membership.
Again, the difficulty lies in reconciling the liberal nation-state system with the ability to
protect minority groups from the homogenizing effects of liberalism.
Neither Taylor nor Kymlicka satisfactorily reconciles the contradictions between
an unrestrained liberalism and multicultural protections in this debate. Both seek to
redefine (or at least, revise) liberalism to suit their end goals, yet neither is able to ensure
that their rearticulation will be undertaken nor even supported. The work of Chandran
Kukathas returns to traditional liberalism by arguing that the promotion of individual
rights inherent in liberalism is enough to ensure cultural survival of minority groups:
The reason why liberalism does not have a problem with multiculturalism
is that liberalism is itself, fundamentally, a theory of multiculturalism. This
is because liberalism is essentially a theory about pluralism; and
multiculturalism is, in the end, a species of pluralism (Kukathas 1998,
690).
His basic statements in support of liberalism refer to the fact that true liberalism does not
promote any group over the rights of an individual. Thus, individuals are free to associate
and congregate with groups of their choice as long as those groups do not disrupt the
stability of the society. This view, although quite utopian, counters the assertions of
Taylor and Kymlicka that liberalism, understood in its traditional form, is incompatible
with multicultural goals. The problem with this view, however, is that it continues with
the assumption that liberalism is something of an “end goal” of sociopolitical
development. Parekh’s critique of Kymlicka makes a similar comment:
He [Kymlicka] expects Amer-Indians, Inuits, and other non-liberal
communities to take a liberal view of themselves, that is, to view and
relate to their cultures in a way that the liberal does to his, and he defends
them only to the extent that they behave as respectable liberals (Parekh
1997, 59).
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Parekh goes further to comment of the dangers to a universal assumption of liberalism
that seems to typify the liberal/multicultural debate partly illustrated here:
While rightly stressing its [liberalism’s] great values, he nowhere
acknowledges that they do not represent the last word in human wisdom
and that they might greatly benefit from a dialog with nonliberal ways of
life (Parekh 1997, 62).
The conceptual preoccupation with the nature of liberalism and its (apparently)
inexorable connection to democratic governance ignores the history of liberalism and its
artificiality. The emphasis on the tension and conflict between multiculturalism and
liberalism lose much of their relevance when a Polanyian approach is incorporated. The
contradiction being resolved in this debate is directly related to the Polanyian double
movement of liberal market predation and the demands of a national population for
protection. This cursory illustration of the difficulties surrounding the reconciliation of
liberalism and social protections is an excellent example of how political economic
conditions can be translated into issues of identity construction and culture.
This debate on integrating liberalism and multiculturalism provides a useful
conceptual exemplar for this project. We know that there has been a change that now
requires states to actively reconcile the liberal foundation of contemporary Western
democracies with the need to protect national populations, including vulnerable groups
within respective national populations. The previous example focused on
multiculturalism as a protectionist strategy-a position that the remainder of this
dissertation will emulate.
The fact that liberalism and multiculturalism require reconciliation points to the
existence of an ideological “double movement” at work. The dominant ideology of
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political economic liberalism, particularly in core nation-states is not questioned in the
above debate. The issue at hand is how to reconcile a (arguably) non-liberal ideology that
has been politically implemented as a result of national ethno-cultural diversity. The
questions not asked in the previous excursus are the mechanical processes analyzed in
this dissertation. Specifically, if the dominant political economic ideology is being
challenged by non-liberal ideologies and policies, how did this conflict come into being?
What is required of nation-states as they enter into this global liberal market economy?
How are states and national populations changed by this process? How do states respond
to these changes and challenges that are the direct result of globalization processes?
This project examines the post-World War II political economic and demographic
histories of Canada and Québec to understand what state capacities exist in an era of
globalization. Economic globalization has limited the policy capacities of contemporary
nation-states with respect to national economic protection, but the importance of the
nation-state has not experienced commensurate political demise. The remainder of the
project is designed to understand what capacities are available to the nation-state and how
this process of economic globalization has played a role in qualitatively changing how we
understand the nation-state. Part II provides necessary historical background information
for both Canada and Québec to further justify the methodological comparison of two
distinct nation-states. Part III will provide empirical evidence in support of the project as
conceptualized in Chapters One and Two.
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Part II
The Historical Development of National Culture in Canada and Québec
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Part II Introduction

Part II, consisting of Chapters Three and Four, contains historical background
information for Canada and Québec, respectively. Contemporary divisions in Canada
between English-Canadian, French-Canadians, and First Nations populations are deeply
rooted in the colonial histories of each respective group and the shared history of
Canadian national development. These two chapters are essential to the overall
dissertation in that they allow the reader to better understand the associated yet
autonomous nature of national history in Canada. History is, in its most political form, a
nationalist project. The nationalist project of Canada is distinct from the nationalist
project in Québec. National histories must reflect this important social, cultural, and
political distinction. These chapters literally conform to this political reality and attempt
to tell two sides of the same story.
Part II is, by necessity, repetitive to a certain degree. Québec history is the history
of Canada with the converse being equally true. Similar organization and chronological
patterns allow for significant overlap. On the other hand, each national history contains
perspectives and events that vary in their significance in relation to a respective
nationalist project. In the effort to maintain and illustrate the autonomous nature of each
nationalist project each national history is told with attention to each nationalist project.
Chapter Three is the national history of Canada that intentionally minimizes the
divisions and problems of nation-building with the persistence of two European colonial
legacies. Chapter Four is the national history of Québec with particular attention to the
conflict between Anglo- and Franco-Canadian cultures and political economic realities.
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Both histories are defined by their interdependence yet both support an insular nationalist
project. Part II is designed to illustrate the functional interdependence and insular
nationalism of both histories.
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Chapter Three
Canada: History and Nationalist Project

The history of Canada tells both a unique and common story. It is unique in that
its history of conquest, expansion, and legislative management are centered on the reality
of bilingualism and the presence of at least three (broadly defined) founding peoples:
those of English, French, and Aboriginal ancestry. Canadian history is common with
respect to its story as a British colonial possession. One can find common experiences,
patterns of action, and strains of governance in British post-colonial societies such as
Australia and New Zealand to name a few.
This chapter chronicles the general history of Canada with specific attention to the
project of creating a singular Canadian nation-state. With at least three ethno-cultural
groups claiming status as “founding peoples” defining a distinct nationalism is essential
in the fight for political capital (not to mention the social and economic benefits of
cultural dominance). The history of Canada, from a Canadian nationalist perspective, is
distinct from indigenous, Québec, or any other ethno-cultural national history. The
purpose of this chapter is to tell this national story, but also to illustrate the struggles to
promote a singular Canadian nationalism, particularly from a singularly EnglishCanadian perspective.
1. Prehistory, First Contact, and the Colonization of New France9
The archeological evidence of Canadian pre-history has identified two migrations
of native peoples. The first migration is believed to have occurred in successive waves
9

This section was compiled from several narrative historical sources including Dickason (1997), Eccles
(1972; 1969), Parkman (1983; 1962), and See (2001).
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from anywhere between 20,000 and 10,000 BCE. Archeological evidence supports the
“land bridge theory” of Asiatic migration of Native American peoples. This theory and
evidence is, in turn, supported by recent genetic evidence that links Native Americans
with Asian (particularly Siberian) ancestry (Lell et al. 2002; Santos et al. 1999; Bonatto
and Salzano 1997). A second migration is thought to have taken place between 8,000 and
3,000 BCE and explains the linguistic differences apparent between Inuit and Aleut arctic
cultures and southern native peoples (Brace et al. 2001; McGhee 1978, 1996; See
2001)10.
These Native Canadians comprised a population that arguably reached 500,000 or
more prior to European contact. Geography and linguistics traditionally separated these
peoples into several distinct groups from the Chinook and Salish of the Pacific Northwest
to the Blackfoot and Chipewyan of the Plains to the James Bay Cree and Huron of the
Eastern Woodlands to the Beothuk and Penobscot of the Atlantic Maritimes to the Inuit
and Dene of the Arctic. Prehistoric Canada was clearly a land of great demographic
diversity. The European “Age of Discovery,” as was the case in the entirety of the
hemisphere, brought about the end of indigenous predominance in North America. The
continued (to this day) centrality of native peoples to the history and culture of Canada
cannot be discounted. Politically, however, the establishment of New France would
sound the beginning of European dominance over the region.
Norse sagas make mention of contact with Native Canadians at or before 1000
CE, but sustained contact between Native Canadians and Europeans was not to occur
10

It should be noted that traditional Native Canadian beliefs reject these scientific theories of migration on
the basis that they contradict First Nations religious beliefs that respective tribes have lived on what is now
Canadian soil from the beginning of time. These scientific theories are viewed as being political tools to
discount First Nations claims of sovereignty and autonomy.
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until the 16th century. Explorations by John Cabot (1497) and Giovanni de Verrazano
(1524-1528) were two of the many who began to explore the Atlantic coast of what
would become Canada. Verrazano was of particular importance as he sailed under the
French flag (commission by King François I) and proclaimed the land Nova Francia. The
common story of exploration was told again in “New France” as commercial opportunity
drove the first settlements. Fishermen eager to take advantage of fishing stocks off the
shallows near Nova Scotia and Newfoundland established the first temporary settlements,
while Basque fishermen and whalers did the same.
Jacques Cartier’s three voyages in the early 16th century did little to encourage
French settlement but did develop an improved cartographic knowledge of the St.
Lawrence River including visits to what would be Québec and Montréal. For years,
informal fishing settlements constituted the European population of New France. These
settlements established trading relationships between European groups (French, English,
Portuguese, and Basque) and Native Canadian groups.
French interest in Canada rose in conjunction with demand for beaver furs in
Europe. Samuel de Champlain succeeded in establishing the colony of Québec in 1608
after a failed attempt in Nova Scotia four years earlier. Champlain’s retention of the
Algonquin name Québec reflects a relationship with the local Algonquin peoples that
would enable the settlement to survive. This was a relatively reciprocal relationship as the
French engaged in Algonquin-Iroquois conflicts on behalf of their allies for years. Of
course, disease and sporadic French-Algonquin conflict would ultimately decimate the
once populous group.
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As the settlement of Québec began to show that a permanent French settlement
was possible and as the trade in beaver fur remained lucrative, more settlers began to
arrive to settle the St. Lawrence region. However, tenuous support from the French
government and the failure to discover alternative sources of income (other than furs)
ensured that the colony would remain small in comparison with English, Dutch, and
Spanish possessions to the south.
New France did succeed in cultivating enough land in the St. Lawrence region to
stabilize their population. The French settlers had another series of advantages over larger
colonies; the geography of the region was especially conducive to the fur trade as well as
providing transportation infrastructure for future commercial endeavors. The St.
Lawrence River System provided a series of inland ports and protected harbors that
served the French well. The fur trade provided ample financial incentive to invest and
travel to New France, if only as a temporary resident. The consequence of this expansion
of the fur trade and settlement in the Mississippi River Valley as well as in the Great
Lakes region was that conflict with the also expanding British colonies would be
inevitable.
King William’s War (1690-1697) represented the first of many violent conflicts
between the French-Algonquin alliance and the British colonials. These conflicts ebbed
and flowed with the currents of war blowing from Europe, but the conflicts in New
France and the American colonies took on a regular pattern of coordinated raids on towns
and ports from the late 1600s through 1763. A series of European treaties (Utrecht in
1713 and Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748) ensured that the political map of North America was
in constant flux. Both the British and French used colonial possessions as bargaining
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chips throughout the treaty process. Settlers seemed to be constantly in a state of raidpreparedness and uncertainty over claims to forts, lands, and strategic geography. This
state of constant contact and conflict culminated in the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763)
and effectively ended French political and economic participation in the settlement of
North America.
1a. The Seven Years’ War and the Conquest of French Canada
The Seven Years’ War began as prior colonial conflicts had – as both extensions
of European continental conflict and local conflict between groups seeking the same
material resources. In 1754 colonial British and French forces met near Fort Duquesne at
what would become the city of Pittsburgh. This relatively minor conflict illustrated the
fact that French dominance of the Mississippi River Valley was increasingly challenged
by British-American colonists crossing west over the Appalachian Mountains. As
colonial settlers battled for territory and resources, their European masters continued the
long history of French and British warfare. The colonial conflict soon escalated from
frontier skirmishes to a full-scale war culminating with British victories at Québec and
Montréal. The particulars of the protracted War have been chronicled to the point of
mythology, especially the battle at the Plains of Abraham in which both Generals
Montcalm and Wolfe died11. The eventual defeat of French forces in North America
effectively ensured British and American control of the northeastern portion of the
continent.

11

Full and detailed accounts of both the Seven Years’ War as well as the legendary status of the battle for
Québec on the Plains of Abraham have been eloquently written by Fred Anderson (2001), Francis Parkman
(1962), and Francis Jennings (1988).
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With the fall of Québec in 1759 and Montréal in 1760, New France was officially
captured territory in the hands of the British. The 1763 Treaty of Paris officially granted
the lands of New France to the British ensuring that, for the time being, territory
stretching from the Atlantic seaboard to the Mississippi River Valley and from Georgia to
the Arctic Circle was British. In the same year a Royal Proclamation created the colony
of Québec and set the conditions for French assimilation. The Catholic Church was
ignored by the new colonial administration, as was the feudal land-grant system of
seigneurial control. English criminal and civil law replaced the dominant authority of
both the French colonial administration and the Catholic Church. Clearly, the goal of the
1763 Proclamation was to assimilate the French population as quickly as possible. The
British colonial authorities underestimated the desire of French-Canadians to retain their
language and culture. In addition, the dominance of the Catholic Church in the life of the
average Canadien12 was unquestionable. English efforts to eliminate Catholicism from
Québec were met with staunch resistance. The population and culture of French Canada
was too entrenched for any comprehensive assimilationist policy to be effective.
Anglophone immigration was limited to “mostly administrators, merchants, and
military leaders” (Conrad, Finkel, and Jaenen 1993, 249) and could not counter the
population and solidarity of the Francophone Canadiens. The British responded to the
failed policy (1763 Royal Proclamation) with the Québec Act in 1774. This act restored
French civil law, including recognition of the Catholic Church, while maintaining British
12

The term Canadien refers to Francophone citizens of Canada. This is a cultural distinction made by
French-Canadians that implies a distinct history and lineage of a colonial founding people. The term can be
compared to habitant, which is an original French-Canadian farmer that worked under the seigneiurial
system of land tenure in early Québec history. The habitants are a specific rural group with strong ties to
the rural, agricultural history of Québec, while Canadien is a term that can be applied to Francophone
citizens of the larger Canadian nation-state.
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criminal law and political authority. This Act served the dual purpose of pacifying
Canadien dissent and bolstering British colonial authority on the eve of the American
Revolution. Unlike the Royal Proclamation of 1763, the Québec Act was successful in
quelling any potential Francophone revolt and keeping Québec out of the American
Revolution.
The issue of the American Revolution is significant in its impact on Canadian
history. British loyalists (Tories) migrated en masse during the War as a result of
American discriminatory measures and their desire to maintain ties to the British Empire.
A first migration of Tories moved to Nova Scotia and petitioned the British to create a
new colony that would become New Brunswick. There was also a later movement to the
border region between the St. Lawrence River and Detroit (Lanctôt 1967). This second
migration of English-speaking British loyalists would also petition the British
government for political autonomy due to the conditions of the Québec Act, which denied
them the right to British civil law. The British responded to this request with the 1791
Constitutional Act that divided Québec into two: Upper (English) and Lower (French)
Canada. The Act allowed respective legal, religious, and civil systems to exist in each
region while maintaining British political control.
The division of Canada allowed local cultural and civic institutions to function.
To say that this was a concession to the Francophone Canadiens would be an
overstatement. The British instituted a mercantile trade relationship with Canada thus
facilitating Anglophone control of trade. Trade and merchant relationships with Britain
were of supreme importance and thus much of the fur trade commercial management fell
into the hands of the English, particularly in Montréal. This shift in control of commercial
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centers would create an historical condition of economic stratification that will be
discussed in the next chapter. By the beginning of the Nineteenth Century, the political
and economic face of Canada was increasingly English.
2. Post-conquest and Confederation, 1800-187013
Canada in the first half of the Nineteenth Century would be defined by
intermittent rebellious sentiment, an evolving relationship with the United States to the
south, and the persistent problem of the “French Fact.” Each of these conditions
contributed to the environment that spawned the first of Canada’s multi-act constitutional
documents: the Constitution Act of 1867.
A series of rebellions against British colonial authorities began in 1837 due to the
effects of an economic downturn earlier in the decade caused by poor harvest and
political reform in Britain that did not extend to the Canadian colonies. These conditions
created a certain level of anti-authoritarian sentiment on the part of both French and
English Canadians and were directed squarely at the British colonial authorities,
including their local representatives in both Upper and Lower Canada. The ideological
influence of the United States on Canada during this period cannot be ignored. The
combination of lethargic British colonial administrative reforms and the example of
liberal capitalist governance to the south created quite a strong desire among Canadians
for change.
These rebellions were poorly organized and relatively sporadic in both Upper and
Lower Canada. The level of British colonial control and the languid pace of political and

13

The chapter was compiled from several historical narrative sources including Buckner (1985); Conrad,
Finkel, and Jaenen (1997); Hallowell (2005); and See (2001).
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economic reforms provided ample motivation for reform oriented leaders whose message
of change was eagerly absorbed by impoverished farmers. In terms of generating large
scale change or even wide-spread revolutionary action, these rebellions were failures.
The outbreak of violent insurrection in Canada so soon after the American Revolution
greatly alarmed both conservative (Tory) Canadians and the British government.
The motivations for these rebellions in Lower Canada and Upper Canada were
reflective of the larger transitions from a mercantilist to liberal economic relationship
with the United Kingdom. The British government was resistant to reforms, particularly
in its established colonies that provided the bulk of England’s raw material resources.
While the rebellions could easily be classified as a “middle-class” reaction to the British
refusal to reform economic structures, the rebellions in Lower Canada also contained a
level of ethnic mobilization and included many lower-class farmers. This difference is
entirely consistent with the economic inequalities present between Upper and Lower
Canada at this time. The free-holding agricultural system of Upper Canada was more
amenable to capital accumulation and thus a greater middle-class agricultural population.
In Lower Canada, the seigneurial system was based on a quasi-feudal relationship
between a landed seigneur and a tenant farmer. The lack of property ownership and the
rent requirements of this relationship ensured that the habitants remained landless and
poor.
While these resistive activities did little to affect immediate administrative
change, they did pressure the British to establish an inquiry led by Lord Durham in 1838.
The subsequent Durham Report suggested establishing a unique level of Canadian
governmental autonomy while remaining within the British Commonwealth. The intent
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was to effectively address the causes of the rebellions but also maintain supreme
authority in matters of political and economic relations between Canada and Great
Britain.
The Durham Report is significant for two historical reasons. The first was the
promotion of a confederation model of governance that would shape the future of
Canadian federal-provincial relationships for years to come. The second issue of
significance was the resurgence of anti-French sentiment through the Report’s insistence
on French assimilation in Canada. The legislative importance of the Durham Report is of
primary importance in this chapter. The cultural legacy of the Durham Report will be
revisited in the following chapter.
The emergence of an autonomous government in Canada began with the 1841 Act
of Union that united Upper and Lower Canada into the single colonial entity of Canada,
while maintaining the legislative distinction of Canada West and Canada East,
respectively. Both entities were allowed legislatures of equal numbers but firm executive
power resided with the Governor who was the Crown’s official representative in Canada,
thus maintaining British political authority. These political organizational changes were
reflective of the larger economic shifts away from mercantilist empires to a more open
liberal market economy. Domestically, the colonial divisions of Canada were view by
colonial authorities as an impediment to civic improvements projects and economic
development, particularly westward expansion. Liberal economic reforms were viewed as
the solution to economic stagnation, particularly agrarian reforms that allowed both land
ownership and the ability to accumulate reinvestable capital by Canadian farmers with
the goal of expanding the agricultural production capacities of the colony.
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These reform impulses motivated the Confederation Debates between all BritishCanadian colonial entities at the 1864 Québec Conference. The most contentious and
historically persistent issue of federal and provincial relations was that of autonomy
under the aegis of a confederated Canada. In short, the proposed federalist system of
governance included a level of centralized control that was disconcerting for some
colonies. These issues were enough to keep Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland
from participating in the confederation project. The novel concept of an autonomous state
within the British colonial system became a reality with the British North America Act
(BNAA) in 1867.
2a. The British North America Act
The BNAA reflected the conflicts and conditions that originally motivated the
Durham Report. International relationships, with the United States and the United
Kingdom played a significant role in the shaping of the BNAA with respect to federalism
and national identity construction. In the case of federalism, the recent American Civil
War motivated the Canadian framers to attribute more power to the federal government
of Canada than to individual provinces. The mechanics of the document promoted the
three ideals of “peace, order, and good government” in an obvious departure from the
language of the American Declaration of Independence. This attempt to differentiate
Canadian and American histories, societies, cultures, and identities is the first legislative
effort to create a unique Canadian national identity. This would be a difficult and
prolonged effort that continues to this day and serves as one of the single most important
challenges to Canadian government as will be shown in subsequent chapters.
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The Act established a House of Commons and a Senate with legislative powers.
The British monarchy retained executive powers with the appointed Governor-General
serving as the Crown’s proxy. The BNAA did allow room for legislative interpretation
with respect to authority granted to the central Canadian government and that of
provincial authorities. This ambiguity concerning federal and provincial authority was
largely responsible for nonparticipation by Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland in
1867 and continued to color Canadian history with respect to the numerous debates
concerning federal and provincial authority. The federal government was granted powers
of taxation and veto with respect to provincial legislation, while the provinces were
granted autonomy over educational policies and issues of civil rights.
The BNAA also granted the legal status of two official languages in the country:
French and English. This provision again shows the persistence of the “French Fact” in
the face of considerable English pressure for the assimilation of the Canadiens. The
legislative recognition of linguistic equality in conjunction with the federal-provincial
balance of powers that was established by the BNAA would create significant platforms
for issues of political autonomy and control. The issue of federal-provincial relations
undergirds the previously mentioned issues of culture and national identity in Canada.
These relationships will be discussed at length but bear mention here for the fact that
their origins lie with the British North America Act. It should be noted that the BNAA,
while providing the necessary political autonomy for a national-state foundation, was
motivated in large part by the British government. The BNAA was instrumental in
providing a framework on which a Canadian national project could be built, but should
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not be understood as a distinctly Canadian product. Rather the BNAA reflects the
growing political economic potential of a British colony in a time of declining empire.
2b. Westward Expansion and the Beginning of the Canadian Nation-State
With the (partial) unification of Canada completed, the newly elected federal
government under the leadership of Canada’s first Prime Minister, Sir John A.
Macdonald, undertook the massive project of westward expansion. This was seen as an
economic imperative as the vast plains of Manitoba and Saskatchewan presented vast
agricultural potential and the newly established province of British Columbia (1871)
offered a Pacific port for future trade with Asia. The project of expansion carried with it
the same issues and conflicts as in the American experience. Specifically, Native
Canadian assimilation and land appropriation resulted in resistance, rebellion, and
conflict in the Red and Saskatchewan River regions in the interior of the new country.
The combination of the encroaching Canadian Pacific Railway and a massive
government effort to settle and exploit the interior plains pressured the indigenous
peoples and Métis14 to respond. The Red River conflict of 1869 saw a period of sporadic
violence between settlers and the Métis provisional government. This provisional
government was designed to protect the culture and land of indigenous and Métis
inhabitants of the region in response to Canadian encroachment. The conflict and outcry
over the actions of these Catholic, Francophone, and mixed-race Métis pressured the
14

The Métis are the children of French and English fur traders and members of the Cree, Ojibway, and
Saulteaux tribes. The Métis played a significant leadership role in the history and governance of Manitoba.
In fact, the entrance of Manitoba into the Canadian confederation in 1870 illustrates the influence of the
Métis. The Manitoba Act (1870) ensured separate educational institutions based on linguistic preference as
well as recognizing English and French as official provincial languages. The 1873 “Half Breed Land Grant
Protection Act” was only partly successful in protecting the land claims of the Métis settlers of the
province, but it does serve an historical purpose in exposing the power of the Métis people to motivate
provincial protectionist legislation on their behalf.
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Macdonald government to diffuse the situation. The federal response was to establish the
province of Manitoba in 1870 while maintaining many of the local protectionist policies
of the provisional government.
This compromise was not to last as rapid settlement and frequent treaty violations,
commonly in the form of land acquisition pushed many Métis west to the Saskatchewan
River region. Conditions continued to deteriorate as several treaties claimed former
Native Canadian land for federal government use. The 1876 Indian Act, designed to
encourage assimilation of Native Canadians, also inflamed already tenuous relations
between the Métis and settlers. The resulting North-West Rebellion resulted in the
execution of several indigenous combatants including the leader of both the Red River
and Northwest rebellious actions, Louis Riel. This was the last organized resistance to
Canadian westward expansion.
The repression of indigenous resistance in the West allowed the nationalist
expansion project to continue. Under the Macdonald “National Policy” the shape of
Canada drastically changed. British Columbia became a province in 1871, the Canadian
Pacific Railway was completed in 1881, and the late Nineteenth Century saw Canada’s
first massive recruitment effort to populate and exploit the vast natural resources of the
country. It was clear very early in the colonial Canadian project that the resources and
land-spaces of Canada were far too vast for the small population of French and English
settlers to productively exploit. New sources of labor were needed if westward expansion
was to be successful. The federal government actively promoted the Canadian as a place
of amazing agricultural potential.
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3. Immigration and the Peopling of Canada15
The organizational and deliberate promotion of selective immigration in order to
encourage agricultural growth in Canada was led by the Minister of the Department of
the Interior, Clifford Sifton16. The Department’s Immigration Branch began to distribute
promotional materials in strategic locations such as the United States and Great Britain.
The emphasis on recruitment in the United States was quite successful with an estimated
750,000 Americans emigrating between 1901 and 1914 (Citizenship and Immigration
Canada 2000). The provincial creation of Saskatchewan and Alberta in 1905 further
emphasized the managed growth and dominion claims of the Canadian government.
Encouraged by the success of the American and British recruitment efforts, Sifton
continued to expand his efforts into Central and Eastern Europe. His goals for peopling
the interior of the country were colored by desires for a specific type of immigrant, the
“stalwart peasants” (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2000). The most numerous of
these people agreeing to Canada’s offer of settlement were from the Ukraine. The
Ukrainian example is an historically important one as this was an ethnic group that
actively strove to maintain its cultural and linguistic heritage in an adopted land. In 1905
the province of Manitoba financed a teacher education program in the Ukrainian
language, enacting arguably Canada’s first multicultural policy outside of the traditional
triad of Indigenous, French and English peoples. The years preceding the First World

15

The chapter was compiled from several historical narrative sources including Brown and Cook (1974),
Cameron (2004), Halli and Driedger (1999), Owram (1992), See (2001), and Waite (1971).
16
Sifton served as Minister for the Department of the Interior from 1896 to 1905 under the Liberal
government of Wilfrid Laurier. Information pertaining to his ministerial career and policies was obtained
from Citizenship and Immigration Canada’s Forging Our Legacy project,
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/legacy/.
.
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War were characterized by massive recruitment and immigration to Canada. Ukrainian
settlers were followed by Germans and Italians who settled both in urban and rural areas.
An example of this massive growth is Saskatchewan, which saw its population explode
from approximately 91,000 in 1901 to 500,000 in 1911 (Bitner and Newman 2005).
The active recruitment of immigrants led to a populist political backlash. Public
sentiment against non-Northern and Western European immigration was palpable,
particularly against the expansion of Chinese immigration in British Columbia. As early
as 1885 (and again in 1900 and 1903), financial disincentives were established to reduce
Chinese immigration into the country. When Sifton resigned his post in 1905 he was
replaced by Frank Oliver, whose approach to immigration was focused much more on
public sentiment and political opinion. One year later the federal government passed the
first of several laws regulating immigration into Canada. The Immigration Act of 1906
established definitions for “immigrant” and established restrictions on acceptable
individuals (denying the mentally disabled and incompetent, criminals, those “afflicted
with a loathsome disease” and the very poor) and occupations (criminals and prostitutes).
The real impact of this Act, however, was in the federal codification of immigration
regulations with standardized procedures and penalties for non-compliance17.
The 1906 Act provided the legislative precedent for further restrictions in 1910.
The Immigration Act of 1910 was much more explicit in its prohibitions (adding the
blind, deaf, and dumb to its existing list of physical and mental maladies) and allowing

17

The Immigration Act of 1906 is a watershed legislative moment in Canadian history. In just one year the
official stance of the federal government went from promoting Canada as an opportunity to restricting
landings and legislating discriminatory policies. The text of the Act can be found at the Canadian National
Library at http://www.canadiana.org/ECO/ItemRecord/9_07188. Of particular note are the stated restricted
peoples listed and defined in sections 26-29.
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more subjective leeway for immigration officers, particularly with respect to race and
ethnicity. For example, Section 38 of the Act states that immigrants of “any race deemed
unsuited to the climate and requirements of Canada, or of immigrants of any specified
class, occupation, or character18”. Clearly, the welcome for non-Western European
immigration had been rescinded in Canada. These measures would serve to pacify public
outcry against increasing ethnic diversification due to liberal immigration policies – a
common theme in North America at the turn of the century.
4. World Wars and Political Autonomy19
By the time of the First World War, Canada had expanded its industrial
capacities, thanks in part to protective tariffs and a concerted effort to expand the pool of
available labor through immigration. The coming of the First World War brought the
realization that Canadian isolation, or at least its status as a subordinate British colonial
possession, had come to an end. Prior to 1914 many Canadian economists and business
leaders began calling for the commencement of reciprocal trade with the United States
and the removal of nationalist trade protections. Their reasoning was reflective of the
growing sense of Canadian autonomy and a desire to realign economically from a fading
global power to a more geographically convenient emergent power. The defeat of the
Liberal party platform of trade reciprocity with the U.S. in 1911 quelled this argument for
a time, but Canadian involvement in World War I would usher in an era of greater
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The Immigration Act of 1910 is viewed as the logical outcome of its 1906 predecessor. While raciallyspecific immigration policies regulating Asian migration had been in effect since the 1860s, this was the
first federal regulatory measure applied to immigrants with general racist criteria. The text of the Act can
be found at the Canadian National Library at http://www.canadiana.org/ECO/ItemRecord/9_07184.
19
The chapter was compiled from several historical narrative sources including Bothwell, Drummond, and
English (1989; 1987); Brown and Cook (1974); Granatstein (1975); See (2001); and Thompson and Seager
(1985).
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political economic autonomy for Canada and shift the dominant international economic
relationship from the United Kingdom to the United States.
In a sense, Canada was drawn into World War I at the behest of the British.
General public support for England and France in Canada was not in serious question;
however it was Canada’s position within the British Empire that created a de facto
position of military support. Ironically, this support and Canadian political actions after
1918 would further distance the country from its colonial past and work to create a
modern nation apart from the constraints of the British Empire.
Canadian contributions to the war effort included increased industrial production,
support services (including medical and transportation services), and a significant
military contribution. These military contributions, specifically conscription which was
instituted by the Military Service Act of 1917, served as the most contentious issue on the
Canadian home-front. Resistance to conscription was widespread throughout the country
but remained a minority position outside of Québec. This popular position (in Québec)
was indicative of the French-Canadian argument against European imperialism. Why, it
was argued, should French-Canadians support a war on the grounds of saving the British
Empire when Québec was a victim of British imperialism? The fact that France was
under attack was of little consequence as many French-Canadians viewed France as
having abandoned their kin to the British. Both the military effort in general and the
Military Service Act went unsupported in Québec and resulted in anti-conscription riots
throughout the province. These events further illustrated the divergent attitudes and
opinions that belied a Canadian national identity. For the federal government however,
these domestic conflicts and disagreements were secondary to the process of building a
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sovereign nation-state. Independent participation in the war effort was an important step
in this nation-building process.
The level of Canadian participation in World War I accelerated its emancipation
from Britain. The inter-war period illustrates the level of this emancipation on both
positive and negative tracks. Immediately following the war, Canada participated in the
short-lived League of Nations as an independent member. This political autonomy was
further exemplified with the negotiation of the 1923 Halibut Treaty that codified Pacific
Northwest fisheries. This treaty was negotiated and enacted between the United States
and Canada without participation of the British government. In 1926 Lord Balfour
advocated a level of political sovereignty of countries within the British Commonwealth.
This support from Balfour was essential in promoting the 1931 Westminster Statute that
officially created the British Commonwealth including the recognition of independence
with respect to domestic and foreign policy but retaining British legislative authority.
4a. Economic Interdependence
In terms of trade and economic issues, the decade of the 1920s saw the emergence
of the United States as Canada’s single greatest trading partner. This economic
relationship would motivate a decrease in national protective tariffs, particularly on the
part of Canada and drastically increase the level of economic interdependence between
the two North American countries. No experience is more telling of this relationship than
the nearly identical experiences of Canadians and Americans during the Great
Depression.
The expansion of liberal market economics in the latter half of the 1800s pushed
individual nations toward increasing their export capabilities. This reorientation would
101

prove disastrous for most Western countries during the Depression Era. The immediate
and persisting effects of economic depression ensured that foreign orders would decrease
– in most cases drastically. In turn, decreased domestic income due to the collapse of
export income would allow no viable avenues for short-term recovery. These conditions
were exacerbated in a situation of massive economic interdependence like that of Canada
and the United States. The resulting “Dirty Thirties” saw matching industrial and urban
poverty levels rise dramatically. Agricultural regions and sectors were heavily impacted
as drought and a decline in market demand combined to create conditions of abject
destitution. The “Dust Bowl” conditions so passionately captured in photographs ran
from Mexico to the northern reaches of agricultural production in Saskatchewan and
Manitoba.
Political responses to the Depression era were also quite similar. The
Conservative government of Richard Bennett attempted to replicate the relative successes
of Roosevelt’s “New Deal” by providing programs such as unemployment insurance,
industrial oversight, and permanent economic planning. These efforts were unsuccessful
and resulted in the defeat of the Conservative government in 1935. The result of these
collective experiences was a nearly universal belief that the federal Canadian government
was not doing nearly enough for its citizens, particularly in times of crisis. The postDepression period would see a desire to establish clear social responsibilities of the
federal government. This desire to strengthen the state was reflected in the 1940 RowellSirois commission report. The Rowell-Sirois Commission pointed to the increase in
provincial power due to judicial decisions as a serious problem for welfare provision. The
report advocated a resumption of the federal authority established by the 1867 British
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North America Act. Much of the Rowell-Sirois report was supported by the inability of
provincial governments to address the massive social and economic welfare crisis of the
Great Depression. This era would see the legitimation and practical expansion of the
Canadian state that would play an essential role in the post-World War II history of the
nation.
4b. The Expansion of the Canadian Welfare State
The Second World War again saw Canada enter a major international conflict and
provide significant human and material resources on behalf of the Allied powers. The
typical Canadian story during World War II told of support for the Allied effort,
particularly on behalf of a besieged Britain. There were exceptions particularly in Québec
where the resurgent criticism of British support ensured that the Canadian effort would
not be universally supported. Conscription again emerged as a contentious issue with
Québec in opposition to a reestablished draft. The majority of Canada, however,
supported conscription and welcomed the massive increase in industrial production that
accompanied the war years.
The post-war devastation of Europe created a significant opportunity for Canada.
The industrial and economic infrastructures that supported the war effort remained intact
and Canada’s position as a growing power to the north of the Western Superpower of the
United States ensured increased international visibility. The country was a major
participant in the founding of the United Nations in 1945 and an early leader in
humanitarian efforts within the organization.
Domestically the post-war period continued massive increases in industrial
production and economic growth. This period of economic growth was extended by
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Canada’s participation in the Korean War, but would come to an end in 1957, as the
global trends of economic growth would slide into recession. The classic Canadian
problem of manpower again served as a significant post-war problem. Increases in
immigration provided essential labor to fuel Canada’s economic boom. This situation of
economic growth hampered by persistent labor demand would play a significant role in
the development of contemporary Canada and will be addressed in subsequent chapters.
In brief, the period from 1945 through 1960 saw increases in state responsibility for
social welfare, a massive rise in immigration through the late 1950s, and a growth in
Canada’s international status as a central political and economic power. The major
outcome of this period would be centered on an old but intensifying Canadian problem:
national unity.
The Diefenbaker government of 1957-1963 offers several illustrations of these
dynamic yet ominous times. First, Diefenbaker clearly understood the dangers and threats
to national unity posed by rapid economic growth and accompanying increases
immigration. His government promoted two efforts to stem the liberal notion of
individual ethnic identity and encourage an assimilationist Canadian nationalism. The
first was a general emphasis on national unity called “One Canada.” This policy was
designed to deemphasize racial, ethnic, and cultural identification and promote a singular
nationalistic ideal of personal identity. The second effort was the 1960 Bill of Rights that
provided legislative justification for the ideological positions of the “One Canada” policy.
This was the first of many legislative efforts to promote and define Canadian nationalism
as a singularity. Diefenbaker should be credited as one of the first to legislate a definition
of “Canadian.”
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Both the ideological and legislative nationalism of the Diefenbaker government
seemed the final straw for Québec. In 1960, the long-standing conservative provincial
government of Maurice Duplessis (1936-1939 and 1944-1959) was defeated by Jean
Lesage’s Liberals who immediately began a project of Keynesian economic and
governmental reforms intended to modernize the province. These reforms would evolve
into a political and cultural period of empowering change known as La Révolution
tranquille (Quiet Revolution). The consequence of this period in Québec would be the
motivation of a more inclusive nationalism and the strengthening of the Canadian nationstate.
5. The Quiet Revolution and Ethnic Challenges to Pan-Canadian Nationalism20
In brief, the Quiet Revolution was a period of political and economic
modernization in conjunction with an urban cultural nationalism centered on the
uniqueness of Québec. The “revolutionary” aspects of this period describe the incredible
speed with which the province shifted from an agrarian rural society that was largely
defined by its Catholic faith and social institutions. Following the Quiet Revolution, we
find a Québec that is urban, industrial, and increasingly secular in its worldview. For
English Canada, the Quiet Revolution represented a significant acceleration of the
demands and volume of French-Canadian nationalism. The emergence of an articulated
Québécois identity in conjunction with the persistent call for Québec sovereignty led
many in English Canada to begin to question whether Canada could, in fact, survive this
challenge to its national-state framework.

20
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Briefly, the Quiet Revolution was a period of political change that instituted
liberal economic reforms (within a socially democratic context) and ethno-nationalist
social and cultural reforms. The “Revolution” formally ended traditional structures of
socio-political control in the form of the Catholic Church and Anglophone economic
dominance in Québec commercial centers. The provincial state quickly replaced the
Church in providing social services to the Québec population through the expansion of
state control over education, health care, and other social services. The state also
increased its role in economic sectors with the nationalization of power and water utilities
(Hydro-Québec) and gaining control over a provincial pension plan that also had the
ability to protect specifically Francophone businesses. The goals, and in fact the actual
outcomes, of the Quiet Revolution were to reassert the Francophone, Québécois nature of
Québec society while at the same time expanding economic sectors and productive
capacities to harness the growth potential of liberal (economic) market integration.
The full impact of the Quiet Revolution will be discussed in the following
chapter. Its importance to the development of a French-Canadian identity and culture that
was neither Canadian nor French but Québécois cannot be understated; however its role
in the history of Canada is of primary importance here. The “revolutionary” aspects of
this period are debatable and will be further discussed. The extended nature of this
process of change does connote some level of significant change; however the sentiment
of French-Canadian or Québécois nationalism was neither new nor revolutionary. The
significance of this change was the provision of a secular state support structure that
allowed Québécois nationalism the opportunity to thrive as a progressive alternative to
stagnant isolationism. The Quiet Revolution period was complex with divergent attitudes
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and directions yet served as a focal point for a people who generally felt repressed by the
power of Anglophone Canada.
During the same period, Canada was faced with yet another problem – that of a
resurgent economy (following the recession years of 1957-1961) and a dwindling source
of labor migrants. As Europe began to recover and promote intra-continental labor
migration, Canada saw a precipitous decline in its traditional sources of immigration.
Labor from alternative source countries was needed if Canada was to continue its longterm project of economic growth. As a result Canada passed a series of legislative acts
designed to reduce racial and ethnic restrictions on possible immigrants. In 1962 the
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration announced the de-racialization of Canadian
immigration by emphasizing educational attainment and vocational skills as entry
criteria. In 1966 the Assisted Passage Loan Scheme (a program of loans to desired
immigrants) ended its European-only policy and was amended to include migrants from
the Caribbean. Finally, in 1967 Canadian immigration policy completely eliminated race
and country of origin from its selection criteria with the implementation of the Points
System, which evaluated vocational and language skills, education, and other aspects of
potential immigrants.
The result of this economically driven shift in immigration policy was the rapid
diversification of Canadian immigration and the increasing diversification of Canadian
urban areas. For example, prior to 1962 the top three origins of Canadian immigrants
were the United Kingdom, Italy, and Germany. By the year 2000, the top three origins
were China, India, and Pakistan (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2000). Changes in
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Canadian immigration policy in the 1960s would forever change the face of metropolitan
Canada and pose additional challenges to the idea of a pan-Canadian nationalism.
5a. Managing Ethnic Diversity
The pressures of the Quiet Revolution on Canadian federalism prompted the
Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in 1963. Their work was intended
to solidify Canadian nationalism through the recognition and inclusion of Francophones
as “founding peoples.” The ethno-cultural dichotomy assumed by the Commission led to
discontent and protest from Canadians of neither English nor French ancestry. This socalled “Third Force” rejected any bicultural definition of the country and motivated the
addition of Book IV to the Commission’s final report chronicling the “The Cultural
Contributions of Other Ethnic Groups” in 1970. The Commission on Bilingualism and
Biculturalism Report (B&B Report) would serve as an important tool for one of the most
controversial Prime Ministers in Canadian history, Pierre Eliot Trudeau.
Trudeau came to power in 1968 and immediately resumed Diefenbaker’s project
of creating pan-Canadian nationalism. It is unclear whether Trudeau originally agreed
with Diefenbaker’s singular or mono-cultural view of Canada, but a resurgent Québec
and a labor migrant population that was increasingly ethnically diverse motivated a shift
in the federal position in defending and defining Canadian nationalism. The B&B Report
allowed Trudeau to sponsor a series of cultural policies designed to define Canadian
nationalism and acknowledge the changing face of the Canadian nation. The 1969
Official Languages Act recognized both English and French as national languages and in
1971 Trudeau laid the groundwork for a federal multicultural policy. These actions
countered the ethnic nationalist message of the Quiet Revolution in Québec through their
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message of inclusion and the recognition of diversity throughout the country. In other
words, through the official embrace of ethno-cultural diversity, the multiculturalism of
the Trudeau administration effectively recognized the distinctive Québécois culture while
recognizing this diversity as being of equal status to that of other non-Anglo groups in
Canada. Québec was, in the eyes of the federal government, distinct but equal, and above
all a Canadian province like all the others.
The Multicultural Policy of 1971 had yet another nationalistic purpose in its
ability to distinguish Canadian diversity policy from that of the United States, thus further
distinguishing a distinctly Canadian national culture. By promoting the “cultural mosaic”
model over the American “melting pot” strategy, Canada could distinguish itself
internationally as an increasingly distinct and independent society. This was further
exemplified by the federal government’s continuing concern over foreign economic
investment and ownership of Canadian production facilities. Trudeau’s lack of support
for increased “free-trade” between the United States and Canada, as well as his
unwillingness to fully support US actions in Vietnam and the Cuba trade embargo,
further distanced the two countries politically while maintaining the status of mutual
primary trading partners.
The question of national unity, which was a continuing priority for the Trudeau
government, suffered a significant blow in 1976 with the election of René Lévesque and
the Parti Québécois (PQ) in the province of Québec. The PQ wrested provincial power
from the traditional liberal party (Parti libéral du Québec) on the platform of sovereignty
through a renegotiated relationship with the Canadian federal government. The PQ was
successful in bringing about cultural policies intended to codify the cultural goals of the
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Quiet Revolution. Among the most significant legislative achievements of the Levesque
administration was the passage of Bill 101 (Charter of the French Language) that
officially enforced French as the language of major business and government as well as
requiring that new immigrants to Québec send their children to French-language schools.
In 1980, the PQ brought about a public referendum on that they termed “sovereigntyassociation.” If successful the referendum would grant authority to the provincial
government to negotiate the extent and level of provincial autonomy leading toward
increased sovereignty. The referendum failed as sixty percent of provincial voters
rejected the proposal. The failure of the 1980 Québec referendum was a significant
victory for the Trudeau administration that had dedicated tremendous resources to the
defeat of the referendum. This failure for the Parti Québécois led Levesque to approach
an emboldened Trudeau and work with him on a standing promise to revise the
relationship between federal and provincial authorities.
6. Constitutional Repatriation and an Autonomous Canada21
These promised revisions to the British North America Act prompted Trudeau to
bring provincial leaders together in the hopes that a new constitutional agreement could
be reached that would replace the British North America Act. This process would grant
Canada a domestic tradition of self-governance and officially remove the British
legislative legacy from a political system that was practically free of British influence by
this time. In November 1981 all but one of the provincial ministers signed the revised
constitution (Constitution Act), which was passed as the Canada Act by the British
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Parliament in 1982. Québec abstained from signing the document and joined with several
Native Canadian nations in rejecting the language and process of constitutional
repatriation.
The Constitution Act is a significant document that articulates Canada’s final
entry into sovereign statehood, however also reflects the tradition of compromise in
Canadian politics. The most significant point of ambiguity was the “notwithstanding
clause” that allows provinces to ignore certain aspects of the Constitution that infringe on
local authority. The potential invocation of this clause is particularly problematic when
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms is taken into account. The Charter is an inclusive
legal statement defining and protecting liberal equality making the Charter “one of the
most progressive constitutional documents in the world…” (See 2001, 178). Section 15
clearly exemplifies the inclusive nature of the document:
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and,
in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability22.
The Constitution Act finally defined Canada as a fully autonomous country with a
functioning constitutional foundation. Many have pointed to this document as an ultimate
success for Trudeau and his projects of nation-building and pan-Canadian nationalism.
However the persisting domestic thorn in Trudeau’s side was Québec. Despite his tireless
efforts to include the province within a unique nation-state, the province continued to be
22

This statement is a general definition of equality rights. The entirety of the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms continues to include groups as protected Canadians on the basis of race, ethnicity, language,
culture, sex, religion, and disabilities with significant legal protections for all Canadians. The document
also shows the imprint of provincial negotiations in its specific language. For example, in Section 16 on
Official Languages, subsection two clearly identifies New Brunswick as the only officially bilingual
province in a bilingual Canada. The entire Charter of Rights and Freedoms is included in the 1982
Constitution Act, which can be found at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/const/annex_e.html#I.
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dissatisfied with the lack of recognition and authority granted by the federal government
on a number of issues.
The Constitution Act is a significant illustration of this disparity due to the
continuing absence of a Québec signature. To date, the province of Québec has not
signed the Constitution Act yet functions within the federal Canadian system as if it had.
Again, the legislative ambiguity of federal-provincial relationships serves as a doubleedged sword in the quest for a united Canadian nation-state. Although the challenges
posed by the Quiet Revolution and the 1980 Québec Referendum resulted in a stronger
federal Canadian state, the nation continued to be increasingly fragmented.
6a. The Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords
The problems of national fragmentation and unequal state participation
were addressed by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and Québec Premier Robert
Bourassa in the 1987 Meech Lake Accords. Provincial ministers agreed to modify
the existing Constitution Act to recognize Québec as a uniquely distinctive
society within Canada, reinforce the federal commitment to bilingualism, allow
provinces additional authority in matters of immigration, and give greater
authority to provincial constitutional veto powers. Clearly, the federal government
was willing to give Québec and other provinces increased authority in exchange
for national unity. The Manitoba Legislative Assembly, however, did not agree
and refused to sign the Accord. Newfoundland then followed the Manitoban
example and rejected the Accord as well. Objections were raised over the
significance of Québec society and federal recognition of uniqueness over all
other Canadian provinces, cultures, and concerns. The First Nations also objected
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that their concerns were not addressed and that their level of participation was not
acceptable. With passage in only eight of the required ten provinces, the Meech
Lake Accord failed to resolve the lingering constitutional non-participation of
Québec.
The 1992 Charlottetown Accord again attempted to reconcile Québec’s
concerns with the 1982 Constitution Act. A group of provincial, federal, First
Nations, and Métis representatives reached an agreement designed to encourage
national unity and promote a singular Canadian nation-state. The Accord limited
federal powers over provincial statues; guaranteed federal funding of social
services such as health care and education while limiting provisional requirements
for funding; included a “Canada Clause” that recognized certain values as being
officially “Canadian” such as equality, diversity, and again recognizing the
distinct nature of the Québec province, culture, and society; and interestingly
included a statement on liberalizing trade through the abolition of protective
tariffs between provinces. The Charlottetown Accord, unlike the failed Meech
Lake Accord, was to be put to a national vote through the referendum process,
although unanimous approval was again required for ratification. Only five of the
twelve Canadian provinces approved the Accord with Québec rejecting the
proposal 57 to 43 percent.
The failure of the Charlottetown Accord to resolve Québec constitutional
non-participation led to the defeat of Bourassa’s Liberal government in Québec.
The Parti Québécois again gained power in 1994 led by Jacques Parizeau and held
another referendum the following year. The 1995 referendum was supported by
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the PQ, a new federal separatist party, the Bloc Québécois, led by Lucien
Bouchard, and popular dissatisfaction with federal efforts to resolve Québec’s
objections to the Constitution Act. The 1995 referendum was only narrowly
defeated (50.6 percent to 49.4 percent) and continued the legacy of ambiguous
cooperation in a Canada that continues to struggle with issues of domestic unity.
7. Economic Growth and the Shift to “Free-Trade”
The 1970s saw a continual rise in Canadian economic growth as well as
international political status. The federal government further clarified immigration
definitions through the 1978 Immigration Act that created categories for refugees and
other humanitarian immigration cases as well as further reducing discriminatory
measures targeting medical problems and sexual orientation. The process of urbanization
and ethnic diversification continued throughout Canada creating a country that could be
defined as primarily urban with 76 percent of all Canadians living in urban areas in 1980
(Statistics Canada 1996). Canadian economic growth and geographic proximity to the
United States led to inclusion in the 1976 G7 economic summit and subsequent
participation in the group’s meetings and operational agreements. Some have pointed to
this inclusion as being somewhat artificial as mid-1970s Canadian economic performance
was not necessarily on par with that of other G7 countries and perhaps promoted Canada
to international prominence before the state was prepared to assume such a role (Hawkins
1988, 12). This premature promotion to the global political economic elite continued
Canadian global market integration, particularly with respect to liberal “free trade.”
The election of the Conservative Mulroney government in 1984 ushered in the
end of large-scale trade protectionism, even though the official Conservative party
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platform was against expanding Canadian “free trade” agreements. In fact, the issue of
“free-trade” was, by this time, already in practice between Canada and the United States
with the most notable liberal trade policy being the Canada-United State Automotive
Agreement of 1965. There were significant trade protections remaining that were
effectively demolished by the Canada-United State Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) in
1987. Political opposition to this liberal trade agreement and the fears that this would
usher in the fall of Canadian economic and cultural independence made CUFTA the
central issue of the 1988 federal elections. Mulroney’s Conservatives won, but the two
parties (New Democratic Party and the Liberal Party) in opposition to CUFTA received
the majority of total votes. Liberal opposition was short-lived as the 1993 election of Jean
Chretien’s Liberal government saw the expansion of CUFTA to include Mexico with the
enactment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994.
Liberal trade agreements remain an issue in Canadian politics, but opposition to
liberal trade and globalization has been marginalized. The only remaining political party
in opposition to “free-trade” agreements remains the New Democratic Party. However
public opposition to NAFTA has been resurgent in the past few years largely due to the
United States’ failure to adhere to the trade agreements23.
Present-day Canada is by most accounts a successful nation-state despite the
failure to resolve several key national problems. Canadian economic growth has out
performed its fellow G8 countries for the past several years and fiscal solvency projects
have resulted in federal surplus revenues for the past six years. This economic growth has
23

The continuing dispute over softwood lumber sales to the United States has been a significant obstacle.
The US position on applying tariffs to Canadian softwood timber was ruled illegal by the NAFTA
adjudication body on several occasions. A recent World Trade Organization ruling was more amenable to
the US position, but the situation has yet to be resolved.
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not been without cost. The federally funded health care system (Health Canada) is facing
increased financial difficulty after years of reduced funding. Education and cultural
programs, including the vaunted Multicultural Program have experienced years of
reduced funding. In addition, increased regional dissatisfaction with federal
appropriations and intrusion on perceived provincial matters has continued to mar federal
and provincial relationships. The ever-increasingly close economic relationship with the
United States continues to serve as a thorn in the side of Canadian nationalists as they
often lament the loss of distinctive Canadian culture to American symbols and affinities.
The combined threat of external influence and internal dissatisfaction poses a major
problem for future Canadian leaders, particularly with respect to promoting an acceptable
national identity. The recent “Adscam24” scandal illustrates the immediacy and
problematic nature of promoting a pan-Canadian national identity. For the Canadian
government, this is a necessary project if Canada is to survive.
Despite these simultaneous successes and failures, the issue of most significance
is the persistence of the “French Fact.” The solidification of Québec as an autonomous
and culturally distinct province within Canada continues to be problematic for the federal
government and its project of pan-Canadian nationalism. The following chapter adds
more detail to the history of this “French Fact” and juxtaposes Québec history and
nationalism with that of Canada.
24

“Adscam” is the informal moniker given to the scandal that has brought about the recent fall of the
Martin Liberal government. Briefly, the Chretien Administration authorized the payment of millions of
dollars to several Québec marketing firms for the purpose of promoting Canadian nationalism in the
province. The intent was the encourage Québécois voters to support Canada as opposed to the PQ and its
project of sovereignty. In reality, this support of Canadian nationalism took the form of illegal financial
contributions to the Québec provincial wing of the Liberal party (the PLQ). The money meant for
marketing purposes was, in effect, laundered through these marketing firms and used for political purposes
in support of the PLQ and defeat of the PQ.
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The goal of Chapter Three, however, is to establish a clear, yet problematic,
nationalist project in Canada. Economic under-population, dual European colonial
heritage, indigenous autonomy and sovereignty claims, and increasing ethno-cultural
diversification are just a sample of the challenges to articulating a singular Canadian
nationalism. This has not stopped the federal government and other supporting groups
from attempting to define what in fact a Canadian actually is. This challenge is
increasingly important as the national population of Canada becomes more diverse as a
result of shifting immigration sources. This project argues that culture is becoming
increasingly important in maintaining nation-state stability. The history of Canada
implies that culture is a continually problematic notion, but also that the state has
continually worked to define Canadian nationalism in various attempts to maintain a
singular national cultural ideal. The remainder of the dissertation examines the changes
that have occurred in the post-World War II era and argues that the challenges facing the
Canadian state with respect to defining a national culture and maintaining national
stability are increasingly complex and problematic. The dissertation also argues that
control over cultural definitions and symbols is increasingly important and necessary for
core states such as Canada. Chapter Four will examine the same process of Québec
national cultural definition in historical context.
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Chapter Four
Québec: History and Nationalist Project

This chapter illustrates the interdependent history of Québec as a Canadian
province. It also tells the story of Québec national cultural development as a process and
project independent of Canadian nationalism. In this way the history of Québec is the
history of Canada; however, the nationalist history of Québec retains significant
autonomy from that of Canadian nationalist history. The persistence of this duality, a
shared yet distinct history, is problematic for both Canadian and Québec nationalist
projects. Chapter Four examines this shared history with particular attention to distinctive
events, conditions, and occurrences that have defined Québécois nationalism and enabled
a distinct Québec national history to develop alongside Canadian national history. The
existence of dual nationalist histories is important in support of methodological
comparative efforts as well as understanding divergent approaches to global market
integration that will be shown in Part III.
The persistence of this duality is has historically provided the most significant
obstacle for a singular Canadian nationalism. The “French Fact25” of a Francophone
founding people is a reality that Canada is continually forced to reconcile. Any discussion
of one must include a substantial discussion of the other. However, the unique and
25

The “French Fact” is a term describing the reality of bilingualism in Canada. This is a phrase that is used
mainly in an Anglophone and federalist context. The 1774 Québec Act was the first official recognition of
the “French Fact” in an otherwise Anglo colony. This attitude of resignation has given way to the official
incorporation of the “French Fact” into state policies of bilingualism. As stated by the Canadian Heritage
Department, “Recognizing the importance of the French fact at home, as well as its international
dimension, the Canadian government joined La Francophonie [this refers to the international cooperative
entity consisting of Francophone countries] very early on and was involved in establishing and developing
its many institutions.”
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relatively insular creation of culture in both Québec and in Anglophone Canada raises
serious questions concerning the development of a homogenous historical narrative26.
The question of autonomy is very real when discussing both Canadian and Québec
histories. The reality of history necessitates a dual telling of the Canadian story. The
historical reality of the “French Fact” in Canada is that Québec has created a culture and
society that is national in its actions and composition. This chapter will also show that the
relative successes of Québécois nationalism present equally challenging conditions as
Québec integrates into the global market economy.
As previously stated, this chapter takes the position that it is not only possible, but
also historically necessary to understand Québec as a semi-autonomous nation-state in a
political, economic, and cultural sense. In support of this methodological definition, a
brief telling of the Québec provincial story is necessary.
1. Settlement to Conquest27
The French were the first European group to actively colonize what would
become Canada. Of course this was a project of appropriation as many Native Canadians
occupied the land desired by encroaching Europeans. The French experience in Canada
was typical in the sense that disease and warfare worked to decimate a once populous
general Native Canadian population. The experience was unique, however, in the sense

26

The issue of cultural diversity by region and settlement patterns has always been present in Canadian
history. The unique history of the Acadian (New Brunswick) region differs from that of Québec, from that
of Alberta, from that of Vancouver. To say that there is even a clear homogenous narrative in Francophone
or Anglophone Canada would be incorrect. The growth of Canadians of neither French nor British origins
further complicates the project of constructing a singular Canadian historical narrative.
27
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that there was a level of cooperation and cohabitation with indigenous groups that existed
on a scale not often seen in the history of American colonization.
The first claim of French sovereignty over the lands of Eastern Canada was made
by Giovanni da Verrazano whose voyages were funded by the French monarch François I
between 1524 and 1528. The French began their colonial endeavor by joining Portuguese,
Basque, British, and Irish fishing expeditions off the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia
coasts. François also sponsored Jacques Cartier’s three exploratory voyages between
1534 and 1542. Cartier’s mission was to find the mythical Northwest Passage to China
but instead “discovered” the Native Canadian settlements of Stadacona and Hochelaga,
which would be renamed Québec and Montréal respectively as the French settled and
took control of the region. Successive voyages saw Cartier and a French nobleman by the
name of Roberval attempt settlements at Stadacona (Québec) with no success. It seemed
that no passage to the Orient would be found nor would the land produce the mineral
wealth found by Spanish expeditionary forces in Central and South America. Cartier’s
voyages yielded little in terms of material wealth but did produce considerable
information concerning geography and natural resource potential. Contact with Native
Canadians was simultaneously negative and cooperative. Cartier’s kidnapping of several
Iroquois who died under his care set the stage for centuries of French-Iroquois conflict.
Conversely, Cartier was able to gain information and negotiate limited trade with several
Iroquois and Algonquin groups. Perhaps Cartier’s most lasting contribution was his use
of the Iroquois place name Canada to identify the region.
More than half a century passed before sustained French efforts to settle Canada
were resumed. Samuel de Champlain, with the financial backing of the Sieur de Monts,
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first attempted a permanent settlement near the present-day border of New Brunswick
and Maine on the St. Croix River. This was a short-lived experiment as the settlers,
including Champlain, were forced to abandon the location in 1607 and return to France.
Undaunted, Champlain led another settlement expedition in 1608, this time in the more
protected St. Lawrence River region. Champlain’s desire to facilitate trade between the
French and Native Canadians promoted a fairly successful cooperative effort to coexist.
A benefit to such a cooperative agreement on the part of the Algonquin was the
acquisition of a powerful ally in their persistent conflicts with the now southern tribes of
the Iroquois Confederation. This agreement created local security as well as an ally for
the new settlement of Québec on the former Iroquois site of Stadacona. It also would
create a European-Indigenous alliance that would serve to allow French settlement and
the nascent fur trade to succeed.
The settlement of Québec, and later Montréal, succeeded and became important
trade centers for the single most important commodity being exported to Europe from
Canada: furs and pelts. The relationship between Québec and France was strictly
mercantilist. The colony had a monopolistic trade relationship with the French Company
of Hundred Associates and barred Protestants from settling in what was then called New
France. This dominance of Roman Catholicism would shape the history and destiny of
New France and later Québec until the latter half of the Twentieth Century.
As the colony began to grow, agriculture became a more sustained project.
Clearing of the St. Lawrence River Valley became a priority and was seen as essential to
the sustained growth of New France. The model of land appropriation was modeled on
the feudal French seigneurial system. The crown would grant land to seigneurs, direct
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representatives of the French monarchy, who then divided the land grant among tenant
farmers who became known as habitants (although officially termed censitaires by the
French authorities). Most of these agricultural communities remained in the St. Lawrence
Valley and served as the central grain-producing region of New France. Life in colonial
New France was rural, religious, and feudal in its structure. But, as Scott See states,
“ample evidence suggests that habitants enjoyed some freedoms, aggressively asserted an
independent streak, and regularly ignored state regulations or church edicts. In short, the
peasants of the Old World were swiftly becoming the Canadiens of the New World”
(2001, 45).
New France began to grow as a result of an agricultural base that supported the
semi-urban settlements of Québec and Montréal, which in turn supported the flourishing
fur trade that created the urban center of Montréal and solidified its place as the
commercial capital of New France. This demographic and economic growth, in addition
to the strategic transportation value of the St. Lawrence River system, ensured that the
colony of New France would soon come into conflict with the burgeoning British
American colonies to the south. A series of European continental conflicts (King
William’s War, 1689-1697; the War of Spanish Succession, 1701-1714; and King
George’s War, 1744-1748) instigated tensions between colonial rivals that resulted in
nearly continual military and paramilitary conflict in North America from the midSeventeenth to the late Eighteenth centuries. These conflicts culminated in the Seven
Years’ War in which the British gained complete control over all former French colonial
possessions in North America.
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As stated in the previous chapter, the short period of British assimilationist efforts
in the newly named colony of Québec failed miserably. The recognition that Québec
would always be a French culture was recognized by then-Governor James Murray. The
1763 Royal Proclamation that removed legislative support for the seigneurial system as
well as support for the Catholic Church, made it illegal for Catholics to hold public
office, and imposed both British criminal and civil law upon an unwilling populace
created an impossible position from which to govern. Murray and his successor Guy
Carleton supported ending this assimilationist project and partially succeed with the
enactment of the Québec Act in 1774.
2. Post-conquest and a Bicultural Existence28
The Québec Act was designed to reinstate French civil controls in the hopes that
those reinstated elites would support the larger British colonial project. This was
increasingly important to British colonial authorities due to growing rebellious sentiment
in its American colonies. As Conrad, Finkel, and Jaenen (1993) state:
Designed to strengthen the traditional elites in the colony, the act was
based on the mistaken belief that those elites would ensure the loyalty of
the masses in time of war (P. 254).
The austere provisions of the 1763 Proclamation were reversed to allow Catholics to
worship, hold office, and ensure that the traditional system of religious authority would
continue. In addition, the seigneurial system of land ownership and administration was
officially recognized by the British colonial authorities. British criminal law and, of
course, colonial authority remained entrenched. The result was a colony extending from
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the Labrador coast to the Ohio River Valley that was uniquely French, Catholic, and
governed by the anti-democratic cooperation of priest and seigneur that pleased few
outside of the local power structures in British North America, including American
colonists and many habitants.
As previously stated, the Québec Act was as much of a British protective measure
as it was a policy designed to control the French-Canadian population. The hope that
Québec colonials would support the British was initially dashed as invading American
contingents under Richard Montgomery met little or no resistance in their march to
Montréal. The city was taken without a struggle in September 1775 with Governor
Carleton escaping to Québec. The mobilization of resistance to the American invasion
was less a result of the Québec Act and more the actions of the occupying American
forces. Antagonistic actions against the Catholic Church and the illegal acquisition of
property and supplies by Montgomery’s men led to a rapid increase in local support for
the British defensive forces. By the time Montgomery joined with Benedict Arnold (who
had marched from what is now Maine) at Québec they met heavy resistance in defense of
the city. On December 31 the combined American forces saw Montgomery killed and
Arnold wounded in a last major attempt at taking Québec. The siege was ended in May of
1776 when ten thousand British troops sailed down the St. Lawrence to reinforce the
besieged colonial forces (numbering fewer than 600) at Québec.
The lack of local habitant support for the British war effort troubled British
colonial authorities. Elite control over the local “peasant” populations envisioned in the
Québec Act never materialized. The position of the British political hierarchy was soon to
be reinforced through the immigration of large numbers of British migrants. After the
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1783 Versailles Treaty that ended the American Revolution, thousands of British
Loyalists (Tories) escaped to the colony of Québec. This massive population shift
significantly altered the demographic composition of the colony and prompted British
authorities to take action.
The newly arrived Tories demanded an elimination of the French system of civil
law and a return to the monopolistic British controls inherent in the 1763 Royal
Proclamation. French-Canadian elites were not sympathetic to the demands of the Tories
for obvious reasons. A compromise was found as the 1791 Canada Act officially divided
Canada into Upper (English) and Lower (French) halves. Upper Canada, roughly presentday Ontario, was home to approximately 20,000 Anglophone Canadians and Tories and
maintained British criminal and civil systems of governance. Lower Canada, roughly
present-day Québec, included the metropolitan areas of Montréal and Québec with a
population of approximately 110,000 and maintained the French civil/British criminal
system established by the Québec Act (Conrad, Finkel, and Jaenen 1993). In comparison,
the Canadian population near the turn of the century is estimated at 250,000 (Klein,
Goldewijk, and Battjes 1997). The French-Canadian population constituted a significant
portion of the total national population and was able to resist assimilationist efforts on the
part of British colonial authorities. The British government grew increasingly aware of its
inability to assimilate such a large population and sought a compromise solution. The
Canada Act effectively created a bifurcated colonial nation-state by creating legislative
and administrative divisions between English and French Canada.
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2a. Growth and Rebellion under British Rule
Lower Canada in the beginning of the Nineteenth Century was a colony governed
by an odd mix of Anglophone commercial and political elites supported by the
Francophone seigneurs and clerical elites. This relationship, and the centrality of English
control over the commercial activities in Montréal and Québec, would create a condition
of stratification. The sustainable farming tradition of the habitants created a condition of
poverty that was much more extreme when compared to English wage-earning farmers in
Upper Canada. The lack of land ownership coupled with a relatively feudal system of
social and commercial interaction for Lower Canadian, Francophone farmers allowed the
consolidation of wealth in urban areas and primarily in the hands of the Anglophone
commercial merchants and political elites. Of course a significant amount of wealth was
distributed to Francophone seigneurs and to the Church, which resulted in limited elite
motivation to alter the status quo. The situation of urban (particularly in Montréal)
Anglophone control over wealth and commercial resources would couple with the strong
social service (health care, education, moral guidance, etc…) structure of the Catholic
Church to create an unfortunate disparity in wealth and resources that largely followed
cultural lines.
Despite the socio-economic stagnation engendered by the British colonial power
structure in Lower Canada, economic expansion was occurring. The decline of the fur
trade that had largely created the commercial center of Montréal was replaced by timber
extraction. Lower Canada became the primary supplier of timber to the British Navy
further reinforcing the commercial power of the Montréal Anglophone elite. The desire to
increase the English presence throughout the colony led to the granting of land to
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Anglophone farmers (mainly expatriate American Tories) willing to move to Lower
Canada. Approximately 20,000 agricultural migrants settled in what is now known as the
Eastern Townships to the South and East of Montréal following the 1791 Constitutional
Act. The Townships remain to this day one of the few examples of a rural Anglophone
presence in Québec.
The dominance of the English-Catholic alliance in Lower Canada was dealt a
blow by the French Revolution, but a blow that would only be felt years later. With the
conservative French-Canadian Catholic Church aghast at the liberalism and independence
of French Revolutionary ideals new sources of educated priests (not immediately
influenced by the liberalism of France) was required. The Church established
Francophone colleges throughout Lower Canada to train future clerical leaders. Many of
these graduates would choose a secular path and created a limited but important
Francophone middle class. These were mainly civil servants and lawyers who were
ultimately subject to the ethnocentric controls of the British that kept many in this
increasingly populous professional class unemployed. This educated and skilled
Francophone group began to advocate a Francophone nationalism that embraced political
democracy while retaining the feudal economic and cultural controls embodied in the
seigneurial system and the Catholic Church. This uniquely conservative nationalism
would speak on behalf of Québec sovereigntists until 1960. This rise of a Francophone
intellectual elite was coupled with a growing population that was impoverished by the
proto-feudal seigneurial system29.
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As population increased in the early Nineteenth Century, there were not enough seigneurs to supply land
appropriations in order to meet demands. The seigneurial system was based solely on patronage and thus
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The persistence of poverty in Québec promoted anger and frustration particularly
among the Francophone habitants who viewed the accumulation of wealth and power by
the Anglophone minority in Montréal, as well as increased agricultural prosperity in
Upper Canada, as signs of English oppression. In fact, it was the combination of arcane
economic controls and the cultural promotion of high birth rates that contributed most
greatly to the agricultural (read: economic) crisis of the early Nineteenth Century. This
fact was not lost on the British colonial authorities who did little to assist Québec in
alleviating nearly universal rural poverty among the Francophone population. In fact, the
acquisition and distribution of land in the Eastern Townships added to the sense of
abandonment on the part of the habitants as these acquisitions were based on the liberal
capitalist notion of land-granting and thus outside the patronage of the seigneurs. Thus
the only individuals and groups able to acquire these newly created agricultural plots
were those with disposable capital, which excluded nearly the entirety of the habitant
population.
The newly emergent Francophone intellectual elite seized this opportunity and
created the Parti canadien (PC), a nationalist political party designed to gain power
through legislative means in the Québec House of Assembly. The conservative
nationalism of the political party was welcomed by the traditional Francophone elites
(seigneurs and Catholic clergy) due to the fact that it allowed the retention of their social
station and power. In 1822, the Parti canadien, with the support of the Catholic Church,

did not allow the habitants an opportunity to accumulate capital in the same manner as their English peers.
The Roman Catholic Church culturally promoted large families and the inevitable condition of a large
population with little to no capital and an agricultural system that was ill designed to deal with the reality of
capitalism led to massive poverty. Add this to poor crop yields in the post-1812 era and a picture of dire
poverty is painted of the Québec rural landscape.
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defeated a British proposal to unite Lower and Upper Canada. In 1827, the PC won
nearly ninety percent of the available seats in the House elections due to habitant support
for a policy of increased seigneurial holdings that meant greater agricultural opportunities
for a desperate rural population. These demands persisted and created a significant level
of tension between Anglophone merchants and their allies in both Upper and Lower
Canada who viewed this “obstructionism” (through their promotion of an expanded
seigneurial system) as being anti-commercial and thus a threat to economic growth in
Canada (Conrad, Finkel, and Jaenen 1993, 414). As a result, steps were taken in 1837 to
circumvent Assembly control and increase privately held land outside of the seigneurial
system. Funds were appropriated by the British colonial government for the sale of
millions of hectares of land to the British American Land Company; these holdings were
then sold to the highest bidder – effectively excluding most Francophones. These actions
allowed the PC and its leader Louis-Joseph Papineau to legitimate their claims that the
British government cared little for improving the lives and democratic rights of its
Francophone citizens.
A series of economic and civic disobedience tactics ensued that were intended to
subvert British political and economic controls. Sporadic violence broke out between
Anglophones and Francophone patriotes in Montréal and the Governor of Lower Canada,
Lord Gosford, called for the immediate use of British troops to quell any Francophone
nationalist sentiment and violence. Papineau and other patriote leaders were ordered
arrested and many, including Papineau, fled to the United States. Organized resistance in
the form of organized habitant militias defeated a British colonial force at St-Denis in
November 1837. The days following this initial victory saw a deflated (after Papineau’s
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escape to the United States) rebellion crushed by British troops. A brief attempt at
rekindling the rebellion occurred the following year when approximately four thousand
patriots, led by leaders who had escaped to the US in 1837, attacked British positions in
Lower Canada. They were quickly defeated and the British sought to quell any future
rebellion through the execution, deportation, and exile of patriote leaders.
These relatively minor armed rebellions were important examples of the
development of Canadien nationalism; however their defeat illustrates a conflict of
interest between political, economic, and cultural spheres of Québec society. Prior to
1837, the Parti canadien transformed into the Parti patriote which succeeded in
promoting a reduction in the socio-political power of the Church in Québec society. The
obvious outcome was that the Church refused to support the rebellion and thus an
opportunity for legitimation was lost. The continuing affirmation of the seigneurial
system by the Parti patriote was also a source of consternation for many habitants. Why
should they risk their lives to maintain a traditional system of land allocation that denied
them ownership and profits? These points did little to engender universal support for the
patriote rebellions and possibly contributed to their ultimate failure.
As stated in the previous chapter, the political outcome of the Lower (and Upper)
Canadian rebellions was the compilation of the Durham Report that advocated
assimilation of all Francophone Canadiens through a process of colonial unification. The
Durham Report prompted the 1841 Act of Union that promptly infuriated nationalist
Candiens, but offered a unique opportunity for compromise between English and French
parliamentarians. The Act of Union occurred simultaneously with a British move away
from mercantilist trade and toward a liberal “free-trade” model. This created increased
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trade opportunities between Canada and the United States, resulting in the 1854 Treaty of
Reciprocity. The result was a situation that encouraged modernization of political
economic systems of control in a traditional Lower Canadian society.
3. Encroaching Liberalism and Confederation30
As Canadiens struggled for executive governmental inclusion (achieved through
an Anglo-Franco Executive Committee in 1842, rescinded by the subsequent Governor
General Metcalf, and reinstated in 1848) an alliance between economic and political
liberals crossed ethnic lines. An unintended parliamentary majority emerged that
advocated reforming the existing socio-economic structure of Canada in order to
facilitate increased trade. The result was the dissolution of the seigneurial land-patronage
system in 1854, increased spending on public (secular) education, and massive
transportation projects (railways and canals) intended to encourage expanded trade with
the United States. Thus, the Durham Report and the subsequent Act of Union succeeded
in achieving a measure of assimilation through the destruction of the unique land-holding
system and monopolistic control over education held by the Catholic Church that created
the differences upheld as “distinct” by the conservative nationalists of the 1830s.
Cooperative multiethnic governments showed that the common political economic goals
of liberalism and “free-trade” could overcome linguistic and cultural differences. This
serene picture of cooperative economic development hid the continued stratification of
economic conditions between Upper and Lower Canada.
The political alliance of Anglo and Francophones based on a common desire for
30
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liberal economic reforms was an elite alliance. Popular support for such reform-centered
cooperation was limited by the persistence of economic stratification based on ethnolinguistic lines. These economic divisions created the opportunity for political dissent on
the part of conservative opponents of liberal reforms in Québec. These conservative
nationalists relied on cultural definitions of Québec traditions and norms and provided the
basis for a unique Québec nationalism that was based on cultural affinity and
traditionalism.
The Canadian response to the American Civil War and a decline in trade volume
with both the United States (who refused to renew the Treaty of Reciprocity in 1866) and
Britain was to promote a more politically sovereign union. The result was the
Confederation of Canada under the British North America Act of 1867. Within Lower
Canada, liberals and the conservative clergy celebrated the prospect of Confederation as
an opportunity to alleviate pressures of American annexation and to establish political
control over a provincial government. There was significant opposition to Confederation
in the form of the Rouges who advocated a nationalistic and democratic ideal that
mirrored that of their Patriote founders. The Rouges-led opposition could not overcome
the liberal-clerical alliance and Confederation became a reality in 1867. The new
parliamentary system established minimum rates of representation for provincial
Members of Parliament (MP) and consolidated strong central federal control over
political and economic matters. Fitzmaurice provides a useful example of this
renegotiated trade reality:
The Provinces of course lost their customs revenue, but the Dominion of
Canada assumed their debt and paid them an annual subsidy (Fitzmaurice
1985, 20).
132

This exemplifies the series of compromises made on the part of Provincial representatives
in the hopes of creating a strong union to expand economic production and political
protections (largely from encroaching American capital investment and population in the
West). What it does not show is any legislative evidence of continual Canadien
nationalism that was embodied by the Rouges opposition to Confederation.
The newly formed Dominion of Canada was reminded of the persistent “French
Fact” when Louis Riel led his fellow Métis31 in an open revolt against the westward
expansion of the Canadian population and accompanying land acquisition for agricultural
production. Riel was born in the Red River region of what is now Manitoba and received
a clerical education in Montréal. Educated, Francophone, and Métis, Riel personified
Canadian diversity. During the Red River and Northwest rebellions of 1869-70 and 1885
respectively, Louis Riel became a symbolic hero throughout Québec. Although the
actions of Riel and the Métis were antithetical to the liberal project of westward
expansion, his resistance to an oppressive federal force that was attacking yet another
Francophone claim of sovereignty and uniqueness generated public support for the man
throughout Québec. The sentiment was just as strong in the opposite direction throughout
English-speaking Ontario, as they viewed Riel as a traitor and enemy of Canadian
economic growth (Siggins 1994).
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As stated in Chapter Three, the Métis were a distinct population born of intermarriage between English
and French fur trappers and indigenous peoples in the interior of Canada. The Métis are historically known
for their mixed ethnicity and the fact that they are predominantly Francophone. The linguistic nature of this
Canadian population is of primary importance in this chapter and in the relationship between the Canadien
population of Québec and the resistance actions of Riel and other Métis in what is now Manitoba and
Saskatchewan.
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The political and economic union of the Confederation-era clearly did not reflect
the cultural differences still evident between French and English Canada. While Riel’s
actions did little to stem expansion, they did illustrate persisting frustration and a sense of
repression on the part of French-Canadians, particularly in Québec. The Dominion of
Canada was a political and economic compromise of the day, and not indicative of any
cultural unification on the part of the citizens of Québec in support of a pan-Canadian
nation.
3a. Post-confederation
The mid-Nineteenth Century in Québec was a time of rapid change.
Modernization and urbanization began to weaken the traditional controls of the Catholic
Church and the patrimonial seigneurial system of land appropriation had been abolished
allowing individual farmers at least the opportunity to own their own land. The postConfederation period was also a time of massive expansion in industrial and demographic
growth. The expansionist desires of the Macdonald (and others) government necessitated
increased sources of labor. With a limited urban population base, particularly in Englishspeaking Canada, the answer was to be found abroad32. European immigration served to
replenish the limited Canadian labor force. Québec’s role in this process was significantly
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By the mid-Nineteenth Century urban Canada was fairly limited. Two of the four major metropolitan
areas were in Québec and both located along the major transportation throughway of the St. Lawrence
River. Montréal (100,000) and Québec (50,000) continued to serve as trade ports and centers for Canadian
commerce during this period. Québec could eventually lose much of its metropolitan and commercial
power nationally due to the reorientation of trade patterns from the United Kingdom to the United States.
Trans-Atlantic trade was facilitated by the protected ports on the St. Lawrence, but as trading patterns
shifted southward the river system declined in relative economic importance. This shift in predominant
trading partners is also reflected in the rise of both Montréal and Toronto as commercial urban centers. The
rise of Toronto (60,000) would continue unabated and ultimately become the desired destination for many
labor migrants. Halifax (20,000) continued to be Canada’s main maritime trading center, but the fragile
economic conditions of the Maritime Provinces as well as the transportation costs associated with domestic
Canadian trade would ensure Halifax’s eventual decline in commercial importance.
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determined by geography. The most logical ports of call for European immigrants were
Halifax, Québec, and Montréal. Halifax, as Canada’s primary Atlantic seaport, offered a
simple first-stop for European migrants on the road to Canadian economic opportunity.
The relative isolation of Halifax and the Maritime Provinces in general discouraged many
from settling in Halifax. The major urban centers of Québec and Montréal provided much
more in terms of employment and transportation opportunities. As the only opportunity to
travel from Europe to North America was by seagoing vessel the St. Lawrence once
again provided a maritime highway for facilitating economic growth in Canada.
The increase in railway and canal construction in the 1850s made Québec and
especially Montréal very attractive ports of call for European migrants. There were
significant economic opportunities for Europeans in both cities, but the shifting trade
relationship to the United States was already making Montréal the singular commercial
center of the province due to its proximity to New England and New York commercial
centers. For this reason many immigrant chose to continue down the St. Lawrence to
Montréal. The other major factor contributing to Montréal’s importance to Canadian
immigration was that the Grand Trunk Railway provided transportation opportunities to
Canada’s other growing metropolitan center, Toronto, as well as to points west. Until
well into the Twentieth Century, many immigrants to Canada used urban centers as
stopover points on their way to the land and agricultural opportunities of the West. Many
though stayed in Québec, with most settling in the Montréal metropolitan area. Much
more will be said on these points of ethnic diversification later in Chapter Six The period
of massive immigration promotion on the part of the Canadian government did much to
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provide Montréal with a base of labor that would allow the city to continue its growth and
economic viability in both Canadian and international economic contexts.
The geographic position of Montréal as an island at the intersection of two major
transportation throughways (the St. Lawrence River and the Grand Trunk Railway)
ultimately created a multiethnic urban center in the mid to late 1800s – well before the
well-known multicultural perception of Canada in the 1970s. Italian, German, Ukrainian,
and Irish communities began to grow and participate in the economic and cultural life of
the city. This did not, however, have a significant impact of the political and economic
power structures in place in either the city of Montréal or the province of Québec. The
shift of major trading patterns from England to the United States did little to disrupt the
Anglophone control over commercial institutions. It also did little to alleviate persistent
rural poverty and the inability of many poor Francophone framers to own their own land.
This led to a massive exodus of rural (and some urban) French-Canadians to New
England towns such as Manchester, New Hampshire; Fall River, Massachusetts, and
Woonsocket, Rhode Island in search of employment. The reality of Francophone life in
Québec was still a picture of income inequality and monopolistic control of wealth and
political power by the Anglophone minority in Montréal supported by an Anglophone
federal government in Ottawa. The sustained inequalities and rural impoverishment of
Québec did little to reduce ethnic nationalist sentiment although little was done formally
to protest the situation.
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4. The War Era and the End of Traditional Québec33
The onset of the First World War in 1914 shattered any superficial perceptions
that Québec had been pacified. Opposition to Canadian involvement, and thus Québec’s
involvement, in the War effort was limited to a minority of pacifist individuals and
organizations. This was to change in 1917 with the passage of the Military Service Act
that instituted conscription for Canadian military service. Québec vehemently rejected
being forced to fight for a federal government that was perceived as being, at best,
discriminatory. In fact, the stage for Québec opposition to conscription had been set in
1913 when Ontario passed provincial legislation removing French language instruction
from its public schools. This abandonment of the bilingual ideals of the country inflamed
anger and resentment at English Canada in general. The federal demand that FrenchCanadians serve in the national military was, in many ways, the last straw.
Riots and protest marches occurred in Québec and Montréal from 1917 though
1918. Added to this condition of perceived oppression at the hands of English Canada, a
federal political alliance of Conservatives and pro-war Liberals engineered34 an election
in 1917 that would put a new Union government in power. This government was rejected
in Québec and added to the belief that the federal government was doing all it could to
oppress the provincial population. In addition to the violence of anti-draft riots,
legislative efforts toward sovereignty were unsuccessfully promoted in the Québec
33
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Robert Borden, the Conservative Prime Minister, sought to crush opposition to his government and war
opposition by allying with selected Liberals. In 1917 he passed a series of electoral measures that allowed
voting rights only to women who were serving in the military or who were related to male service members
and prohibited war-opponents (broadly defined as “conscientious objectors”) from voting. The result was a
large victory for this Conservative-Liberal Union government.
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National Assembly. It became increasingly clear that the cooperative political successes
of economic partnership were both falling into ruin and exacerbated by a federal
government that was increasingly hostile to the public sentiment and demands of Québec.
The global interwar pattern of initial growth followed by economic depression
was replicated in Québec. The export-orientation of liberal economic modernization
created a domino effect as foreign orders for agricultural products and natural resources
(primarily timber in Québec) declined and created a glut of supply with limited demand.
The impact of the Great Depression on Canadian society was previously discussed and
little more can be added here with respect to any possible unique conditions in Québec.
The effects of a massive global economic depression on an already impoverished
population were as would be expected: devastating.
The recovery period in Québec was assisted by the resumption of demand for
Québec raw materials such as timber, asbestos, and refined materials such as aluminum
and paper products. Politically, the rise of Maurice Duplessis and his Union nationale
(UN) political party won power in 1936 and promptly began to viciously implement
policies intended to expand foreign investment (and ownership) and repress social and
political dissent. The platform of the UN was conservative in that it advocated a return to
the Catholic, traditional nationalism reminiscent of the Parti canadien but augmented
with a liberal economic strategy that actively repressed union activities and persecuted
socialist and communist organizations throughout the province. Duplessis’ popularity
throughout the province was due, however, to his nationalistic (albeit within a Canadian
framework) rhetoric that reflected French-Canadian frustration with continual minority
Anglophone control over economic institutions in Montréal and throughout the province.
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The onset of the Second World War in 1939 brought about a familiar
disagreement. The Liberal federal government of Mackenzie King promoted active
Canadian involvement in the war effort, while Duplessis questioned the necessity of
Québec’s involvement. The resurgence of these positions led to the federal government’s
involvement in the 1939 Québec provincial elections in which the Québec Liberal Party
defeated the UN35. Duplessis and the UN would return to power in 1945 but not after a
less-dramatic return to the conscription crisis of 1917-18.
King won the 1939 elections by pledging not to reinstitute conscription. By 1942
it became obvious that volunteer military contributions would not be enough to sustain
the Canadian war effort. King called a national plebiscite to release the government from
its non-conscription pledge. Eight provinces voted to release the government from its
promise, while over three quarters of Québec voters held the government to its anti-draft
promise. The government reestablished the draft in 1944. The street violence and
sovereignty initiatives that characterized the 1917-18 era were not replicated, however
the popular understanding in Québec continued to center on the belief that the federal
government was ignorant of Québec concerns, desires, and will. The continued public
statements of King on Québec were commonly antagonistic, particularly his use of the
anti-nationalist phrase “Québec est une province comme les autres.36”
The post-war period of Québec history was, again relatively similar to that of
Canada. Increased immigration, industrialization, and overall economic growth
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The federal government actively promoted and financed the provincial branch (PLQ) of the Liberal
ruling party. The high level of support and participation in this provincial election is significant and bears
mention due to the importance King and his administration placed on national unification and a singular
Canadian national-state.
36
“Québec is a province like the others.”
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characterized the post-war years. Politically, the return of Duplessis continued the
socially conservative project of clerical social and educational service provision coupled
with liberal economic policies. These conservative policies did little to elevate the status
of Québec within Canada as the reference to the province as “priest-ridden” was common
in the post-war era. Clearly, the socially conservative nature of the Duplessis regime was
responsible for this perception but also for pushing the Duplessisme agenda37 so far that it
generated one of the most significant cultural reactions in Western history: la Révolution
tranquille.
5. La Révolution tranquille and the Birth of les Québécois38
La Révolution tranquille (the Quiet Revolution) describes the period of the early
1960s that saw the dramatic transition of Québec political and cultural institutions shift
from traditional norms to more state-centered proactive views of Québec nationalism. In
short, the long dominant Catholic Church was literally removed from its position as the
primary social service provider and replaced by the Québec state. Hinderences to
nationalized economic institutions were removed and the state became a primary
motivator for liberal economic reforms. Culturally, the integrative idea of a FrenchCanadian was replaced by a more autonomous and independent Québécois national
identity: neither French nor Canadian, les Québécois were a culturally distinct
population.

37

Duplessisme is largely defined as having authoritarian governmental tendencies, anti-statist with respect
to the provision of social services or economic controls, and incorporating a romanticized or lionized view
of rural, Catholic Québec as symbolic of true French-Canadians – all tenets of the Parti canadien and thus
staunchly conservative and nationalist.
38
The chapter was compiled from several historical narrative sources including Bashevkin (1991);
Bothwell, Drummond, and English (1989); Fitzmaurice (1985); Godin (1991); Pelletier (1983); See (2001);
and Thomson (1985).

140

La Révolution tranquille was more of a cumulative effect than any sort of
temporally distinct or spontaneous action. The evolution of this ‘cumulative revolution’
occurred in economic, political, and cultural facets of Québec society. Economically, the
continued dominance of Anglophone commercial and business centers in Montréal were
a source of constant French-Canadian ire. The traditional Anglophone monopoly was in
decline however, as the process of economic modernization continued to unfold in the
province. What started with the clerical expansion of educational opportunities to fill the
demands of a growing priesthood and was secularly advanced by the political cooperative
efforts of English and French liberals in the mid 1800s resulted in a population that was
predominantly urban, educated, and oriented toward industrial production. In addition,
the expansion of educational and economic opportunities for Francophone citizens in
Québec ensured that the status quo could not be maintained. Francophone intellectual and
economic (largely small business) elites began to attack traditional economic and social
structures, namely Anglophone business entities and the Catholic Church, as retarding
Francophone social and economic progress.
The political foundations of la Révolution tranquille clearly lay in the early
Nineteenth Century divide between traditionalists and liberals within Québec society.
The early attempts by the Parti canadien to bridge the divide by maintaining traditional
ties to the existing power structures of the seigneurs and the clergy were partly successful
in winning some liberal reforms, however the efforts of the Parti patriote to secularize
Québec society and liberalize its quasi-feudal agricultural system were met by
reactionary forces that worked to retrench the conservative structures of authority. The
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Duplessis regime in the first half of the Twentieth Century is an excellent example of this
reactionary change.
The post-World War II period of expanded global economics further stressed the
traditional isolationism of the Duplessis and conservative political elite in Québec.
Duplessis did invite massive foreign investment, however the expanded economic
opportunities brought about by this liberal urbanization project reduced the traditional
rural political base of the Union nationale and allowed for a new urban Francophone
political consciousness to emerge. It became increasingly clear that an emphasis on
export-orientation in terms of trade, which motivated urbanization and industrialization,
could not be supported by rural Québec. In fact, Duplessis did sense the impending
changes that were shifting the entire nature of the province from a rural-agrarian to
urban-industrial society. He enacted several reformative measures intended to reduce the
religious control over education and some social services. The problem for Duplessis was
in finding replacements for these services as the Union nationale rejected a large-scale
expansion of state-provided social services.
The cultural organization of Québec underwent significant change in
conjunction with the structural changes of the period. Statistically the province was one
of the most religious in the Western world with upwards of 85 percent of the population
regularly attending Catholic Mass. This superficial description belied a continual conflict
between those who promoted a progressive modernization of Québec society and those
who maintained that traditional social institutions should be maintained and strengthened.
The process of cultural change is difficult to articulate and can only be viewed through
the persistent instances of conflict between liberal and traditional groups that has been
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briefly presented in this chapter. Perhaps the most striking statistic is that active Catholics
in Québec dropped from the aforementioned 85 percent prior World War II to less than
30 percent by 1970 (Fitzmaurice 1985, 60). This massive and rapid cultural shift cannot
be simply attributed to rapid, short-term action. The decline of Catholic hegemony in
Québec was a process that simply required an alternative support structure in order to
complete the project of secularization that had begun in the early 1800s.
That Catholic controls over social and educational services were gradually eroded
cannot be disputed. Even the staunch traditionalist Duplessis and the UN were resigned to
continue these liberal reforms. Their political decision to replace these clerical social and
educational services with state-sponsored services opened the door to the possibility of
Keynesian state-centered strategies for economic modernization.
The confluence of economic, political, and cultural history in Québec created an
industrial infrastructure while maintaining political and economic restrictions on its
expansion, a political structure that attempted to maintain legitimate authority through a
dubious mix of traditionalist ideology and tacit liberal reforms, and a cultural system in
the Catholic Church that had been declining with respect to its cultural authority for
decades. The stage was set for large-scale social change. All that was required was a
stagehand to raise the curtain on a new Québec.
5a. Lesage and the Institutionalization of Change
Jean Lesage and the Parti Liberal du Québec (PLQ) were elected to power in the
1960 provincial elections. Lesage’s message was liberal and progressive in both rhetoric
and action. The PLQ leadership began to implement the state-centered strategies of social
service provision and an expansion of nationalized controls over utilities and
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transportation that were avoided by the Duplessis administration. Hydro-Québec39, the
state-owned electricity producer, represents the most successful example of this process
of nationalizing the utility infrastructure. It is doubly significant in that was also entirely
Francophone in its leadership and, most importantly, considered French its language of
business.
The provincial educational system was significantly reformed with the opening
of tuition-free secondary education and the expansion of a Francophone university
system with the founding of the Université de Québec system with campuses in Montréal
(1969), Chicoutimi (1969), Trois-Rivières (1969), and Rimouski (1973). This expansion
of a state-sponsored educational system is merely an example of the massive increase in
state spending that characterized the Lesage government. Civil service employment in the
provincial government increased from 32,000 in 1960 to over 70,000 in 1966 (Pelletier
1983). The purposes of these political economic reforms were first, the modernization of
the Québec economy and its liberation from a stagnating traditionalism and secondly, to
create state control and protections that would enable and facilitate Francophone
economic participation and correct the economic inequalities that had colored urban
Québec society for centuries.
The promotion of secular government as responsible for the social welfare of
Québec citizens occurred in conjunction with a rearticulation of French-Canadian
nationalism. Gone was nationalistic promotion of tradition and a romantic past inherent
in Duplessisme. This nostalgic affirmation of the status quo was replaced by a renewed
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Hydro-Québec is the primary provider of electricity to Québec and a significant power source for the
Northeastern United States. For a more detailed description of Hydro-Québec please see Chapter Five.
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sense of autonomy that embraced Québec as a unique nation that was neither French nor
Canadian but Québécois. Lesage’s oft-repeated slogan, “matres chez nous40” clearly
differentiated this new era of political leadership from the inclusive association position
of the Duplessis conservatives. He was not, however, an advocate of Québec sovereignty.
In fact there was a distinct minority of Québec citizens who advocated an independantiste
position of Québec state-hood.
This cultural distinction from Canadien to Québécois was not simply a political
promotion of an official nationalism. Literary journals such as Cité Libre and Maintenant
created a public discourse and motivated debate concerning the nature and scope of social
change in Québec. One significant articulation of this public discourse was the
emergence of Joual41 as a class-centered dialectical alternative to orthodox French that
became symbolic of this new Québécois identity. This dialect was the clear
understanding that being Québécois also had political and economic components. The
history and experience of Francophone poverty and subordinated status was reinforced by
English Canadian authority and could not be divorced from a mere shift in linguistic and
cultural identification.
5b. Nation and State Development
The relationship between the federal government and Québec provincial
government after 1960 was culturally and politically contentious at best. One of the most
interesting points of compromise came with Québec’s insistence on controlling its own
40

“Masters of our own house.”
The title Joual describes a unique dialect that is French with truncated phrases and partially incorporated
English terminology. The term is derived from the Montréal working-class use of the word “joual” in place
of the French word “cheval,” which means “horse.” Malcolm Reid’s The Shouting Signpainters (1972)
offers a colorful and expressive discussion of the emergence and importance of Joual to the emergence of a
Québécois identity.

41

145

immigration. In 1968 the provincial government established a Department of
Immigration that had little real power, but clearly exemplified the ability and the desire of
the Québécois to control their own foreign policy. In 1974, the Liberal Premier Henri
Bourassa demanded “cultural sovereignty” for Québec if relations between the federal
and provincial governments were to be reconciled. This “sovereignty” included final veto
power over all federal laws pertaining to language, culture, and communications
technologies as well as expanded control over immigration decisions.
The 1975 Ottawa-Québec agreement on immigration began the process of
allowing provincial control over matters of migrant entry into the province, which
ultimately led to the Cullen-Couture Agreement codifying provincial immigration
controls. While the Cullen-Couture Agreement is fairly limited in the scope of federalprovincial relations it does establish the important precedent of autonomy for Québec
over matters of provincial culture. This is a point that will be revisited many times
throughout this dissertation, although its historical importance can only be touched on at
this point. While the nationalist sentiment of Québec can be clearly viewed through
symbols and language it is the political codification of relationships and positions that
gives us a greater view of the power to control and shape culture. The Cullen-Couture
Agreement (1979) granted Québec a level of international diplomatic autonomy – a
position normally reserved for nation-states. In a limited sense, this act is the beginning
of legitimated Québécois statehood.
The mixed-economic mission of the PLQ found a ready audience in a Québec
population seeking a replacement for the weakened social protections offered by the
Catholic Church. In many ways the state became the new Church in the lives of many
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Québécois. Social services, education, and cultural authority quickly moved from the
private to public spheres as the provincial government mobilized Québec society under
its leadership. That the Québec population so quickly turned its back on the Catholic
Church should come as little surprise when the history of anti-statism in Québec
conservative political leadership is taken into account. With the removal of this political
barrier and the implementation of a state “safety-net,” the Québécois were given the
freedom to choose their own paths. The result was a secular nationalism centered on the
government of Québec to lead their cultural shift to a national Québécois identity.
The importance of the Quiet Revolution to the modern articulation of Québec
nationalism is clear. The outcomes of the political economic changes under the Lesage
government were varied. The UN wrested power back from the PLQ in 1966, but did
little to reverse the state-centered modernization implemented under Lesage. In fact, the
UN leadership oversaw the most internationally visible articulation of Québécois
nationalism during a state visit of French President Charles de Gaulle in 1967. Speaking
to a large crowd from the balcony of the Montréal City Hall he emotionally proclaimed
“Vive le Québec libre!42” The remainder of his visit to Canada was cancelled when
federal authorities reacted negatively to his support for additional sovereignty for
Québec.
This independantiste sentiment was clearly growing in the latter half of the 1960s.
One of the architects of the PLQ’s nationalization project, René Lévesque, decided that
the Québec liberals were not sufficiently pursuing sovereignty for the province. He left
the party in 1967 to form the Mouvement Sovereignté-Association then the Parti
42

“Long live free Québec!”
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Québécois (PQ) in 1968. The emergence of the PQ gave Québec citizens a political party
that was clearly advocating the political sovereignty of Québec (albeit thorough
continued political and economic association with Canada) for the first time. Lévesque’s
frustration with the PLQ’s lack of action of sovereignty was not isolated. In 1969 a
radical movement known as the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) embarked on a
course of bombings and political kidnappings that culminated in the assassination of the
provincial Minister of Labor Pierre Laporte in 1970.
The actions of the FLQ and other radical groups prompted Prime Minister Pierre
Trudeau, with the support of the Québec government, to invoke the War Measures Act
and declare martial law in Montréal. Citizens suspected of communist or other radical
affiliations were summarily arrested and questioned. The declaration of martial law and
the presence of federal troops in the streets of Montréal resulted in a mixed reaction.
While many radical student groups supported the FLQ, the majority of Québécois did not
support their actions, although the presence of federal troops in the province was even
less popular. Trudeau’s invocation of the War Measures Act, even though supported by
provincial political leaders (including the PQ), directly resulted in a loss of votes in
Québec and his minority government of 1972.
6. The Parti Québécois and Sovereignty43
The violence of the FLQ suppressed any revolutionary urges that may have
existed within the majority of the Québécois, however it did little to stem the tide of
independantiste sentiment. Growing frustration with the UN and PLQ on the subject of

43

The chapter was compiled from several historical narrative sources including Bernard (2000);
Fitzmaurice (1985); Linteau, Durocher, Robert, and Ricard (1991); and See (2001).
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federal intrusion (with respect to the 1970 crisis and successive legislative attempts by
the Trudeau government to promote pan-Canadian nationalism) brought the Parti
Québécois to power in 197644. The PQ was elected on a platform supporting provincial
sovereignty that greatly worried the Trudeau government in Ottawa.
The new government that settled into control in Québec City sent shivers
down the spines of Canadians, essentially because the PQ had been elected
with a promise to negotiate a new relationship with Canada. The PQ
believed that Québec was already a nation. What it lacked was the
sovereignty to pursue its own destiny (See 2001, 172-73).
The PQ government, led by René Lévesque, continued the provincial project of
modernization and state-sponsorship of social services. It was in this economic arena that
the contending political parties of Québec agreed. This is not surprising, as the desire to
promote liberal capitalism has long provided grounds for political cooperation, as
evidenced by the Anglo-Franco cooperative organizations of the mid-1800s. Throughout
the Quiet Revolution and to the present day there is little disagreement over issues of
provincial economic development.
A useful example of this common economic project between the PLQ and PQ in
spite of divergent political and cultural goals is the massive James Bay Hydroelectric
project. This project was begun in 1971 under the watch of the PLQ and has been of
central concern for subsequent liberal and sovereigntists governments. Massive political
and social pressure was put on the provincial government by the local James Bay Cree
who received little to no compensation for the loss of land or disruption of traditional
ways of life. In 1975, Hydro-Québec and the James Bay Cree signed an agreement that
44

This frustration existed despite the PLQ’s passage of Bill 22, which established French as the language of
government and business in Québec. Bill 22 would be the precursor to better-known language legislation in
Québec, but this was the first time that the linguistic culture of Québec was codified.
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could compensate the Cree but left other ownerships claims unresolved. Successive
provincial governments to this day have dealt with continual construction, legal, and
commercial problems with the James Bay Project. For instance, in 1992 the State of New
York withdrew a $17 billion purchasing contract with Hydro-Québec, largely due to the
efforts of Cree leaders who embarked on an informational tour that showed the negative
social effects on the local Cree due to the massive project. This setback led to a
cooperative effort on the part of the Québec government that enabled Hydro-Québec to
sell to the entire North American electricity market in 1997. Agreements in 2002 and
2004 between Hydro-Québec and the James Bay Cree resolved many of the legal issues
surrounding the project and provided substantial compensation for the local Cree. This
continual support of the James Bay Project serves as a cursory illustration of the common
liberal attitudes and economic orientation of the ruling provincial parties or Québec.
Also common among Québec political parties was a desire to see French
nationalism codified. The PLQ and the PQ differed significantly on the issue of
sovereignty, but were in agreement with respect to the position of Québécois supremacy
in the province. Bill 101 (Charter of the French Language) was passed in 1977 that
allowed English language public education only if both parents were educated in English
in Québec. Basically, all new arrivals to the province would be forced to send their
children to French-language schools. The Charter also required that French be the
language of business in Québec. The implementation of Bill 101 was a victory for
Québécois nationalism as it protected the culture and language of the province and
ensured that the children of immigrants would be able to linguistically integrate into
Québec society. Conversely, Anglophone citizens of the province rejected both the
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platform of the PQ and the intent of Bill 101. Many left Québec for Ontario and other
English speaking provinces in the late 1970s as a result of these political actions.
The PQ decided to press their political hand in 1980 with the first referendum on
political sovereignty. While the referendum would not declare independence for Québec,
it would give the PQ authority to negotiate for full control over taxation, legal
institutions, and foreign relations. The federal response of the Trudeau administration
was immediate and aggressive. The federal government attacked the wisdom of the PQ
leadership in advocating increased sovereignty and offered Québec the opportunity
renegotiate the British North America Act and develop a new constitutional agreement.
The result was a resounding 60 to 40 percent defeat of the referendum. Despite this sound
defeat on sovereignty Lévesque and the PQ were returned to power in the 1981 provincial
elections.
With national sentiment against Québec, Trudeau pressed ahead with his plan for
constitutional repatriation. This was a referendum promise to the citizens of Québec but
the process of writing a new constitutional agreement met with disapproval by the
Québec delegation. In November 1981, Trudeau reached an agreement with nine other
provinces on a Canadian Constitution that circumvented Québec’s objections to the
document. Known as the “La Nuit des Longs Couteaux,45” the resultant Constitution Act
of 1982 remains unsigned by Québec despite the resumption of constitutional
negotiations between Lévesque and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in 1984. These “beau
risques” negotiations resulted in a split within the PQ and Lévesque’s resignation the
following year.
45

“Night of the Long Knives”
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The PLQ regained power in 1985 and attempted to restart constitutional
negotiations with the Meech Lake Accords in 1987. The failure of Meech Lake to be
ratified in 1990 further convinced many Québécois that Canada was comfortable in their
refusal to accept Québec’s unique history and place in the country. The continuation of
these age-old frustrations led Lucien Bouchard to found the Bloc Québécois, a federal
level political party intended to bring about Québec sovereignty. The following year Bill
150 was passed by the PLQ-led National Assembly that asserted Québec’s right to secede
from Canada and called for another referendum on sovereignty in 1992. This was highly
significant as it represented the level of frustration and discontent in Québec. If the PLQ,
who had opposed the PQ in their calls for sovereignty, was endorsing Québec right of
secession then it can be safely assumed that federal-provincial relations in the early 1990s
were, at best, strained. The federal government quickly responded with calls for another
round of constitutional negotiations in Charlottetown on Prince Edward Island. The call
for a sovereignty referendum was shelved to allow for the national referendum on the
Charlottetown Accords, which failed in the fall of 1992.
The failure of both the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords illustrates the
persisting divide between English and French Canada. English Canadians resented the
claims and demands of a unique and sovereign Québec and seem convinced of
Mackenzie King’s sentiment that Québec is a province like any other in Canada. The
Québécois, on the other hand, rejected Charlottetown on the basis that the constitutional
revisions did not go far enough in ensuring their cultural and ultimately national
sovereignty. The “French Fact” again proved an irreconcilable divide in the quest for
Canadian nationalism and national unity. The return of the Parti Québécois in 1994 under
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the leadership of Jacques Parizeau would again bring about the question of whether the
“French Fact” could stand alone within its own nation.
In 1995 a second referendum was put to the Québec electorate and asked a single
question: “Do you agree that Québec should become sovereign after having made a
formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership within the scope of
the bill respecting the future of Québec and of the agreement signed on June 12, 1995?”
The referendum was defeated by less than one percent of the vote (50.58% non
against 49.42% oui). The close vote prompted many to dispute the balloting procedures
of the PQ and to claim voter intimidation on both sides of the issue. The number of votes
in the oui camp, however, led many to believe that the sovereignty issue was far from
being defeated in the minds of the Québécois. In 1998 the Supreme Court of Canada
unanimously resolved that the province did not have the authority to leave Canada
although the Court left open the possibility of future constitutional renegotiation. The
federal government of Jean Chretien made the issue even more muddied by passing the
“Clarity Act (C-20)” that gave the House of Commons authority to edit any proposed
sovereignty referendum and to unilaterally determine if an “acceptable majority” had
been obtained by the referendum. The definition of “acceptable majority” was left
ambiguous. In response the Québec Assemblée nationale passed legislation that defined a
majority as “50 percent plus one.” The legacy of these attempts at legislative clarification
remains to be seen. To date, no logistical discussion or planning has taken place in the
province to bring about another referendum on Québec sovereignty. Neither has a
concerted effort to challenge either the Supreme Court decision, the Clarity Act, or
Québec’s definition of sovereignty been launched by either federal or provincial parties.
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7. Conclusions
The purpose of this and the previous chapter is to present the dually
interdependent yet independent histories of Canada and Québec. The historical interrelationship in social, political, economic, and cultural terms cannot be ignored. In fact,
the independent nationalist projects inherent in Canadian and Québec histories rely in
large part on defining respective projects in contrast to the other. That is, both Canadian
and Québécois nationalism (and nationalist histories) are driven by their definitional
existence as mutually antithetical.
As such, these chapters should read as somewhat redundant in their content, but
also inherently distinct with respect to perspective and emphasis. These chapters are
designed to illustrate the duality of nationalist perspectives in telling what is essentially
the same history.
The role of Part II in the larger dissertation project is to (1) support the overall
methodological position that Canada and Québec are comparable nation-state entities and
(2) to provide adequate understanding of the perspective and independent historical
development that allows for divergent approaches to the challenge of globalization. This
second point is significant as global market integration affects both Canada and Québec
in similar fashion, as will be shown in Chapter Five. The methodological foundation of
this dissertation supports the view that analyzing state policy response to a similar
political economic challenge will allow the analyst to understand the capacities and
abilities of respective states (in comparative context) to respond to this singular
challenge. This is, of course, the purpose of Part III.
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To this point we have established a series of conceptual definitions and a
methodological framework for understanding how to understand and examine the
contemporary capacities of the core nation-state. Chapter Two established a theoretical
framework for understanding the nation-state, globalization processes, and provided an
excursive illustration of the interactive process of ideological justification/legitimation
with respect to establishing non-liberal social protections within the larger context of a
liberal political economic system. Part II is essential to both the methodlogy and later
analytical portions of this project. We must understand the autonomous development of a
nationalist history in both Canada and Québec. Without an understanding of the inherent
nationalist project in Canadian and Québec histories, we cannot fully understand the
dialectical outcome of policy decisions and strategies in response to encroaching
globalization processes. Chapters Three and Four are essential to this project in order to
fully embed the analysis in the larger context of historical development. The following
chapters in Part III will examine empirical evidence to answer the main questions of this
project.
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Part III
Analyzing the Effects of Global Market Integration in Canada and Québec
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Part III Introduction

Part Three, consisting of Chapters Five, Six, and Seven, contains the analytical
portion of this dissertation. The purpose of these chapters is to provide empirical support
for the theoretical claims made in Part One. Each chapter is compares a categorical
process of global market integration with the end goal of providing an overall
comparative-historical view of the transformative process of global market integration.
The bias of the project, to investigate the role of culture in the process of defining
contemporary state capabilities, is inherent in the subject matter of these chapters. This
project focuses on the process of ethno-cultural diversification as a primary requisite of
core state integration into the global economic system. Therefore, from this perspective
the question of culture becomes central to understanding the contemporary role of the
nation-state. I would defend this “bias” by stating that the process of ethno-cultural
diversification is a requisite outcome of economic growth and not simply a singularly
cultural process.
Chapter Five compares the actual experience of Canada and Québec in the
process of global market integration. The intent of the chapter is to illustrate the process
of integration, the policy shifts that accompany state desire to integrate into the global
market economy, and to ensure that both Canada and Québec are, in fact, integrated into
the global market economy at some level.
Chapter Six examines the process of ethno-cultural diversification as a function of
systemic labor migration. The chapter compares immigration policy change in Canada
and Québec to determine the role of the state in determining immigration levels and
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ethno-cultural composition of respective immigration populations. This chapter illustrates
the role of labor migration in the project of national economic expansion due to increased
global market integration. Chapter Six provides empirical evidence in support of claims
made in the previous chapter; namely, that global market integration is a desirable goal
for both Canada and Québec and resulting ethno-cultural diversification is a necessary
outcome that must be reconciled.
Chapter Seven examines this process of state reconciliation. That is, the
promotion of global market integration by both Canadian and Québec state institutions
has qualitatively altered the demographic composition of each respective national
population. This chapter examines the policy efforts by each state to address national
population demands for greater national cohesion, labor market stability, and a
reaffirmation of a singular nationalism.
Part Three analyzes the comparative experiences of Canada and Québec as they
integrate into the global market economy. First, the level of respective global market
integration is determined. Secondly, the results or outcomes of these integrative processes
are determined. Finally, the response of each respective state institution is evaluated.
Chapter Eight concludes the dissertation by integrating the analytical findings of Part
Three and the previous four chapters for the purpose of gaining greater insight into the
contemporary role and policy capacities of the core state.
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Chapter Five
The Global Market Economy: History and Impact on Canada and Québec

How has the global market economic system in the post-World War II era
developed and how has it impacted the economic autonomy of Canada and Québec?
Chapter Five provides this answer by examining the process of global market integration
in Canada and Québec. The chapter itself is divided into three sections.
The first briefly chronicles global market economic history from 1870 to the
present. As this dissertation is concerned with explaining globalization’s impact on the
nation-state, I constrain my definition and view of the global market economy to the
period of institutional international global financial and trade control. This perspective
begins with the institution of the gold standard in the late 1800s46. The purpose of this
section is to illustrate the dynamic nature of global market development and the
requirement of stable systemic proponents (state institutions).
The second and third sections examine the impact of global market integration on
Canada and Québec, respectively. I examine the actions and policy responses of the
Canadian and Québec governments with respect to issues such as tariff reduction, export
expansion, and market integration. The general contention among political economic
scholars is that economic globalization, defined as the post-1973 political economic
environment, has decreased the political economic autonomy of the individual nation46

This starting point is not consistent with either world-system or economic globalization approaches,
which begin their analyses in the 1500s and 1970s, respectively I use this starting point because this project
utilizes social practice, in the form of policy, as a medium of analysis. Thus I am interested in how states
and political economic institutions manage and control the global market economy, not necessarily in the
analytical nature of the global market economic system in its entirety.
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state (Albrow 1996; Kennedy 1993; Robinson 2004; Sklair 1995; Spruyt 2002). The
purpose of this chapter is the identification of historical change in the global economic
system and the role of the nation-state in this system as well as the deeper examination of
how these changes have affected Canada and Québec47.
1. The Global Market Economic System48
The existence of a governed global market economy can arguably be traced back
to the institution of the International Gold Standard in the late-1800s49. The standard was
predicated on two major prerequisites: the fixed, standard value of gold and the
hegemonic economic power of a lender of last resort. Due to its position as the dominant
capitalist economy, Great Britain assumed the role of lender-of-last-resort with the Bank
of England serving as the principal control over interest rates, supply of credit, and issues
of trade.
The establishment of a fixed currency valuation system created the stability
necessary for international trade and financial exchanges that define an international
liberal market economic system. The system worked relatively well in maintaining a
stable medium of exchange for financial and trade exchanges due largely to the economic
and political hegemony of Great Britain. The relative decline of British hegemony in the
47

This chapter is concerned with demonstrating global market integration and not in evaluating the benefits
or drawbacks from such integrative processes. As such there have been no efforts made by the author to
evaluate performance or efficacy of growth such as increasing socio-economic stratification or inequality
exacerbation in health care provision, education, or vocational inequalities.
48
General background information for this section was compiled from various sources including Best
(2005), Cerny (1996), Gilpin (2000;1987), O’Brien and Williams (2004), and Woods (2000).
49
The exact date for the adoption of a global gold standard is difficult to establish as individual nationstates adopted the monetary practice at different times such as Germany (1871), France and Italy (1873),
1879 (Austria), and Russia (1893). Another problematic issue is that practical adoption and political
affirmation are often dissociated evidenced by the case of the United States. The U.S. was practically tied
to the international gold standard in 1873 with the US Coinage Act that ended the silver dollar standard,
however it was not until 1900 that the dollar was officially tied to the American dollar to the international
gold standard with the passage of the US Currency Act.
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late-19th and early 20th centuries created a level of instability in the global economic
system, particularly affecting confidence that the British administration could administer
credit levels and interest rates.
World War I effectively ended the International Gold Standard. The years of 1914
through 1945 were not good ones for a stable global economic system. Global warfare,
economic depression, and national economic isolationism ensured that a resumption of
the global trade system in existence before World War I would not occur.
The coming end of World War II prompted allied nation-states to consider options
for revitalizing global trade. In 1944, delegates from forty-five nation-states met at
Bretton Woods, New Hampshire determined to establish a stable international
commercial medium to revive the global market economy. The conference was led by the
United States and Great Britain, but in reality the United States held the key to reviving
the international economic system. By this time the United States controlled fully threequarters of the world supply of gold and had emerged from the War era as the sole global
economic power. A compromise solution50 to the problem of economic leadership and
agreeable management came with the establishment of a “dollar standard.” The
agreement required the United States to peg the value of the dollar to a $35 per ounce
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The initial proposal, put forth by John Maynard Keynes, was for the creation of an international nongovernmental central bank. The purpose of this bank would be to “monitor trade imbalances and with the
power to force deficit countries to adjust their economic policies any time deficits were out of line” (Pool
and Stamos 1989, 3). This proposal was soundly rejected by the United States, as it offered no incentive for
their economic leadership. This position was a replication of previous British positions in 1870 and again in
1922 when the British, in exchange for the responsibilities of managing and supporting the gold standard
and gold-exchange system, respectively, were granted the power of monetary policy power. In short, the
British and later American hegemonic economic leadership was not selfless and carried several national
economic advantages.
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standard, which made the American dollar the official currency of the Bretton Woods
global market system.
Another outcome of the Bretton Woods Conference was the establishment of two
nongovernmental institutions: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
Bank. The former was tasked with the responsibility of monitoring commercial activity
within the global market system and be available for short-term, deficit-reduction lending
purposes. The latter was established as a fiscal management institution for the rebuilding
of Western Europe after World War II. For the first time the global market economic
system was supported by international nongovernmental institutions albeit under control
of donor states (Best 2005; Endres 2005).
This revived global economic system collapsed in the 1970s. Faced with a
number of domestic political pressures (demands for protectionism, a trade deficit, and a
pending election) and international pressures (a decline in confidence due to the
expansion of an inflated dollar and the inability of the US to match its gold-convertibility
responsibilities), Richard Nixon ended dollar to gold convertibility in 1971. This action
effectively ended the Bretton Woods system by abandoning the primary disciplinary
mechanism designed to stabilize the global currency unit (the U.S. Dollar).
Once again, those promoting a global market economic system were required to
find a means to administrate and discipline such a system. A solution was sought by the
seven largest industrial economies (G-751) at successive international economic summits
in New York (Plaza Agreement of 1985), Tokyo (1986), and Venice (1986). The
agreements varied in content and scope, but one central feature emerged: policy
51

Canada, France, (West) Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States
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coordination. In short, the G-7 agreed to “coordinate their macroeconomic policies and in
effect formulate a macroeconomic policy for the entire world…. Collective leadership of
the world economy would be substituted for the decline of American leadership” (Gilpin
1987, 151; see also O’Brien and Williams 2004; Schaeffer 2005; and Slaughter 2005).
The resurgence of national economic foci that occurred following the collapse of
the Bretton Woods system began to decline in the mid-1980s. The demise of Keynesian
state-centered economic strategies conversely ushered in the beginning of the so-called
current era of neo-liberalism. In short, the ebb and flow of laissez-faire liberal economic
theory, policy, and institutionalization that has occurred since the late 1800s once again
flowed toward a liberal market system – at the expense of national economic controls.
The major development centers on the emergence of a supranational
organizational structure that reflects the contemporary climate of policy coordination.
The Bretton Woods institutions (the IMF and the World Bank) have been reoriented to
facilitate the ideological and structural conditions necessary for global market integration
in the developing world. In addition, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
(GATT), which provided a significant level of trade discipline, was institutionalized in
1995 with the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) after the Uruguay Round
of the GATT in 1993. The WTO was granted powers of adjudication as well as a central
mandate to eliminate national (and other) barriers to liberal trade and financial flows. In a
very real sense, the WTO represents the most explicit institutional manifestation of neoliberal political economic ideology. The fact that developed and developing nations are
members of the WTO lends credence to the contention that international nongovernmental organizations (and their non-governmental actors) have usurped economic
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policy-making power from individual states on a global scale. Member states must adhere
to the mission and rulings of the WTO, thus the capability of respective states to enact
national protections is restricted, albeit by choice.
The purpose of this cursory history of the modern global economic system is to
show the evolutionary nature of systemic development. Simultaneously, we are able to
see that systemic development and maintenance is an active process of adaptation by
group and institutional proponents. This is important with respect to Canada and Québec
in that their active institutional participation and support is necessary for the global
economic system to survive. The following sections illustrate the process of global
market integration and institutional support for the global economic system in both
Canada and Québec.
2. Canada52
Canada was an autonomous participant in the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference
and continued to set its own political and economic agendas independently of British
control. Canada’s political image as an independent mediator in international disputes as
well as its expanding economic sectors led to a series of appointments to high level
political economic posts (autonomous membership in the League of Nations (1919) and
the International Labour Organization as well as appointment to the United Nations
Security Council in 1947). These appointments and recognitions culminated in Canada
being named as the seventh member of the powerful Group of Seven (G-7) economic
powers in 1976.
52

General background information for this section was compiled from various sources including Bothwell,
Drummond and English (1989; 1987); Chodos, Murphy and Hamovitch (1993); See (2001); and Urmetzer
(2003).
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Economic globalization can be roughly defined as the integration of national
economies into a global liberal market economic system. Thus, the primary mechanism
for the expansion of such a global economic system is the incorporation of liberal market
economic structures to govern national economic systems. In other words, integration of
national economies into the global economy requires that individual states relinquish a
level of economic policy autonomy. As previously stated, a global market economy
cannot function without a centralized control structure. In the era of globalization this
structure has shifted from American hegemonic control to a more liberal system of policy
coordination (albeit under strong American influence). In most cases, national economic
integration requires that state economic policy conform to the rules of the liberal market
system – with the most obvious consequence being an inability to protect national
markets.
Given that Canada is one of the seven most powerful economic nation-states, we
can safely make two assumptions. First, that the economic policies of Canada will be
consistent with those made by other G-7 countries and in accordance with the Bretton
Woods system of dollar hegemony and later the position of policy coordination. This
consistency is limited to Canada’s support for a stable global economic system not stating
that global market integration is an egalitarian or consistent process in and of itself. In
other words, the ebb and flow of the international global market system should be easily
observable in the economic policies of the Canadian government. Second, as one of the
few economic powers in the world, Canada should have a greater ability to institute
national socio-economic protections to benefit its population from the predatory effects
of liberal market economic integration. This section will examine the role of international
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economic policy development, foreign direct investment (financial capital flows), and
trade flows in Canada to test these assumptions.
2a. Canada: International Economic Policy
The issue of liberal trade in Canada has been a long and contentious one. From
early liberal reforms that mirrored global economic reforms in the 1800s to efforts to
entrench national economic protections in the post-war era, Canada has been a reflection
of international political economic shifts. The post-war era is most helpful in providing a
nation-state level example of global market integration and the problematic acceleration
of this integrative process due to demands for national socio-economic protection during
periods of transition.
Prior to World War II, the bilateral trade relationship between Canada and the
United States was the most active in the world. This relationship continues to grow in the
post-war era and remains the largest trade partnership in the world. This relationship
would come at a cost, evidenced by the 1951 Massey Commission which concluded that
Canadian culture was being compromised by encroaching American interests. The
Massey Commission report offers an important early example of the concern for the
effects of trade integration.
The economic reality of Canadian-U.S. trade could not be ignored, nor could the
geographic proximity of many manufacturing centers such as Detroit, Michigan and
Windsor, Ontario. Both were significant automotive manufacturing centers, yet trade
between the two was restricted by tariff and trade restrictions. In 1965, the CanadaUnited States Automotive Agreement (Auto Pact) would liberalize trade in the
automotive sector between the two countries.
166

The Pact eliminated tariffs on most automotive products produced in both Canada
and the United States. The Pact had an immediate effect in expanding the market for
Canadian automotive products. In 1964, only 7% of Canadian automotive sales went to
the world’s largest automotive market (the U.S.), but by 1968 fully 60% of Canadian
automotive manufactures were exported to the United States. The success of the Auto
Pact in expanding Canadian industrial production and American production cost
decreases have led many to label the 1965 Auto Pact as the precursor to later bilateral
liberal trade agreements (Anastakis 2005; Perry 1982). This agreement was significant,
yet focused on a limited economic sector. The idea of opening Canadian markets to
American capital was seen as highly lucrative but problematic53.
The legacy of the Massey Commission report and the increasing integration of
American and Canadian economic and cultural spheres led to a period of nationalist
rhetoric and protectionist positions by the Trudeau administration, particularly in the
1970s. Efforts to expand the Auto Pact and increase trade liberalization with the U.S. met
an unreceptive federal administration54 occupied with national protectionist demands to
resolve several issues such as ethno-cultural unrest (including First Nations and
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In 1967, a Task Force on the Structure of Canadian Industry was commissioned. Their findings were
published in a then-confidential report chronicling the “double-edged” nature of foreign investment in
Canadian industry. Economic analysts clearly saw the advantages of increased foreign capital in promoting
economic growth, however they consistently warned that economic autonomy would be the major
casualty/cost of such a growth strategy.
54
This national protectionist tendency should not be construed as an isolated event in Canadian economic
history. Many economic historians have commented on the global period of the 1950s through the mid1970s as a period of national economic retrenchment (Gilpin 1987; O’Brien and Williams 2004; Strange
1985). Therefore, the fact that Canada engaged in a political economic period of protecting its national
economic interests should be viewed as neither surprising nor unique with respect to global political
economic trends. However, we must consider the national protectionist demands made on the Trudeau
administration and the similarities in their occurrence throughout the Western world. The 1960s in
particular saw a global explosion of nationalist demands for increased state protection of cultural rights,
economic prosperity, and general demands for retributive and social justice.
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Québécois nationalism), urban ethnic and racial diversification, and social change rooted
in increased urbanization and economic growth. It was not until the election of Brian
Mulroney and the Conservative Party in 1984 that this resistance to liberal market
economics faded. The Mulroney Administration’s embrace of liberal trade agreements
(despite campaigning against such agreements in 1983) effectively ended federal
resistance to liberal market integration. The federal Liberal Party (as well as the National
Democratic Party) attempted to rally anti-CUFTA support in 1988, but Mulroney was reelected comfortably on a platform supporting liberal economic reforms and the expansion
of free-trade agreements. The benefits, it was seen, outweighed national protectionist
concerns and in 1994 the Liberal administration of Jean Chrétien finalized the expansion
of Canadian free-trade to Mexico with the NAFTA agreements.
Proposals for a North American Trade Agreement were made in the United States
as early as 1979. The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 and his administration’s push to
liberalize trade created a necessary political pre-condition for such an agreement. It was
not until 1985, after the election of the Conservative Mulroney administration, that talks
on creating a regional zone of “managed trade” was politically feasible from a Canadian
perspective. In 1988, both countries signed the Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement (CUFTA), with agreement implementation occurring on January 1, 1989.
Soon after the CUFTA agreements took effect, Canada was included in ongoing
trade talks with United States and Mexico. The negotiations resulted in the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which was signed in 1993 with full
implementation in 1994. The basic agreement was similar in structure to CUFTA with the
main thrust being the elimination of trade tariffs and other national protectionist
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strategies. This culmination of liberal market political negotiations marked the effective
end of political resistance to liberal ideological and structural reforms –the only federal
Canadian political party in opposition to liberal market trade policies was the NDP,
whose opposition has waned since 1994. In fact, even the NDP has embraced limited
“free-trade” in advocating a reduction of inter-provincial trade barriers as well as
reorienting NAFTA toward a “fair trade” focus (National Democratic Party 2005). If
CUFTA opened the gates to liberal market expansion in North America, NAFTA ensured
that those gates would remain open. The past ten years has seen a marked expansion of
liberal political economic agreements. Chile recently lobbied for inclusion in the NAFTA
agreement and bilateral trade agreements were brokered between Canada and Chile
(1995), Costa Rica (2001), and Israel (1997)55.
These regional and bilateral agreements, while illustrative of increased global
political economic cooperative efforts, are limited in scope in comparison with the
creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. The WTO was created as an
organizational alternative to the series of liberal trade agreements known as the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). Briefly, this organization, of which over 145
countries are members, establishes rules for trade to which all participating member
states must adhere. This participatory organization is, in effect, the nongovernmental
administrative, adjudicative, and political control mechanism for the global market
economic system. Trade disputes and macro-economic policy decisions are made, in
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Agreements such as CUFTA, NAFTA, FTAA (proposed), and numerous bilateral trade agreements show
that the process of global market integration and neoliberal market reforms are a contentious and fluid
process. Adaptation in reaction to national protectionist demands require constant attention and flexibility.
This section, and indeed this chapter, is designed to present the structure of global market integration, not
to imply that these processes are static.
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most cases, within the negotiating structure of the WTO. Canada’s active participation in
the WTO and its push to increase bilateral trade negotiations (active negotiations are
currently underway with Korea, Singapore, El Salvador, Guatamala, Honduras,
Nicaragua, the European Free Trade Commission, as well as continuing negotiations to
establish a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)) show that Canada has fully
integrated itself into the liberal market economic system. An examination of (1) trade
balances and (2) foreign investment will provide a clearer picture of what this global
market integration looks like and how is has impacted the Canadian economy.
2b. Canada: Balance of Trade
A main argument of liberal economic proponents is that export-orientation must
be a primary focus of national economic development (O’Brien and Williams 2004;
Woods 2000). In other words, the more integrated a national economy is in the global
market economy the higher its exports and, in the best case scenario, the lower its
imports. This optimal situation theoretically results in a trade surplus providing capital
for additional economic growth. This simplistic theoretical exposition can best be viewed
in the construction of the Bretton Woods system and the development of American
Dollar hegemony. Only the United States, as the financial keystone of the global market
economy, was encouraged to run a trade deficit due to issues of liquidity (Gilpin 1987,
135). All other nation-states were encouraged to work towards a positive balance of
payments. This emphasis on positive trade exchanges is a central focus of liberal market
economics: barriers to trade are barriers to economic growth.
Canadian integration into the global market system offers interesting insights as to
how a core state can profit from favorable global trade. Canada in the immediate post170

war period experienced modest economic growth due to increases in industrial
production, but ran trade deficits throughout the 1950s. After 1961, Canadian balance of
trade experienced only one deficit year in 1975. This consistent surplus should be viewed
as a success of liberal market adherence. However, a closer look at specific trends is
necessary to determine a commensurate decline in state policy autonomy as a result of
economic growth due to global market integration.
One of the major components of the Trudeau administration in the 1970s was its
nationalist emphasis both in terms of culture and economic autonomy. This was a
difficult road as the United States was (and remains) Canada’s largest single trading
partner. The stagnant growth of a trade surplus in the 1970s is reflective of increases in
domestic spending as well as the stagflation period within the global economy due to
high energy costs. Pressure from business and economic interests led to talks on the
establishment of a regional managed trade bloc in 1979. Increases in United States deficit
spending, as well as reduced energy costs led to a massive increase in Canada’s early
1980s trade surplus, with the most massive increase being a jump of $10 billion from
1981 ($7.7) to 1982 ($17.6). The Canadian balance of trade would oscillate from a high
of $19.8 billion in 1984 to a low of $7 billion in 1991. Interestingly, the signing of the
CUFTA agreement and its implementation in 1989 provided no positive growth in the
trade surplus. In fact, the average trade surplus in the four years following the CUFTA
agreement was approximately $8 billion. This number was well below the massive
surplus number of the early 1980s, but still a relatively significant trade surplus.
The implementation of the NAFTA agreement in 1994 seems to have had a much
more dramatic impact on Canadian trade surplus growth than the bilateral CUFTA
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agreement. In the first three years of NAFTA’s existence, the Canadian trade surplus
grew from $20 billion (1994) to $42 billion (1996). It must be noted that the creation of
the WTO and its governing structure in 1995 also opened up many markets to Canadian
goods. In effect, wholesale Canadian participation in the global market economy began in
the mid-1990s and provided an incredible profit to the nation-state of Canada. The trade
surpluses reflected in figure 1 are indicative of Canadian integration into the global
market economy. As Canada has acquiesced to regional and global trade agreements, its
share of global capital from trade transactions has increased.
This rise in production and export-orientation is, however, only part of the story.
Labor demand to fuel this trade surplus has led to net increases in immigration to Canada
since 1990 and will be discussed in the following chapter. The focus of the following
section is an additional measure of global market integration, foreign direct investment,
or foreign investment/control of Canadian economic and production entities.
2c. Canada: Foreign Investment
Foreign direct investment is a reliable measure of global market integration due to
its reflection of the transnationalization of production (Robinson 2004, 22). As
production in core capitalist states increasingly deals in matters of finance, high
technology, information, and service provision, the transnationalization of production
processes in Canada must be understood as more than simply industrial or manufacturing
production. This point is important, as sociological attention to the integrative function of
FDI has been focused on the developing world as an impetus for modernization. The
contention is that increasing rates of FDI in the developing world is a direct measure of
global market integration of these areas (Dicken 2003; Robinson 2004; Scharpf 1999).
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I do not disagree; however, the power of this measure also illustrates the effect of global
market integration on national populations in core states, particularly with respect to
national protectionist capacities.
Concerns about the effect of foreign investment and ownership of national
economic entities is reflected in documents such as the Massey Commission report
(1951) and the Task Force on the Structure of Canadian Industry (1967). These concerns,
that Canada was losing the capacity to protect its national economy, persisted despite
very low levels of FDI as reflected in figure 2.
These economic protectionist concerns, however, have not been reflected in the
post-Trudeau era (ending in 1984). In fact, one could argue that Trudeau was less of an
economic nationalist as his political rhetoric implies, particularly in his second term
(1980-1984). Beginning in 1983, FDI inflows into Canada began a relatively rapid yet
consistent climb through 2004. The pending WTO and NAFTA agreements accelerated
FDI growth in 1994 ($13 million increase) and FDI continued to advance at a greater
pace following these regional and global trade agreements. Interestingly it was the
founding of the WTO that had the most immediate impact on Canadian financial flows.
In 1997, Canada first became a capital-exporting nation. In keeping with theories of
liberal economic growth, the exportation of capital is designed to encourage trade in
specific regions. If we compare Canada’s trade balance with the increase in FDI outflows
in the period 1997-200 we see a steep drop in the trade surplus in 1997-1998. The years
1999-2001, however, saw the most dramatic historical increase in Canada’s trade surplus
(see figure 1). This evidence suggests that this increase in Canadian investment abroad
had a longer-term positive impact on trade. Aside from the recession years of 2000-2003,
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Canada’s growth in both trade surplus and investment outflows has increased.
Interestingly, FDI inflows have not decreased in any year since 1983.
The concurrent increase in FDI and export-led trade surplus growth is reflective
of Canada’s increasing integration into the global market economy. Canada’s complete
support for WTO regulations and trade authority, its active promotion of the NAFTA
agreements, and continuing support for the FTAA portray a willing and active participant
in the global market economic system. Canadian liberal trade policies have been
consistent with increases in trade surplus growth and FDI inflows. Clearly, Canadian
integration into the global market economic system has been beneficial to the general
Canadian economy.
A closer look at Québec’s integration will offer a comparative example of a state
with strong institutions and commensurate spending although with an equally strong
desire for full global market integration.
3. Québec56
Understanding the role of globalization in Québec is more problematic, primarily
with respect to data collection, but also due to the fact that economic controls in Québec
are a relatively new phenomenon. The role of the Quiet Revolution in changing the
culture and political power of Francophone Québécois is reflected in the predominant
economic concerns of the 1960s and beyond. The push to eliminate the income inequality
that existed between Francophone and Anglophone Quebeckers required increased
control over the economic mechanics of the provincial economy. This legacy of the Quiet
56

General background information for this section was compiled from various sources including Bothwell,
Drummond and English (1989; 1987); Chodos, Murphy and Hamovitch (1993); Fitzmaurice (1985); Fry
(2000); Pacom (2001); and Urmetzer (2003).
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Revolution was massive state-intervention and the nationalization of select provincial
industries.
The Canadian federal-provincial economic relationship is unique in that provinces
are responsible for funding most of their respective social welfare projects, including
health care and education. This means that provinces are also responsible for generating
tax income. The federal government, which is also responsible for generating tax income,
augments provincial tax incomes with an “equalization payment” intended to ensure a
level of provincial financial equality. The case of Québec is unique in that the financial
resources that are expended in the province to support Québec nationalism do not exist
anywhere else in Canada. The primary example is state support for the monitoring and
promotion of French language legislation. Provincial taxation and the highest level of
federal equalization payments in Canada fund these nationalist efforts, including the
unique and autonomous educational system of Québec.
Ironically, while conventional scholarship on economic globalization concludes
that the state is diminished as it integrates into the market economic system, Québec is
actively recruiting foreign direct investment and external trade relationships for
nationalist reasons. In effect, Québec can distance itself from Canada though its own
integration into the global market economy. This perspective is supported by Spruyt:
…liberalism reduces the costs of secessionism. In a mercantilist world
with barriers to the free exchange of goods and services, scale becomes a
decisive asset. Small states simply lack the domestic markets required for
the efficient production of goods (hence, small states tend to rely far more
on trade as a percentage of gross national product than large states). But if
few barriers exist, size becomes a less important prerequisite. Some
scholars have argued that progress on the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) in fact assisted secessionist sentiments in Québec
(Spruyt 2002, 145).
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This perspective is complicated by the combination of liberal and social democratic
ideologies that pervades Québec. The historical provision of social services by the
Catholic Church prior to 1960 and by the Québec state after the Quiet Revolution
generates significant expectations of social and state institutions. The national population
in Québec continues to view social service provision by state institutions as a primary
responsibility of the state. The injection of liberal ideology after the Quiet Revolution
allowed the state to grow in strength, while at the same time maintaining the social
democratic traditions of the province. This section will examine how increasing
participation in the global market economy has impacted the development of a nationstate in Québec.
3a. Québec: International Economic Policy
Québec does not have the political authority to enter into international financial or
trade agreements as an autonomous entity. It does, however, have the power to manage
and control domestic economic matters. This situation has resulted in a massive increase
in the state-management of economic matters since 1960. A simple look at state spending
in Québec in the first few years after the Quiet Revolution reveals this massive expansion
of the Québec state. Bradbury notes this expansion and describes the increase as largely
the result of the desire to eliminate the economic inequality/stratification between
Anglophone and Francophone populations. One of the many economic indicators he cites
is the simple increase in state expenditures during this period. In 1960, provincial
expenditures totaled $598 million while only twelve years later total expenditures
reached $4.5 billion in 1972 (Bradbury 1982, 46).
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The development of a strong nationalist economic orientation has resulted in
several significant institutions. Québec effectively nationalized several economic
institutional entities during and after the Quiet Revolution. Hydro-Québec and la Caisse
de dépôt et placement du Québec are two such examples of state control over national
economic interests in Québec.
Hydro-Québec was created in 196357 and represented the most successful effort at
nationalized energy production and distribution in North America. In fact, initial growth
of the state corporation was so rapid that existing production facilities quickly became
insufficient to meet demand. Hydro- Québec began to import additional energy supplies
in 1969 when it signed an agreement with the Churchill Falls Corporation in Labrador
(Newfoundland). Production continued to increase with the development of the James
Bay project (see chapter four) and the focus on energy exportation was formalized in
1978 with the creation of Hydro-Québec International (HQI). This focus on exporting
(primarily) hydroelectric power culminated with the opening of the Hydro-Québec
distribution system to the North American energy market in 1997. This agreement
created a new Hydro-Québec division, Hydro- Québec TransÉnergie, and an American
subsidiary, HQ Energy Services, to market energy in the United States. The current net
income in 2005 was reported at nearly $2.5 billion spread across four divisions
(production, distribution, equipment, and exports)58.La Caisse de dépôt et placement du
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An earlier version of nationalized energy production, in the form of Hydro-Québec, was created in 1944.
Then-Premier Adelard Godbout partially nationalized Montréal Light, Heat, and Power in an attempt to
begin liberal reforms intended to accelerate Québec’s modernization process. The election of Maurice
Duplessis later in the same year put an end to the nationalization experiment.
58
Information and data for Hydro-Québec were obtained from financial statements and historical profiles
obtained from Hydro-Québec (http://www.hydroquebec.com). Other documents include strategic plans,
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Québec is a financial management and investment institution that emerged from the same
Lesage-reform period of the early 1960s. The institution was originally created in 1965
by an official act of the Québec National Assembly to manage the newly created Québec
Pension Plan. Again, the emergence of state supported social service provision in Québec
illustrates an emergent state in support of national interests. This is important, particularly
with respect to la Caisse, as one of the main goals of the Quiet Revolution was to reduce
the Anglophone dominance over financial institutions in Québec. In the words of Claude
Castonguay, Special Advisor to Jean Lesage (1960-1966), “it was essential to free the
Québec government from its longtime dependence on the powerful alliance of
Anglophone brokerage firms” (Castonguay 2002, 2). In this way, the emergence of la
Caisse represents the institutional end of the status quo arrangement between elite
Anglophone economic and Francophone political and clerical elites. Viewed as a sort of
economic reclamation project, the resumption of economic control by Francophones in
the province was clearly a primary goal of the Quiet Revolution and Québécois
nationalists.
La Caisse was given the responsibility of managing deposits of the Québec
Pension Plan, but it was also given a secondary mandate to support Québec economic
growth at the same time. The investment responsibilities of la Caisse, combined with the
state protect of economic equalization, motivated the organization to oversee the health
and development of Francophone business entities. The combination of the cultural and
economic goals of the Quiet Revolution are readily apparent in the functioning of la

financial reports, and annual reports available at Hydro-Québec, 75 René-Lévesque Boulevard Ouest,
Montréal (Québec) H2Z 1A4.
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Caisse. The responsibility of managing priovncial pension funds occurs within the
context of a healthy provincial economy. All of this economic interaction occurs with the
understanding that Québec is first and foremost a Francophone province/nation.
Therefore, the mandate of la Caisse also includes responsibilities for overseeing the
health and welfare of explicitly Francophone, Québécois economic and business entities
(Arbour 1993; Forget 1984; Pelletier 1989).
This implied mandate was dramatically illustrated in 2000 when la Caisse blocked
the multimillion-dollar acquisition of the Québec company, Vidéotron, by Ontario-based
Roger Communications. The sale of Vidéotron (a Francophone telecommunications
company based in Montréal since 1964) to an Anglophone corporation was, in the view
of la Caisse, detrimental to the cultural sovereignty of Québec. The sale was effectively
disallowed by la Caisse under the authority of their implied mandate to encourage
Québec economic growth and protect Québec (specifically Francophone) investments.
After a series of settlements and negotiations with Rogers Communications, the sale of
Vidéotron to Quebecor, a Francophone communications corporation based in Montréal,
was approved by both la Caisse and the Canadian Radio-Television and
Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) in 2001.
The inability of the Québec government to develop international economic
agreements and arrangements has not stopped the Québec state from participating in the
global economy as an autonomous corporate entity. Through the creation of statecontrolled economic entities such as Hydro-Québec and la Caisse, Québec is able to
directly control its participatory levels in various market economic activities. In fact, the
nationalization of Hydro-Québec and the public-private cooperative structure of la Caisse
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means that Québec participates in the global market economy in a more direct manner
than the federal Canadian government (with la Caisse participation limited to oversight as
a state control institution). Of course, the level of state control over various economic
structures and entities is variable and it remains to be seen whether or not this level of
cultural and economic protectionism is compatible with greater global liberal market
integration. These changes will be discussed in Chapter Eight, tying Québec attempts to
protect national economic sectors with the overall theoretical and methodological project
of this dissertation. Our goal now is to simply illustrate the nature of global market
integration in Québec.
This is not to say that the Québec state is limited to social-democratic
nationalization projects. As previously stated, the federal-provincial relationship is
largely defined by provincial social service responsibilities and taxation authority.
Québec, with its unique political economic structures and nationalist demands, has a tax
structure that reflects these state funding requirements; its provincial personal income tax
is one of the highest in Canada59. Recently, the Québec National Assembly passed a
unique anti-poverty measure, Bill 112, designed to both reduce poverty and eliminate
social exclusion. The bill is unique in its dual emphasis and in its drafting by members of
both the Québec National Assembly and a collection of community movement activists.
The bill will not come into effect until 2006, but its construction and ambitious agenda
(chief amongst being the halving of poverty levels by 2015) are reflective of the national
economic power of the Québec state.
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Interestingly, Investissement Québec, the state-sponsored promotional institution for foreign investment
in Québec, cites the rate of corporate taxation is the lowest in not only Canada, but also North America at
31.02 percent. This illustrates the desire of the Québec state to attract investment and business entities
while at the same time maintaining existing levels of state spending on social service provision.
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Clearly, the commitment to social service provision and national protection
through economic means remains a significant motivation for the Québec state. This
political economic climate seems to show a situation of limited global market integration.
However, we must understand that Québec’s ability to apparently integrate into the
global market economy and maintain national economic protections is highly contingent
on the equalization payments it receives from the federal government. Due to this source
of additional state income, Québec is able to both facilitate global market integration as
well as maintain high levels of national economic protections. Recent events have cast
doubt on Québec’s ability to maintain this contradictory environment and will be
illustrated in Chapter Eight. It must be noted that from this perspective, Québec
sovereignty would undoubtedly mean the end of federal equalization payments and
therefore the end of additional state income to support such programs. One must question
the ability of an independent Québec to profit from global market integration as well as
maintain non-liberal national economic protections. Again, these issues will be revisited
in the project conclusion.
The power of the Québec state to control its domestic economy and to participate
in the global market economy cannot be disputed. In fact, it is the strong state control
over a national economy that troubles critics of Québec economic protectionism. New
political parties such as the Equality Party have sprung up to directly challenge the
sovereignty agenda and social democratic, state-centered national protections. Liberal
critiques point to Québec’s chronic unemployment and relative rates of poverty as being,
per capita, among the worst in Canada. These (and other) problems are exacerbated,
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according to such critiques, by Québec’s refusal to engage in total liberal economic
reforms (McMahon 2003).
On the other hand, Québec has recently taken extraordinary efforts to promote
foreign investment through active marketing and institutional support from such publicprivate cooperative groups as Investissement Québec. Québec also is a public supporter
of free-trade agreements on both regional and global levels. Jacques Parizeau, then
Premier of Québec, argued that Québec had been the strongest Canadian supporter of
both NAFTA and WTO participatory negotiations and that Canadian participation in both
regional and global trade liberalization was due to Québec’s unfailing support (Parizeau
1995).
Québec international economic policy is, undoubtedly, contradictory. Many argue
that Québec is missing an opportunity to grow its economy at much higher rates due to its
protectionist policies. Québec nationalists argue that without these non-liberal national
protections their very culture and social structures would collapse under the onslaught of
free-market capital and culture. But what has the effect of globalization been on Québec?
Have its national protections inhibited economic growth and discouraged foreign
investment? Has Québec been able to encourage investment while still maintaining
demanded national protections?
3b. Québec: Balance of Trade
A look at Québec’s balance of trade since the early 1980s shows marked
similarities and differences with Canada. The first major difference is the fact that
Québec ran substantial trade deficits for most of the 1980s. The second difference is the
fact that when Québec has been able to run trade surpluses, the level of these surplus
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exports have not provided decreased Québec import reliance to a significant degree
(particularly in comparison with the whole of Canada) . These differences are illustrated
in figures 3 and 4, respectively.
The major similarity when comparing Québec and Canada trade balances is the
increase in trade surpluses at two points: 1995 and 2000, respectively. The pattern of
trade is nearly identical when both are compared in scale (see figures 1 and 3). The initial
1995 growth in Québec of over $3 million mirrors the surplus growth in Canada at
approximately $35 million. Both show a marked decline until 1998 for Québec and 1999
for Canada when rapid growth led to the largest trade surpluses for both Québec ($6.8
million) and Canada ($70.7 million) in 2001.
This similar pattern is reflective of the subordinate economic role of Québec in
Canada, but it also shows that, in terms of trade, Québec is similarly embedded in the
global economy, as is the whole of Canada. It would seem that, from this information that
Québec’s socio-economic protectionist policies have done little to retard the integration
of the province into the global market economic system.
On the other hand, this also suggests that high rates of protectionist legislation
(Bill 122, Provincial tax laws) and state control over economic production (HydroQuébec) and oversight (la Caisse) organizations have not hampered Québec’s economic
growth to the extent that some would believe. This, however, is a conclusion that cannot
be addressed with simple balance of trade statistics. It should also be noted that the
massive trade surplus growth of the Canadian national economy provided a significant
buffer during the recession years of the early 2000s.
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Figure 3. Québec: Balance of Trade

186

Trade Balance Canada

80000

Trade Balance Québec

Millions of Canadian Dollars

60000

40000

20000

0

1946

1951

1956

1961

1966

1971

1976

1981

1986

1991

1996

2001

Year

Figure 4. Canada and Québec: Comparative Balance of Trade
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Although the trade surplus dropped significantly in the years 2002-2003, Canada
retained a healthy surplus and has shown a $9 billion growth in the trade surplus in 2004.
Québec was similarly affected by the most recent recession (showing a decrease in 20022003 but a similar increase in both imports and exports in 2004). A major difference in
Québec, however, is the fact that despite this most recent increase in imports and exports,
Québec ran a trade deficit in 2004. This would suggest that Québec’s economy is not yet
capable to fully mirroring global economic trends, as is the national economy of Canada.
It would seem that Québec’s socio-economic protections do, in fact, hamper the ability of
trade to ebb and flow in conjunction with larger trends.
On the other hand, Québec does not have the economic resources available to the
Canadian federal government. While the whole of Canada can buffer provincial poverty
in regions such as the Maritimes, Québec has a limited capacity to address persistent
poverty in regions such as Gaspé and la Côte-Nord. This debate is important, but not the
focus of this project. The conclusions we can make are that Québec has benefited from
neoliberal trade policies (NAFTA) but not to the degree of Canada as a whole.
3c. Québec: Foreign Investment
Mapping FDI in Québec is problematic. Official investment statistics for Québec
are not available to the public, and other FDI monitoring institutions such as UNCTAD
and OECD do not keep statistics below the nation-state level. This makes a statistical
comparison impossible. There is, however, a practical solution that can lead to inferences
being made. First, a simple overview of Québec investment recruitment and management
will illustrate the problematic nature of foreign investment in Québec. Second, statistics
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demonstrating recent growth in foreign-owned capital expenditures offers a simple but
interesting view of Québec’s future in this area.
Foreign investment is traditionally more problematic politically in Québec than in
Canada. Due to Québec’s close relationship with the United States with respect to trade,
investment flows would logically follow the same pattern. This would, obviously, mean
that English would be the dominant language of business and investment in Québec. The
relatively contemporary nature of the Quiet Revolution and the need to reinvigorate
Francophone Québécois business and economic sectors led some to argue against
encouraging increases in foreign investment and ownership in Québec economic
institutions. This view of economic nationalism, or more pointedly economic
decolonization, persisted to the point that actual tangible gains were made in improving
Francophone income equality (Vaillancourt 1985)60. Once these economic disparities
were effectively reduced, the emphasis on economic nationalism has decreased.
It became increasingly apparent to sovereigntist leaders (primarily in the PQ and
Bloc Québécois) that encouraging foreign capital investment in Québec would
accomplish two goals: (1) increase Québec’s participation and integration into the global
economy as an increasingly autonomous entity and (2) show support for liberal economic
policies and create a more positive bilateral political economic relationship with the
United States as a result. In other words, increasing global market integration and

60

Albouy (2005) supports this conclusion by measuring change in the log annual earnings gap between
Francophones and Anglophones. In 1970, the gap within Québec was -.270 (representing the relative gap
between the lower group (Francophones) and the dominant group (Anglophones). In 2000, this gap had
been reduced to -.070 (Albouy 2005, 29). Additionally, his research cites annual earnings figures that offer
descriptive illustrations of this earnings gap. In 1970, Francophone average annual income was
approximately $34,272 while Anglophone annual income averaged $46,857. In 2000, the Francophone
average was $43,418 while Anglophone annual earnings averaged $46,656 (Albouy 2005, 30)
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recruiting foreign investment, as a unique and autonomous entity, is viewed in Québec as
a strategy to expand Québec’s economic base in a more autonomous fashion than simply
as a Canadian province. Of course, the extent of arguments promoting FDI as a
sovereignty issue varies by political party and ideological affiliation. The interesting
point here though is that regardless of whether Québec political leadership is
sovereigntist (PQ) or federalist (PLQ) in orientation, the encouragement of FDI remains
constant.
The universality of FDI promotion by the Québec state is apparent in the
institutional state support of investment recruitment through organizations such as
Investissement Québec61. This organization is based on the same public-private
cooperative model that structures la Caisse and other partners of the Ministère du
Développement économique, de l’Innovation et d l’Exportation62. Through such
institutional programs, the Québec state is able to encourage and manage foreign
investment specifically directed in Québec. These efforts have resulted in positive FDI
increases (see table 1). A recent evaluation of venture capital investment found that
inflows of foreign capital into Québec economic entities were among the highest in North
America; in fact, Québec ranks third in North American biotechnology, information
technology, and venture capital investment behind only California and Massachusetts.
The rapid increase in growth, $49 million in 2002 to $51 million in 2003 to $88 million
in 2004 (and growing), occurred after implementation of liberal economic reforms
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Investissment Québec is a public-private cooperative organization that is organized in a way similar to la
Caisse. The Board of Directors is comprised of Québec state ministers and officers as well as private
business leaders in the province. The goal of the organization is to promote and facilitate foreign
investment in Québec as well as Québec investment abroad.
62
Ministry of Economic Development, Innovation, and Exportation
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Table 1. Québec: Capital Expenditure under Foreign-Control by Industry, 2003-2005 (In
Thousands of Dollars)
Year

Total
Expenditures

2003

6,511,434

2004

7,660,990

2005

8,126,894

by the Charest administration in 2002 (King 2005)63.
Geography and increased governmental recruitment of foreign investment provide
significant motivation. This increase in venture capital is reflected in more material
construction and material goods investment in the province. The growth in capital
expenditures by foreign-owned businesses has greatly expanded in the past three years.
The foreign investment and venture capital growth achieved in the past three to
four years raises significant attention to the effect of liberal reforms undertaken by the
Charest government. The economic policies of the Parti Québécois and the federal Bloc
Québécois have largely mirrored those of their liberal counterparts in both provincial and
federal politics. As was previously stated, it seems that the political position on
sovereignty/federalism is more of a determining difference than is the common desire to
integrate Québec into the global economy through both trade and increased foreign
investment.
The current PLQ government in Québec is, in fact, attempting to decrease these
national economic protections and adhere to orthodox liberal economic demands. The

63

“It was just a drop in the bucket in the context of U.S. venture investments - which came to $15.5 billion
in the first three quarters of 2004 - but with just under C$500 million in disbursements in all of Canada in
the third quarter, the increase in Québec is substantial.” (King 2005).
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success of these down-sizing and privatization efforts remains to be seen, however the
fact that Québec has utilized policy as a tool to historically promote national economic
institutions and protections is significant in defining respective state capacities. More
specifically, a corporatist model of the state may reflect Québec while a more traditional
political model may be more reflective of the Canadian state.
4. Comparative Growth and Conclusions
Canadian economic growth in the post-WTO and NAFTA era has been
impressive. Trade and budget surpluses, at the federal level, have proven to be some of
the largest in the world. In comparison with other G7 countries, Canada was alone in
posting a budget surplus in 2004 (CBC 2004). Québec, on the other hand, has struggled
to register consistent trade surpluses and has posted consistent budget deficits. This stark
position would seem to imply that Canada, exclusive of Québec, was experiencing an
economic boom, while the province of Québec remained mired in economic stagnation.
A quick look at overall GDP growth illustrates this trend.
The problem, however, is that measurement at these levels is problematic due to
the diversity and levels of economic inequality within Canada. For example, natural
resource rich provinces such as Alberta and capital rich provinces such as Ontario tend to
show rates of growth that are much higher than poorer provinces such as the Maritime
provinces and (relatively) Québec. In addition, regional disparities within provinces are
not taken into account. Québec, for instance, has areas of high economic growth
(Montréal and Québec) and also areas of large-scale poverty (Gaspé and Côte-Nord). A
more accurate measure of comparison would be to examine the rates of annual GDP
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economic growth in both Canada and Québec. Figure 6 clearly illustrates this trend of
similar rates of growth.
This comparison is striking in its ability to show the matching patterns of growth
occurring in both Canada and Québec (as shown in figures 5 and 6, respectively). This
pattern would suggest that while Québec often under-performs in terms of annual GDP
growth in comparison with the whole of Canada, its rate of growth is higher at times. We
can conclude that aside from rates of absolute GDP growth, the rate of annual growth
shows a comparable economic growth trend. The conclusions that can be drawn from this
data, with respect to determining global market integration, would imply that Québec has
followed a similar path of economic integration (as Canada). We can assume that through
comparable rates of annual GDP growth, trade flows, and FDI recruitment efforts that
Québec and Canada have achieved at least comparable levels of global economic
systemic integration.
This modest conclusion is somewhat contradictory to liberal critics of Québec
social spending. The relatively low rate of overall growth and the inability to post
significant trade surpluses is tempered with consistent and comparable rates of GDP
growth. In other words, Québec is experiencing comparable growth rates to one of the
most powerful economies in the world, and doing so with high levels of state social
spending. Québec maintains a solidly social democratic statist position in which health
care, education, childcare, cultural-linguistic programs, intercultural, and many other
social programs are supported by the Québec state. The maintenance of non-liberal statecentered spending is cited by liberal critics as the main cause for Québec’s lower level of
growth and most other economic problems.
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Two significant issues emerge from this analysis. First, the national population of
Québec continues to demand that the state maintain traditional levels of spending. This is
in reaction to pressures to decrease state spending by advocates of greater liberal market
reforms. Spending cuts and general economic reforms have been received coldly at best
in Québec. This strength of national population demands is countered by the universal
political will to integrate Québec into the global market economy on an ever-increasing
scale.
This second issue of liberal market promotion provides an interesting
contradictory position – and a potential problem for future Québécois politics. The dual
position, advocated by both the PQ and PLQ, has been to promote liberal reforms such as
increasing FDI and trade, while also maintaining traditional state-funding for social
programs demanded by the national population. This dual position will become
increasingly tenuous if political goals for each major provincial party are realized. The
desire for PQ leadership to promote sovereignty (elimination of equalization payments)
and the PLQ’s current desires to dismantle state social service institutions (as will be
shown in Chapter Eight) both embrace global market integration as a vehicle for political
goals; however, both will result in decreased ability to protect national economic sectors
and social service provision. Again, these conclusions will be revised in the final chapter.
Overall, we can conclude that Québec’s level of global market integration has
been facilitated by its unique position with respect to “foreign aid” in the form of federal
equalization payments. This situation allows Québec to promote neoliberal market
integration as well as maintain relatively high levels of state social spending. This is a
contradictory position that is unique to Québec; however, the existence of this climate
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raises significant questions about the Québec state and its continuation of such a
contradictory and potentially tenuous political economic position (supporting both
neoliberal economic reforms and maintaining non-liberal national economic protections).
I argue that the relative power of the Québécois national population requires this
contradictory state position.
This “inhibited integration” occurs as a result of popular resistance to the effects
of such integration. The political elite of Québec has shown a strong willingness to
promote greater market integration, but have been unable to adequately reduce the state
institutional capacities required for such reforms to fully take hold. Canada, on the other
hand, has succeeded in integrating to a fuller extent and the effects of this integration
have been reflected in reduced federal spending for health care (Health Canada),
education, and other social services once highly prized by the federal government. This
conclusion, and the potential dangers of such a political economic position, is revisited in
Chapter Eight.
Economic growth has occurred in both Canada and Québec at comparable rates.
As Canadian history has shown, economic growth necessitates increases in labor
availability. As an economically under-populated country, Canadian demographics
require that economic growth be fueled by commensurate increases in labor migration.
The following chapter will illustrate this process and the accompanying ethno-cultural
diversification or urban Canada and Québec as a result of this economic growth due to
increased global market integration.
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Chapter Six
Ethnic Diversification and Labor Migration

The post-World War II period ushered in the dual conditions of expanding
economic production in Canada and Québec and an increasingly interactive global
political economy. These, of course, were not mutually exclusive conditions as the
Keynesian economic growth strategies of the post-war period saw increases in national
economic performance along with the institutionalization of global economic
mechanisms in the form of the IMF, World Bank, and (less formally) American dollar
hegemony. These conditions began to create a more interdependent global political
community, dramatically demonstrated by the process of rapid ethnic diversification in
Western capitalist nation-states during globalization’s early years.
We can understand this development as the causal outcome of several historical
and economic forces culminating in the creation of a modern global labor supply system.
First, the traditional labor migration from the source countries of Eastern and Southern
Europe was limited in the post-War era. New sources of labor migration were required
and subsequently filled by migration from the Global South.
Secondly, the political economic shifts that resulted from economic
reorganization following World War II, and again after the collapse of the Bretton Woods
institutions and the energy crisis of the early and late 1970s, created conditions conducive
to the liberalization of immigration policies in many advanced capitalist nation-states.
These conditions included significant motivation for source countries to participate in the
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global labor supply system due to the same global economic pressures that were
functioning in the developing world.
Finally, the transnationalization of production and the expansion of centers of
capital in non-Western areas created a new class of educated and skilled labor migrants.
These migrants would be increasingly in demand for two reasons: (1) their skills in
information technology, which were increasingly in demand as Western states moved
toward information-based economies and (2) their immediate resources, as often these are
monied migrants who possess the skills and resources to immediately contribute to the
expanded economic growth of the receiving country.
This chapter chronicles the experience of both Canada and Québec in promoting
and managing labor migration in accordance with the demands and constraints of the
global market economic system. The development of ethno-cultural diversity as a
significant national issue in both Canada and Québec has been a result of increasing
integration into the global economic system. The development of ethno-cultural
diversification in Canada and Québec must be understood as a consequence of
globalization; an economic growth requisite that must be managed in order to maintain
national-state stability that is essential for global economic systemic maintenance. The
state response to these national demographic changes takes the form of multicultural and
intercultural policies and will be examined in the following chapter. This chapter
provides an important link demonstrating that multicultural policies are, in fact, outcomes
of globalization processes.
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1. Understanding Labor Migration
Labor migration and immigration have been popular topics in the post-World War
II era. The ubiquitous nature of immigration is reflected in the many disciplinary theories
of its origins, functions, mechanics, and outcomes. Predictably, disciplinary theories are
concerned with respective dominant questions. For instance, economic theories of
migration are concerned with explaining the economic motivations and conditions that
promote or discourage migration. Sociological theories of migration are more concerned
with social integration and incorporation into receiving societies. A focus on networks of
labor and ethnic affinity/identity complement perspective examining migration as
motivated by the transnationalization of production (Cordero-Guzmán et al. 2001; Light
and Bhachu 1993; Portes 1998; Sassen 1991). Political theories of migration are largely
focused on issues of governmental control and management of immigration (Brettell and
Hollifield 2000; Brochmann and Hammar 1999; Foner and Rumbaut 2000).
The discipline-specific nature of migration studies is made even more problematic
by two trends in the literature. The first is a general attempt to develop theories of
migration with respect to out-migration, immigration management, migrant integration,
migration flows, and many other specific aspects of the migratory process. The second
trend is typified by case studies intended to show the unique and historically dependent
nature of migrations. Russell King comments on this diversity of questions, issues, and
approaches in the study of migration:
A sampling of even a small portion of migration’s vast literature reveals a
tension between attempts to create models and theories on the one hand,
and the numerous empirical case-studies which tend to emphasize unique
circumstances on the other. The case-studies are nearly always interesting
but have limited theoretical validity or general application; the theories
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either state the obvious or involve unrealistic assumptions…it is perhaps
precisely because it is so difficult to make generalizations about migration
that it is such an important and fascinating subject to study (King 1996, 7)!
The effort to integrate these divergent approaches is a difficult one. For instance, an
identified sociological bias is to focus on the receiving country, particularly on
assimilationist or identity-centered questions of social integration (Brettell and Hollifield
2000; see also Gordon 1964; Kramer 2003). While some have pointed to the inherent
interdisciplinary nature of sociology as providing a natural position of authority in
migration studies (Waters 1999) others have moved beyond disciplinary limitations to
embrace a methodological common ground of systems theory.
Systemic perspectives of international migration are superior to the traditional
“push-pull” models of migration due to their ability to incorporate structural variables in
addition to traditional agent-centered choice models. Briefly, traditional models explain
migration as a dynamic process involving “push” conditions (high population density,
generally poor social, political, economic conditions, or extreme cases such as famine or
war) in source countries and “pull” conditions in receiving countries (notably demand for
labor, high economic growth, and favorable living standards, social condition, and
political stability). While these explanations are often accurate, the methodology is
limiting due to its emphasis on migration as a rational decision-making process on the
part of the individual migrant. This approach is only able to tell part of the story of
migration, specifically “the supply of foreign workers is only a necessary condition for
the phenomenon of international labor migration. The decisive condition is the demand
for foreign labor in the immigration country” (Straubhaar 1986, 853). In other words,
immigrant choice is an important but limited portion of the labor migration process.
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Systemic studies of migration develop divergent conclusions on the motivations
and functions of international labor migration from those of traditional rational-choice
“push-pull” models. Straubhaar (1986; 1988) makes the case that labor demand in
receiving countries is the determining factor in motivating migratory flows. The ebb and
flow of labor demand can be measured through immigration controls enacted by
respective receiving countries. The resulting conclusions of this perspective are that
individual migrants have relatively little power as larger networks of regional and
international migration are dictated by receiver demand and established cultural
connections (such as lingering political colonial relationships or linguistic affinity). These
networks are contingent on conditions of cultural affinity (generally linguistic and ethnic)
that encourage the immigration of specific group to specific locales. The mechanical
operation of migration networks facilitates the creation of ethno-cultural communities in
receiving states.
Harris further critiques traditional migration theory by pointing out its obvious
limitations with respect to the actuality of available choices:
International migration, with all its problems, is only for the better-off
workers – those who have escaped the unremitting misery of labour
experienced by the millions of workers left at home (Harris 1995, 84).
These conclusions are significant advancements over rational-choice perspectives of
traditional migration theory and allow research to investigate the emergence and
development of labor migration as a premeditated system (Hollifield 2000; Potts 1990;
Salt 1989).

202

1a. The Global Labor Supply System
Integrative attempts at understanding systemic international migration is best
demonstrated in Sassen’s The Mobility of Labor and Capital (1988)64. One of the more
important aspects of this study is the ability to examine expansion of international capital
in conjunction with an expansion of the international labor market. Her analysis builds on
the observations of Portes (1978) and others that international labor migration as a noncoercive process corresponding with the “consolidation phase of the world capitalist
economy (Sassen 1988, 31).
The expansion of economic globalization has resulted in a dramatic increase in
foreign direct investment for both developed and developing countries, which Sassen
links directly to increases in out-migration from source countries. Increases in FDI
facilitate economic reorientation to encourage industrial production and increases in
export-oriented production. This industrial shift from traditional economic activities also
results in internal migration and accelerated urbanization. The process of FDI investment
in developing countries contributes to conditions that typify contemporary international
labor migration:
(a) the incorporation of new segments of the population into wage labor
and the associated disruption of traditional work structures both of which
create a supply of migrant workers; (b) the feminization of the new
industrial workforce and its impact on the work opportunities of men, both
in the new industrial zones ad in the traditional work structures; and (c) the
consolidation of objective and ideological links with the highly
industrialized countries where most foreign capital originates, links that
involve both a generalized westernization effect and more specific work

64

While Sassen’s work contributed to the initial development of the concept other authors have contributed
significantly to an understanding of the global labor supply system including Abowd and Freeman (1991);
Nash and Fernández-Kelly (1983); Portes (1978); Potts (1990); and Straubhaar (1986; 1988).
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situations wherein workers find themselves producing goods for people
and firms in the highly industrialized countries (Sassen 1988, 120).
The connections between the acceleration of economic globalization and the changing of
economic structures in the developing world are clear. The link to migration is, largely,
due to the creation of a labor supply through modernization/industrialization funded, in
part, by FDI. The removal of a viable market for traditional agriculture or rural economic
pursuits encourages urban migration resulting in the proletarianization of national
populations in the developing world.
With a ready labor supply, developed countries are able to establish networks of
labor migration that can be adjusted in accordance with demand. The evolution of this
labor supply system is an outcome of economic adjustment strategies (or modernization
processes) that are a consequence of global market integration that defines economic
globalization. The question of why this market emerged after World War II is essential to
understanding how Western receiving countries are ethnically diversified through the
process of labor migration.
1b. Source Region Shifts
In accordance with Portes’ (1978) contention that voluntary labor migration
patterns begin with the consolidation of capitalism, we can view the development of
Western labor migration networks as an outcome of the emergent liberal market economy
of the late-1800s. Early Twentieth Century migration patterns were generally consistent
with cultural affinity in that colonial relationships, linguistic familiarity, and political
management ensured established networks of labor supply. In the case of Canadian labor
migration the common denominator was a European lineage. That is, Europe was the
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source region for labor migration to Canada and Québec until the mid-Twentieth
Century. These patterns are easily observed and follow a general historical pattern of
Western European migration shifting to Southern and Eastern European sources in the
expansionist period of the mid to late 1800s (Bailyn 1986; Games 1999; Hansen 1940).
European (read: Caucasian) migration typified immigration to the West. This pattern of
European out-migration would come to a halt as a result of World War II and the reemergence of a global economic system.
The reconstruction and recovery of European industrial production and
accompanying economic growth by the 1950s effectively reduced European labor
migration to Canada and Québec. At that point labor demand within Europe was
sufficient to motivate continental migration patterns between European nation-states and
stem the flow of out-migration. In addition, the political stalemate of the Cold War
ensured that migration from Eastern European countries tied to the Soviet Bloc would be
restricted, if not eliminated. If labor demand was to continue in both expanding North
American and European markets, new supplies of labor migration were required. The
result was a global shift from the traditional source countries of Eastern and Southern
Europe to the developing countries of the Global South.
This shift to the Global South for labor supply needs brought a rapid and dramatic
demographic change to many advanced capitalist nation-states. While ethnic diversity has
been a hallmark of (voluntary) labor migrations, much of this diversity was Caucasian,
Judeo-Christian, and European in general cultural orientation. Shifting global labor
supply sources to the Global South resulted in a more true diversity of culture, traditions,
values, and race/ethnicity.
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This shift is reflected in Sassen’s description of the mechanics of the global labor
supply system. Economic relationships and capital flows influence emigration. Briefly,
capital investment facilitates modernization and industrialization of developing countries.
The modernization/industrialization of the developing world is further fueled by the
resultant proletarianization of national populations. This predictable pattern follows the
same history of European industrialization as identified by Marx (1964) and Thompson
(1968) – the mechanical capitalist process of creating a centralized (urban) supply of
manual labor out of disparate, rural, and agrarian populations. Thus, for Sassen and
others, individual receiving countries are able to influence migration by increasing FDI
flows into individual source countries or regions. In addition, Sassen alludes to the
existence of certain perceptual “pull factors” that influence the destination of labor
migrants. For example, the image of the United States as a “land of opportunity” works in
conjunction with massive foreign investment in several source countries to motivate and
support this modern global labor supply system (Sassen 1988, 20).
Migratory flows to countries experiencing economic growth, and thus labor
demand, demonstrate a network logic (Light and Bhachu 1993; Portes 1998; Salt 1989).
In the case of Canada and Québec, these networks follow traditional lines of cultural
affinity, and will be demonstrated in later sections of this chapter. It is the role of the state
in the creation and maintenance of these networks that is of primary importance in
understanding the role of the nation-state within the global economy.

206

1c. General Canadian Immigration Prior to 194565
As mentioned in Chapter Three, early Canadian migration was colonial in nature
and predicated on mercantile relationships with respective mother countries. The first half
of the 1800s saw small numbers of emigrants from Western Europe, mainly from the
United Kingdom (most notably Scotland and Ireland). British colonial authorities actively
promoted a pro-British immigration policy that encouraged loyalist migration,
particularly following the War of 1812. The pre-Confederation years were, however, ones
of relatively low migration to Canada.
The political autonomy afforded the Canadian government following
Confederation in 1867 allowed greater flexibility in matters of immigration, specifically
with respect to source county selection. It also provided Canada with a powerful ability to
promote autonomous economic expansion through increased industrial and agricultural
production. Immigration and economic development/growth are inexorably connected in
Canada. Economically, Canada is an under-populated country requiring inflows of
migrants to supplement a limited domestic population.
This focus on migration as essential to the manpower needs of the Canadian
economy is well documented (Danysk 1995; Green 1994; Green and Green 2004;
Hawkins 1972; McInnis 1994). The chronic Canadian economic problem is that vast
natural resources and the economic potential that represents meets a low national
population. This need for external labor to fuel economic growth has led to Canada being
an excellent case to illustrate the “tap-on/tap-off” pattern of immigration policies that is
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Background information for this section was derived from several sources including Cameron (2004);
Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2000); Halli and Driedger (1999); Hawkins (1972); and See (2001).
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able to manage labor migration (Ongley and Pearson 1995: 767; Straubhaar 1986). This
pattern is quite simple. In times of economic recovery or growth, immigration policy is
altered to allow greater numbers of immigrants to enter the country. Conversely, in times
of economic recession or depression, the “tap” of immigration policy is turned off to
reduce migration inflows (Cameron 2004; Green and Green 2004; 1999; Hawkins 1972).
The reality of labor demand in times of economic expansion is pronounced in Canadian
history. The fact that economic expansion can be documented through immigration
policy is significant and adds empirical credence to the methodology of this project;
namely, that state action and motivations can be discerned through embedded policy
analysis.
The traditional focus on loyalist emigration from the UK was replaced with a
more expansive focus on labor market expansion in the latter half of the century.
Westward expansion and the desire to increase Canada’s agricultural production
dominated Canadian immigration policy during the late 1800s to the early 1900s. The
Dominion Lands Act of 1872 allowed free land grants to those willing to settle the
interior of Canada. The Sifton policies during the turn of the century effectively reversed
years of targeted UK immigration to Canada. American and later Eastern European
sources were targeted. A less typical case was that of Chinese migration in response to
the construction of a Trans-Canadian railroad (1881-1885). These migrants had a
different experience as several anti-Chinese legislative actions created conditions of
official discrimination not felt by Caucasian ethnic communities.
World War I effectively ended the large flows of UK and Eastern European
migration to Canada. Intermittent attempts were made by both Canadian and United
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Kingdom authorities to restart immigration flows. The Empire Settlement Act of 1922
was the British governments answer to lagging immigration throughout the British
Commonwealth by providing financial and logistical assistance to UK citizens wishing to
migrate. The Depression years of the 1930s saw a near complete shutdown of Canadian
immigration. High unemployment and limited growth opportunities represented the most
extreme historical example of the “tap-off” tendency in Canadian immigration policy.
The end of World War II ushered in an era of dramatic growth in industrial
production and economic growth in Canada. This growth was made possible by large
numbers of European (Western, Eastern, and Southern) immigrants in the immediate
post-war period as Canada encouraged massive migration to fuel this economic
expansion. As previously stated however, European reconstruction in the mid-1950s
would restrict this source of labor for Canada and Québec. Demographic change and
immigration policy designed to facilitate labor migration necessary for economic growth
are the two foci of the remaining sections on Canada and Québec, respectively.
2. Canada: Immigration Policies66
The Canadian legacy of discriminatory immigration policies began to dissolve
shortly after the end of World War II. In 1947, the Chinese Immigration Act was
repealed, eliminating such racial measures such as the provincial “head tax” and outright
limits on Chinese immigration. The Department of Citizenship and Immigration was
created in 1950, yet preferences based on race continued to be enforced. Small changes
occurred in the early 1950s when agreements with Ceylon, India, and Pakistan allowed
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Background information for this section was derived from several sources including Cameron (2004);
Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2000); Halli and Driedger (1999); Hawkins (1972); and See (2001).
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limited numbers of immigrants necessary to sustain Canada’s post-War economic boom.
This limited “de-racialization” would not be sustained as recession in the late 1950s
created high unemployment and reduced immigration levels until 1962. It was not until
the 1960s that wholesale change began to emerge in Canada’s immigration policies.
By 1960, Canada was confronted with the reality that their traditional sources of
labor migration were evaporating. Western investment in European reconstruction proved
successful and by the mid-1950s the European economy began to require its own sources
of labor. What was formerly a trans-Atlantic migration system began to shift to an intracontinental system (Potts 1990; Straubhaar 1988). Canada, along with the rest of the
Western World, was faced with the need to develop and encourage new sources of labor
migration. As previously shown, that solution was found in the developing states of the
Global South.
In 1962, Canada began the process of facilitating migration from the largely nonCaucasian regions of South Asia, Africa, South America, and the Caribbean. Immigration
regulations were significantly liberalized with the elimination of race as a selection
criterion, although other criteria such as education and “desirable” skills were granted
higher selective authority. Canadians of European-descent also retained greater ability to
sponsor immigrants from primarily European sources. This system also began to break
down in 1966 when the Assisted Passage Loan Scheme (APLS)67, formerly limited to
European immigrants, was extended to Caribbean migrants. Finally, in 1967 the
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The Assisted Passage Loan Scheme was effectively a way for the federal government to subsidize
immigration and encourage targeted economic growth. Loans were provided, interest-free, to desirable
migrants with the understanding that the loan would be repaid within a two-year span and that the migrant
would work for at least one year in a selected employment category. The expansion of this system in 1966
prompted the Canadian government to begin charging interest on these loans in 1967.
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Canadian immigration system was fully de-racialized with the implementation of
selection criteria based on a systems of points with no preference to region or racial
category. In 1970, the APLS was extended to all potential Canadian immigrants with an
established interest rate of six percent.
These reforms led to massive increases in immigration, particularly from source
regions of the Global South. The facilitatation of immigration was extended beyond
traditional labor categories with the development of Canadian refugee protection
programs. Canada’s support of the 1969 Africa Refugee Convention created a distinct
category of refugee migrants with distinct selection criteria. These selection criteria were
essential in allowing humanitarian migration from Czechoslovakia (1968), Tibet (1970),
and Uganda (1972), to name a few. Domestic support for the liberalization of Canadian
immigration was also expanded. Federal funding of immigration was expanded in 1974
with the Immigrant Settlement and Adaptation Program, which provided funding for new
Canadian immigrant initial settlement.
The importance of labor migration to the health of the Canadian economy is
indisputable, however larger national concerns would come to define issues of labor
migration. Nationalist concerns over the increasingly diverse nature of immigrant
populations and the potential for destabilizing existing legitimating structures became
increasingly vocal. Nowhere in Canada was this more immediate than in Québec. The
main point of contention from Québec was that the federal government did not
understand the unique and distinct nature of Québec society and therefore could not make
commensurate selection decisions. Many Québécois pointed to the potential for
destabilizing French language and Québécois culture due to an immigrant base
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determined to use English as their primary language of Canadian integration. The lack of
selective control was a significant point of contention between the federal and provincial
governments. In 1978, the Cullen-Couture Agreement gave Québec the power to select
its own immigrants, albeit an autonomy with ultimate oversight by the federal
government.
A new Immigration Act in 1978 continued large-scale organizational reforms by
establishing four migrant categories: independent, family, assisted-relative, and
humanitarian. The Act also eliminated migratory prohibitions for homosexuals, certain
criminal convictions, and those with particular health problems such as epilepsy.
The Foreign Domestic Workers Program was implemented in 1982 as a way to
provide a pool of temporary service workers to areas of demand in Canada. These
temporary visa holders could apply for permanent resident status after two full years in
Canada. Liberal immigration reforms experienced a political backlash in 1987 with
debates over Bill C-55 and C-84. The former would create a separate Immigration and
Refugee Board to evaluate credibility claims of those requesting refugee status. The latter
was a legislative attempt, sponsored by the Mulroney administration, to discourage
additional refugee claimants from arriving in Canada. Proponents viewed both measures
as necessary to prevent potential migrants from taking advantage of Canadian refugee
status designations. Québécois critics saw this as an opportunity for the federal
government to increase its control over the immigration process and determination of
migrant “desirability” (Hardy and Phillips 1998). Both bills were implemented, in less
contentious forms, in 1989.

212

In 1986, the business class designation of desirable immigrants was expanded to
include an investor category. In effect, immigration was approved based on the migrant’s
ability to invest in Canadian business or economic sectors. As Green and Green state:
While business classes have never become more than a small part of the
inflow, this represents a philosophical shift toward an idea that
immigration could be used as a source of capital and as a means of
establishing trade links (Green and Green 1999, 434; see also Head and
Ries 1998).
The minor demographic, but significant economic role of these business-class migrants
offers an excellent insight into the economic nature of Canadian immigration. An
example of this process was the desire to attract wealthy Hong Kong emigrants following
the Chinese resumption of political authority in 1997 (Abu-Laban and Gabriel 2002;
Green and Green 2004; Harrison 1996). Fears of economic repression led many monied
residents of Hong Kong to consider leaving for more economically friendly
environments. The facilitation of this movement through the business and investor
categories led many of these migrants to choose Canada over other destinations.
The early 1990s was a period of economic recession, but despite this traditional
discouraging condition, the federal government announced its Five-Year Plan (1990) to
increase immigration. This was the first time the federal government engaged in longterm immigration planning and only the second time that immigration was promoted
during a time of economic recession (the first being in 1962). The Québec-Canada
Accord was also signed in 1991. The Accord gave full authority over immigration
selection and settlement to Québec.
Refugee immigration was again restricted in 1992 and 1993, although in 1993
Canada became the first state to issue gender-based guidelines designed to identify
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gender persecution. The mid-1990s was a period of active reduction in immigration
levels as well as a resumption of the Right of Landing Fee in which $975 was charged to
all immigrants seeking permanent residency.
Problems of refugee detention, definition, and settlement largely defined
Canadian immigration at the turn of the century. Canadian labor migration continues to
be dominated by sources of the Global South with issues of integration and settlement
being significant contemporary issues. In 2002, the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act was passed to reorganize and codify immigration changes and refugee claimant
status.
These policy shifts, including various mechanisms to manage immigration flows
by the federal government, provide a brief overview of the changes in Canadian
immigration after World War II. The reduction of European migration, development of
Global South labor sources, and development of refugee and business class designations
all denote managed contributions to the contemporary ethnic diversity existing in urban
Canada. The following section examines, in detail, the changes that have resulted from
these immigration policy changes.
2a. Canada: Immigration Trends68
The history of European immigration to Canada can be traced back to the
beginnings of the country. The post-World War II era presented Canada with a rapidly
changing world in which European labor migration was no longer viable in isolation. As
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Statistical information used in this chapter (including sections on Canada and Québec immigration
trends) was obtained from Citizenship and Immigration Canada statistical collections, archival collections,
and databases. Database information can be obtained electronically at
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pub/index-2.html#statistics.

214

figure 7 shows, several trends can be identified since the mid-1960s when Canadian
immigration began to become a more open and inclusive process.
The two most obvious trends are the dramatic decrease in European immigration
from 1966 through 1985 and the equally striking increase in immigration from Asia. The
decrease in European immigration is the result of continuing European economic
recovery and growth that inhibited further labor emigration from the continent.
Interestingly, European immigration rises in 1990 due in part to Soviet social and
political economic reforms (Perestroika and Glastnost) in the mid-1980s and later by the
pending dissolution of the Soviet Union. These changes greatly increased out-migration
opportunities for many Eastern Europeans.
The massive increase in Asian migration is reflective of Canadian (along with
most other core countries) liberalization/deracialization of immigration policies and its
embrace of the Global South as a new source of labor migration. China and India are
consistently at the top of Canadian immigration source countries both in terms of
independent and business-class migration, with Pakistan, the Philippines, and South
Korea ranked as the most recent top five source countries (see table 2).
Table 2. Canada Immigration by Top Source Countries69
Source
Country
China
India
Pakistan
Philippines
South
Korea

1996
17,533
21,286
7,760
13,158

1997
18,526
19,614
11,239
10,872

1998
19,785
15,372
8,090
8,185

1999
29,119
17,430
9,297
9,171

2000
36,723
26,103
14,196
10,091

2001
40,328
27,869
15,345
12,921

2002
33,237
28,822
14,156
11,003

2003
36,116
24,560
12,330
11,978

3,157

4,001

4,917

7,216

7,635

9,604

7,324

7,086

69

Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Facts and Figures 2003. Immigration Overview.
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pub/facts2003/permanent/12.html
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Conversely, the top European source countries are, on average, Romania and
Russia. The former Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina also appear as top source
countries due to recent warfare and civil unrest in the region. This is reflective of
Canada’s liberal refugee program, which also allowed similar increases in African
emigration. Canadian refugee policy has been at the forefront of assisting African
refugees since the 1969 Africa Refugee Convention.
Deteriorating political economic conditions in many African regions have made
this humanitarian immigration designation an important component to Canadian
immigration as well as foreign policy. This is not to imply that all or even the majority of
African migration is refugee based. In fact, African migration provides an interesting
point of difference when Canadian and Québec immigration is compared.
3. Québec: Immigration Policies70
In 1966, the Union Nationale provincial government created the Ministère de
l’immigration (MIQ) under the Ministère des Affaires culturelles71. Not only was Québec
expanding the structure and power of its state apparatus, it was also creating a political
foundation from which to differentiate Québec from the rest of Canada. Federal control
over immigration was viewed as insufficient for Québec’s needs. More to the point, by
allowing federal control over immigration into Québec to continue, the province was
actively handing Anglophone Canada the tools to effectively dilute the Francophone
influence in Québec, and eventually Canada.

70

Background information for this section was derived from several sources including Rossard (1967);
Cameron (2004); Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2000); Doran and Babby (1995); Halli and
Driedger (1999); and Pâquet (1997).
71
Ministry of Immigration under the Ministry of Cultural Affairs
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In 1968, the province struck an agreement with the federal government to place
Québec officials in several overseas immigration offices to better monitor the selection of
potential immigrants to Québec. This agreement led to the 1975 Entente BienvenueAndras72 in which Québec immigration officials were granted the authority to interview
and recommend the selection of specific immigrants to federal immigration officers.
The 1976 Immigration Act presented an additional opportunity for the federal
government to delegate a portion of immigration power and responsibilities to provincial
governments. Section 108 of the Act allows federal-provincial interaction with respect to
provincial immigration and settlement patterns. This allowance has led to several federalprovincial agreements on immigration, with the 1978 Cullen-Couture Agreement
representing the most significant agreement to result from this policy provision. This
agreement allowed greater autonomy in the selection of immigrants destined for Québec.
The Cullen-Couture Agreement represented a significant step toward autonomous
Québec immigration policy, but the goal of fully Québec control over immigration
processes would not come until 1991.
The Agreement was a victory for the PQ (elected in 1976) as it explicitly
recognized that Québec immigration must contribute to Québec’s cultural and social
health. This statement of federal recognition was accompanied by practical reforms
allowing Québec immigration officials more authority in selecting immigrants bound for
Québec. In addition, the Agreement granted Québec greater authority in establishing
financial, skill, and other selection criteria. The Cullen-Couture Agreement was a
72

The Entente Bienvenue-Andras was the result of continuing dissatisfaction on the part of the Québec
government in matters of immigration control. The Entente was the result of ongoing negotiations between
Canadian and Québec government immigration officials designed to grant increased immigration authority
to Québec.
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significant step in Québec’s development as a state: it had begun the process of gaining
official autonomy in its demographic development.
Québec’s authority in matters of immigration was expanded in 1991 with the
signing of the Canada-Québec Accord. This agreement grants sole authority for
immigrant selection to Québec as well as sole responsibility to provide equivalent
settlement and integration programs. Québec is the only Canadian province to retain
authority over selection criteria, although there are several other federal-provincial
agreements that grant provincial advisory authority to recommend policy and selection
changes. Québec is also the only Canadian province to have independent immigration
offices for the sole purpose of promoting immigration to the province. Québec operates
such offices in Argentina, Austria, Belgium, France, Hong Kong, Mexico, and Syria that
serve as regional administrative and recruitment centers.
The most recent federal Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (2002) does not
alter the Canada-Québec Accord in any way. The federal government retains authority
over total immigration inflows and establishing overall admissibility criteria (largely
health requirements), but selection, administration, and settlement remains the exclusive
responsibility of Québec. This situation is one of the strongest indicators of Québec’s
status as an autonomous state entity. The increasing authority of Québec over
immigration policies and practices is reflected in the analysis of immigration to the
province since the mid-1960s.
3a. Québec: Immigration Trends
Immigration flows into Québec reflect the same shift in source region during the
1960s and 1970s. High European immigration typified the Québec immigration
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environment as it did in the larger Canadian case. In fact, until 1980, European
immigration constituted an even greater proportion of total Québec immigration than in
the larger Canadian total. When the immigration source countries for Québec and Canada
are compared the proportions are strikingly similar, that is until 1995 (see figure 7 and
figure 8). After the Canada-Québec Accord in 1991, Québec gained full control over the
selection and recruitment process. This is dramatically reflected in the source country
shift that occurs in Québec immigration starting in 1995. As total immigration from Asia
rises for Canada, the total Asian immigration flow into Québec actually decreases (from
21,567 in 1990 to 9,329 in 2000). Instead of the trend of increased Asian migration,
Québec shows increases in African (from 4,732 in 1990 to 9,680 in 2000) and South and
Central American (including the Caribbean) (from 4,314 in 1990 to 7,830 in 2000)
migration.
This difference in immigration source regions is made more explicit when
Canadian immigration is controlled to exclude Québec (figure 9). This comparison shows
a similar pattern of source region shift from Europe to the Global South in both Canada
and Québec, thus confirming the initial contention that a shift in global labor supply due
to increasing economic globalization has effectively diversified the demographic
composition of core states, in this case Canada and Québec respectively.
The power of states to control regional migration patterns is an additional
observation that can be made from the comparison of Canadian and Québec immigration.
Canadian immigration reforms in the 1960s contributed to the rapid growth in migration
from the Global South, predominantly from Asian source countries. This pattern was
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replicated in Québec until the early 1990s when Québec immigration controls could be
fully enforced by the Québec state.
The result is a concerted effort to recruit and promote migration from regions
(also of the Global South) with Francophone cultural and linguistic affinity.
This has led to increased recruitment and migration from former French colonies in North
and Western Africa and the Caribbean. It is also interesting to note that European
immigration to Québec has also increased in recent years, although African migration
constitutes the dominant source region for Québec immigration (14,082 in 2004,
representing 32% of total Québec immigration).
From this cursory comparison of Canadian and Québec immigration we can
conclude that both have, in fact, conformed to the dominant systemic shift in the global
labor supply system and encouraged increased migration from regions of the Global
South (as shown in figures 8 and 9, respectively).
Québec, in line with its nationalist project and state development since the Quiet
Revolution, has worked within this systemic change to recruit and encourage migration
from specific regions of the Global South. The result in both cases, however, has been a
rapid and consistent increase in the ethno-cultural diversity of new arrivals in Canada and
Québec. This dissertation argues that ethno-cultural diversification in Canada and Québec
is the result of increased global market integration and shifts in global labor supply.
Economic growth opportunities afforded by increased global market integration in core
states is made possible through increased labor migration.
This is particularly true in Canada and Québec where regressive population
growth presents long-term economic problems with respect to labor market
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maintenance73. Diversity in Canadian and Québec immigration is the result of shifts in
source regions in the global labor supply system. Therefore, ethno-cultural diversification
is the result of labor market demand motivated by economic growth that is, in turn,
motivated by increasing global market integration.
This rapid ethnic/racial diversification (only in the past 40 years) has created a
situation of social change and a series of national demands to which the state must
respond. These social changes have been dually motivated by integration into the global
market economy and changes in the global labor supply system, thus globalizationmotivated change has pressured the individual state to react in turn. Major questions that
must be answered are how the impact of these changes has affected state policy-making
processes? If global market integration inhibits state economic policy, what avenues for
national protection remain?

73

In order to maintain current population levels, exclusive of immigration, in Canada and Québec the
native fertility rate must be 2.06. Current birth rates in Canada are 1.5 and in Québec, 1.46. Neither rates
are sufficient to sustain current population levels nor meet increased labor demands resulting from
continued economic growth (Statistics Canada 2003; Dai et al. 1996).
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Chapter Seven
Multiculturalism, Interculturalism, and the Management of Culture

The confluence of international political economic and domestic demographic
change poses a challenge to both Canada and Québec. On the one hand, demand for labor
continues to exceed domestic Canadian supplies with the expansion of source migration
to the Global South providing an immediate remedy. On the other hand, the rapid urban
diversification that accompanied this solution carried significant problems for both
Canadian and Québec nationalist projects. The development of multicultural policies in
Canada, and later intercultural policies in Québec, offer an explicit example of the
Polanyian “double movement” in which the state must actively work to maintain balance
between the demands of a neo-liberal market economic system and a national population
demanding protections from these systemic forces. This chapter chronicles the emergence
and evolution of both Canadian multicultural policy and Québec intercultural policy in
the context of this “double movement,” albeit with a focus on culture that is much more
explicit than in Polanyi’s original thesis. Figure 10 provides a brief chronology of
Canadian multicultural policies and institutional development in support of the following
section.
1. Canada: Multicultural Policy74
Canada’s unique multicultural policy (the first of its kind among capitalist
democracies) was the result of the 1963 Royal Commission on Bilingualism and
74

Background information used to compile this section was derived from sources including Abu-Laban and
Gabriel (2002); Hawkins (1988); Jansen (2005); and archival sources from Heritage Canada, the Ministry
of Multiculturalism, and the Ministry of State.
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Chronology of Canadian Multicultural Policies and Institutions
1963 – Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism commences
1971 – Policy Statement by Prime Minister P.E. Trudeau, “Multiculturalism within a
Bilingual Framework
1972 – Creation of the Multicultural Directorate under the Department of the Secretary of
State
1973 – Creation of the Ministry of Multiculturalism
1982 – Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms officially recognizes the multicultural
character of Canadian society (Section 27)
1984 – Special Parliamentary Committee on Visible Minorities produces the Equality
Now! report emphasizing the need to enforce non-discrimination legislation
1985 – House of Commons Standing Committee on Multiculturalism is created
1987 – Standing Committee on Multiculturalism publishes a report advocating for the
creation of a Department of Multiculturalism and a stronger policy of
multiculturalism designed to address discrimination.
1988 – Multiculturalism Act provides singular legislative support for defining Canadian
society as multicultural and reinforces anti-discriminatory language of the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms.
1991 – Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship is created with a mandate to
improve race relations and cross-cultural understanding as well as support
minority community development and cultural preservation.
1993 – Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship is divided. Multicultural
programs would be subsumed within the Department of Canadian Heritage and
Citizenship programs would be subsumed within Citizenship and Immigration
Canada.
1994 – Liberal administration of Jean Chretien eliminates federal settlements payments
for federal actions deemed illegal and grievous by various groups (including
formerly interred Japanese-Canadian and several Native Canadian groups). This
action reversed years of settlement payments by Liberal and Conservative
administrations to aggrieved groups.
1996 – Canadian Race Relations Foundation is created by the federal government with an
initial endowment of $24 million. The CRRF assumed race relations research and
monitoring responsibilities formerly of the Department of Multiculturalism.
1997 – Comprehensive review of Canadian multiculturalism revised the federal goals of
multiculturalism to include: identity (recognition of ethno-cultural diversity
within a Canadian national context), civic participation (promoting democratic
participation among immigrant and minority community groups), and social
justice (with respect to equality and non-discrimination). The federal institutional
capacity to meet these goals must now be accomplished with a staff of three
within the Multiculturalism section of Heritage Canada.
Figure 10. Chronology of Canadian Multicultural Policies and Institutions
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Biculturalism (B&B Commission), which was in turn the result of the equally unique
dual colonial legacy of French and English “founding peoples” (Jansen 2005). The
dramatic and immediate changes that occurred in Québec as a result of the PLQ-led Quiet
Revolution75 motivated the federal government to “explore new approaches toward
greater Canadian unity” (Canada 1973). Canada’s long history of promoting a
specifically Eurocentric76 nationalism through immigration regulations and nationalist
cultural policies was increasingly challenged by its entry into global economic and labor
systems after World War II. Marc Lehman points to the post-war changes as being the
end of Canada’s traditional national definitions:
For the most part, central authorities dismissed the value of cultural
heterogeneity, considering racial and ethnic differences as inimical to
national interests and detrimental to our character and integrity. Only the
massive influx of post-Second World War immigrants from Europe
prompted central authorities to rethink the role and status of “other
ethnics” within the evolving dynamic of Canadian society (Lehman 1999,
3).
This post-war reality was, on the whole, not a significant challenge to the Canadian
national “vision” due to the fact that these were largely Caucasian migrations from
various regions in Europe. It was not until the 1960s that shifts in labor supply to the
Global South resulted in a more racially and ethno-cultural diverse immigrant population.

75

As a final statement of clarification, the Quiet Revolution is the historical culmination of long-standing
Québécois nationalism, not a singular and isolated event denoting the beginning of any Francophone
nationalist project. The political economic reforms undertaken by Jean Lesage and the PLQ begin the
process of building an autonomous Québec state. The existence and cohesion of the Québec nation is not in
question.
76
This Eurocentric nationalism was specifically Western European and it could be argued, British. Ethnic
diversity was not viewed as a positive social trait. In fact, Canadian leaders such as King and Diefenbaker
consistently lionized the British nature of Canadian political, legal, social, and cultural national structures.
The shift in immigration by Sifton at the turn to the 20th century brought thousands of Eastern Europeans to
Canada. The active recruitment of Ukrainian groups for agricultural settlement in Manitoba and
Saskatchewan would return in the 1960s as larger number of Southern and Eastern Europeans immigrated
to Canada following the war.

227

Lehman’s focus is on what would be termed the “Third Force” of Canadian
political demography: those who did not claim aboriginal, English, or French ancestry yet
did claim Canadian citizenship. The formation of the B&B Commission in response to
the acceleration of tension between English and French Canada and its framing as a
bicultural conflict in a bicultural nation-state irked the many “Third Force” citizens of
Canada. The most visible and vocal of these groups self-identified as Ukrainian and many
traced their “Canadian-ness” back to the opening of the Canadian West in the late-1800s.
Their stake in the Canadian nation, it was argued, constituted more than a subservient
role in the greater national society (Bibby 1990; Kelner and Kallen 1974; Smith 1981).
Their vocal opposition resulted in the production of an additional section to the B&B
Commission’s report, Book IV, “The Cultural Contribution of other Ethnic Groups”
(Canada 1970).
The role of Ukrainian advocacy groups in the “Third Force” response to the B&B
Commission has been well documented and the existence of a well-organized Canadian
population of non-aboriginal, English, or French ancestry was essential to the success of
the movement. I would argue that Lehman’s point that the influx of European post-war
immigration be taken more seriously as a motivating force in generating Book IV of the
B&B Commission Report. Commonly, studies of the B&B Report view existing Eastern
and Southern European groups as primary motivators for the inclusion of Book IV
(Armour 1981; Bell 1992; Brooks 2002; UCC 1968). This fact is not in dispute. I would
add that the changes in Canadian immigration policy and shifts in global labor supply
also contributed to the Commission’s decision to add Book IV to its official report.
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Passaris comments on the inexorable connection between immigration and economic
growth:
Economic considerations have always been a paramount influence over
the scope and substance of Canada’s immigration program. Indeed, it is
those economic considerations that have determined the gradual change in
the multicultural composition of immigrations to Canada in the post World
War II period and are likely to define the more substantive ethnocultural
diversity and racial pluralism of immigrants admitted to Canada in the
future (Passaris 1986, 17).
In fact, by the time Book IV was published, Canadian immigration had been completely
de-racialized and the cumulative effect of these policy changes resulted in gradual
increases in Asian and South and Central American immigration as early as 1970 (see
Chapter Six). The combination of a more diverse European immigrant population and the
expansion of immigration policies to include migrants from the Global South resulted in
a rapid increase in Canadian diversity. The fact that Canada’s national demographic
composition was rapidly changing as a result of its core political economic position in the
post-World War II world could not be ignored.
The confluence of issues organized around ethnic recognition movements
presented a significant problem for the Canadian government. Not only was Québécois
nationalism a significant threat to Canadian stability and cohesion, but Third Force and
First Nations groups were also demanding recognition. Federal attempts to examine and
recognize the bilingual and bicultural nature of Canadian society seemed to be expanding
into a multicultural context in which all Canadian ethno-cultural groups were contending
for recognition. The development of Canadian multicultural policy, however, embraced
these contending demands in the creation of a national cultural framework intended to
promote a singular Canadian nationalism.
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1a. The Institutionalization of Multiculturalism
The diversification of the Canadian population was underway by the early 1970s;
however, it is important to note that the initial implementation of the Multicultural Policy
in 1971 had little to do with diversifying immigration trends. This policy was, in effect, a
statement of Canadian nationalism that was intended to address lingering issues and
complaints of ethnic minorities with respect to their cultural identification and survival.
In other words, the 1971 Multicultural Policy was a direct result of the three forces
(aboriginal, Québécois, and the diverse “other” category, largely comprised of Eastern
European groups) and their potential to disrupt the national stability of Canada77. More
importantly, the Trudeau administration’s focus on national economic development
required a consistent and stable definition of Canadian nationalism to harness the
productive capacity and potential of the Canadian labor force, including non-Anglo
Canadians.
In 1971, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau announced a new federal government
framework designed to foster a unique and inclusive form of Canadian nationalism:
multiculturalism within a bilingual framework. The policy had four central components:
(1) to allow minority cultures the opportunity to retain traditions and self-identification,
(2) an equal opportunity mechanism to facilitate the removal of economic stratification
77

Polanyi refers to these destabilizing effects in economic terms; specifically, his “tension of classes”
phrase refers to social strain and instability produced in times of high unemployment, high prices, and other
conditions producing socio-economic hardships. The same argument is made in Piven and Cloward’s
(1993) conceptualization of the rise and fall of welfare regulatory efforts on the part of the advanced
capitalist state. In this case, the effects of global market integration are increasingly articulated through a
cultural medium namely, ethno-cultural diversification. As the state increases its capacity to manage and
control national cultural definitions and symbols, maintaining a stable national cultural environment
becomes necessary for ensuring control over these universal (and monolithic) definitions of national
culture. Strong ethno-nationalist sentiment (outside of the “official” national culture) is destabilizing
because it withdraws legitimacy for a universal, state supported nationalist definition.
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based on race and ethnicity, (3) to increase inter-group communication for the purpose of
education and fostering understanding, and (4) to facilitate the acquisition of either
English or French language skills by immigrants (Trudeau 1971).
In order to support these policy initiatives, the Multicultural Directorate was
created under authority of the Department of the Secretary State in 1972. One year later
the Directorate was expanded into an autonomous Ministry of Multiculturalism with the
added responsibilities of monitoring governmental compliance with non-discrimination
measures prompted by the Multicultural Policy. Almost immediately, the institutional
responsibilities of the Ministry of Multiculturalism began to shift. While the initial policy
statement focused on recognition and the protection of relative cultural autonomy within
the context of a bilingual Canadian nation-state, the primary mission of the Ministry
became the facilitation of equal economic opportunity and economic integration of newly
arrived immigrants. These responsibilities were hampered by the lack of legislative
authority to enforce the edicts of non-discrimination.
The need for non-discrimination legislation grew exponentially in the decade of
the 1970s. Although shifts in immigration source regions did not provide a primary
motivation for the initial 1971 Multicultural Policy, these shifts would come to define
both Canadian diversity as well as drive multicultural policy shift in response to this rapid
demographic transition. Lehman makes a particularly direct connection between the rise
in ethno-cultural diversity and changes in multicultural policies:
The architects of the 1971 policy had perceived barriers to social
adaptation and economic success largely in linguistic or cultural terms.
The marked increase in the flow of visible minority immigrants whose
main concerns were employment, housing, education and fighting
discrimination required a shift in policy thinking. Equality through the
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removal of racially discriminatory barriers became the main focus of
multicultural programs and race relations policies and programs were put
in place to discover, isolate and combat racial discrimination at personal
and institutional levels (Lehman 1999, 5).
The need to match ethno-cultural protections with economic development would come to
define Canadian multicultural policy. Until 1982, however, the Multicultural Policy was
simply a federal initiative with no legal authority. The larger goal was to encourage the
national population to accept the reality of Canadian multiculturalism, while at the same
time promoting a unified Canadian nationalism. In 1977, the Minister of State for
Multiculturalism, Norman Cafik, commented on the motivation for official
multiculturalism:
We don’t have a second class culture or a first class culture in Canada. We
have a multicultural society not because we created it that way as a
government, but because that’s the way it is (Cafik 1977).
Cafik’s statement is typical of policy defenses in that his arguments present a state
seeking to support the nation during a period of dramatic social change. That is, the state
is simply reacting to socio-economic changes outside of its control and therefore must
respond in a reactionary fashion to protect its national population. His implication that the
state did not create a multicultural society is flawed as evidenced by the previous chapter.
This implies that the “reactionary” nature of multicultural policy is not accurate.
Multicultural policy supports the diversification of Canada and therefore
maintains a proactive function. By presenting multicultural policy as reactionary, the
Canadian state is able to publicly absolve itself of complicity in facilitating socioeconomic conditions requiring political attention. In other words, the Canadian state
presents itself as protecting Canadian national populations from social changes motivated
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by external forces and processes. The fact that the multicultural policy also facilitates
ethno-cultural changes promoted by global market integration is overlooked in the public
presentation of Cafik’s policy statement.
Cafik was correct in his assessment of the historical nature of Canadian
multicultural society. At no time in Canada’s post-colonization era was there a single
ethno-cultural entity that existed without challenge. Cafik was incorrect in his general
statement about the lack of culpability on the part of the Canadian state. As chapters five
and six have shown, the Canadian federal state actively promotes ethno-cultural
diversification in support of economic growth. From the recruitment of Ukrainian and
other Eastern Europeans in the Western Expansion era to the current shift of the global
labor supply system to the Global South, the federal government has relied on
immigration to fuel economic growth. The labor required to produce economic growth is
increasingly of an ethnic and culturally diverse nature. Therefore, the Canadian federal
government had a strong role in the ethno-cultural diversification of Canada due to its
willingness to integrate into the global market economic system. The collapse of any
semblance of national economic protections in the late 1970s (after the first Trudeau
administration) required that expanded economic growth be accompanied by continued
immigration and accelerated ethno-cultural diversification. The task of the federal
government, unencumbered by economic protections, would be how to manage this rapid
diversification while ensuring a stable economic (production) environment.
The 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as part of the Constitution Act, gave
legal support and authority to the Ministry of Multiculturalism with respect to the
enforcement of non-discrimination. For the first time, Canada was legally able to
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prosecute discriminatory actions in hiring, housing, and public interaction. The Charter
defined Canadian society as being one of equal opportunity, particularly with respect to
the demographic composition of the country. Section 27 of the Charter specifically
codifies the multicultural character of the Canadian nation, while Section 15 specifically
provides legal discriminatory protection for all individuals “in particular…based on race,
national or ethnic origin, colour, religious, sex, age, or mental or physical disability”
(Canada 1982).
The Charter provided important legal authority for anti-discrimination goals of the
revised multicultural policy78. As the face of Canadian immigration continued to grow
increasingly diverse, the federal government began to realize that the official recognition
of cultural diversity and legal protection from discrimination required additional
augmentation. In 1984, the Special Parliamentary Committee on Visible Minorities was
commissioned and one year later the House of Commons created a Standing Committee
on Multiculturalism. On the recommendation of these two Committees, Canadian
multiculturalism was officially codified by the 1988 Multiculturalism Act.
The Multiculturalism Act did not institute any new changes to Canadian
multicultural policy. What it did was provide specific legislation officially defining
Canada as a multicultural society, protecting individuals from discrimination, continuing
the process of cultural diversity education and understanding, and facilitating cultural
preservation for ethno-cultural minorities. The specificity of the Multiculturalism Act
meant that the sporadic mention of multicultural and diversity protection in the Charter of
78

Enforcement of anti-discrimination legislation was limited within the Ministry of Multiculturalism. The
Ministry was able to monitor compliance and cite offenders, but had no adjudicative authority. Ultimately,
the institution of official multiculturalism was enforced by the court system through adherence to both the
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms and the Multiculturalism Act.
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Rights and Freedoms was superseded. The Act also created the Department of
Multiculturalism and Citizenship that eventually commenced full operations in 1991. The
responsibilities of the Department were three-fold. The primary mission was monitoring
race relations (for example, receiving and evaluating discrimination complaints) followed
by cultural preservation (largely through grant support for cultural education programs
and celebratory functions) and then community support (facilitating integration activities
and sponsoring events designed to encourage inter-group dialog). This emphasis on race
relations is an important shift that was prompted by the rapid diversification of urban
Canada and reflective of the changing nature of national demands in the face of these
local changes wrought by global market integration.
Where early multicultural policies concentrated on cultural preservation
and intercultural sharing through promotion of ethnic presses and
festivals, the rejuvenated multiculturalism program emphasized crosscultural understanding and the attainment of social and economic
integration through removal of discriminating barriers, institutional
change and affirmative action to equalize opportunity (Lehman 1999, 7).
1b. The Decline of Institutional Multiculturalism
The institutional position of multiculturalism led many neo-liberal critics to
question the effectiveness of state spending on multicultural programs. The nearly
universal neo-liberal calls to decrease state spending on social service provision heavily
affected the state decision to downsize the mission and institution of official
multiculturalism. As the Canadian state became more and more integrated into the global
market system, the more intense and persistent the calls to reduce and/or privatize the
state’s role in social services.
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As a result, the institutional emphasis on official multiculturalism was revised yet
again in 1993 as the Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship was downsized to
become a subdivision within the Canadian Heritage Department. The administration of
federal multicultural policies was removed as a primary emphasis and placed on par with
official language programs, among many other programs of national interest (media,
national park administration, and support for the arts).
Canadian multicultural policy was revised again in 1996 as a result of increased
criticism from many neo-liberal and national interests. The renewed emphases returned to
the original 1971 policy statement in that Canadian multiculturalism would increasingly
emphasize the recognition of cultural identity while de-emphasizing the authoritative role
of multiculturalism in managing issues of discrimination and diversity. The new policy
focused on the development of community-centered initiatives to promote inter-cultural
understanding and cooperation. The multicultural program within the Canadian Heritage
Department was largely divorced from larger race relation issues with the establishment
of the public-private Canadian Race Relations Foundation (CRRF) in 199779. Initially
funded by a federal grant, the CRRF is now a completely self-financed organization that
is responsible for generating research and awareness of racial/ethnic relations and
problems in Canada. The CRRF has no legal enforcement authority and the federal
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The Canadian Race Relations Foundation was established by an act of Parliament in 1996 and initially
funded by a $24 million grant. The Foundation is run on a corporate model with a Board of Directors with
day-to-day operations administered by an executive officer. A descriptive statement on the CRRF website
(www.crr.ca) offers a more complete view of the public-private model of operation:
CRRF is a Crown corporation with a national mandate operating at arms length from the
federal government from which we receive no funding. Our primary operating funds are
derived from the investment income on the one-time endowment fund.
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government has largely returned to the general non-discrimination statements inherent in
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
This de-institutionalization of multiculturalism in Canada was the result of neoliberal attacks on perceived excesses in both state spending and state involvement in
market economic processes (Frow 1999; Joppke 2004). In fact, Mitchell goes even
further in declaring multiculturalism and neo-liberal ideology incompatible (Mitchell
2004). This conclusion is consistent with the excursus on liberalism and multiculturalism
in Chapter Two illustrating attempts to reconcile these seemingly contradictory forces. I
argue in this dissertation that the conflict between (neo) liberal ideology and
multiculturalism is, in fact, indicative of the “double movement” process of neo-liberal
market encroachment and national protectionist demands. The incompatibility of
liberalism and multiculturalism (as evidenced by Taylor, Kymlicka, Joppke, Mitchell,
and others) is the manifestation of neo-liberal (global political economic) pressures
generating a non-liberal (national protectionist) reaction.
The issue of multicultural (and later intercultural) policy is that it is designed to
mediate these impulses (liberal and non-liberal) – thus we can view the mechanics of the
“double movement” through such policies. In other words, the effects of global market
integration encourage social destabilization at which time national populations demand
protections from these destabilizing effects. The state must negotiate these dual pressures
through policies intended to meet both demands (global market integrative and national
protectionist). This dynamic will be revisited in the final section of this chapter as well as
in the following chapter.
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Returning to the example of Canadian multicultural policy, the return to the
liberal foundations of the Charter is a significant development. In view of neo-liberal
critics, the institutionalism of federal multiculturalism could be easily replaced with a
simple judicial adherence to the liberal equality espoused in the Charter. The pressures of
adherence to the neo-liberal ideology of limited state spending and control have been
identified as a ubiquitous condition of global market integration (Baiman et al. 2000;
Boyer and Drache 1996; Harris and Seid 2000). The case of multiculturalism’s decline as
an institutional entity in Canada seems particularly telling of this process.
This decentralization of multicultural responsibilities beginning in 1993 is a direct
result of these neo-liberal pressures to reduce social spending. Increasing criticism of
multicultural programs in general centered on program costs (Breitkreuz 1997), the
inability to enforce non-discrimination legislation (Jansen 2005), the incompatibility of
multicultural ideology and Canadian social welfare distribution (Barbaro 1995) and the
ideological danger to a cohesive Canadian nation-state (Barry 2001; Bissoondath 1994).
The declining role of multicultural policy in Canada is reflected in consistent decreases in
federal funding and the privatization of one of the once central responsibilities of the
Department of Multiculturalism. Of course, one of the central tenants of neo-liberal
economic governance is decreased state spending for social services that hinder economic
growth.
The decline of institutional multiculturalism in the 1990s represented a success
for neo-liberal critics; however the program continues to play a significant role in support
of Canadian immigration goals. In fact, Canadian business entities now support the ideal
of multiculturalism as being a facilitator of skilled and monied labor migration (Abu238

Laban 2003; Abu-Laban and Gabriel 2002). The current challenge is no longer from neoliberal global market proponents, but from national popular groups claiming that
multiculturalism as a state policy has failed to adequately provide a common sociocultural medium. Critics argue that national cohesion and stability (see footnote 4 in this
chapter) are threatened by a policy that, in fact, creates divisions and separation as
opposed to provided its promised unity under a common nationalist environment (Bibby
1990; Bissoondath 1994; Gwyn 1995).
Before I enter into a discussion of increasing national popular dissatisfaction with
multicultural policies, it is necessary to compare the emergence and decline of
multiculturalism with that of interculturalism in Québec. This comparison will illuminate
one of the central nationalist pressures facing the federal multicultural policy and provide
a more fluid transition into the final concluding section of this chapter.
2. Québec: Intercultural Policy
Official Canadian multiculturalism, particularly the 1971 policy framework and
the 1988 Multiculturalism Act, is a significant achievement. Both the policy framework
and the legislation of official multiculturalism were the first of their kind in the world.
The promotion of official multiculturalism on the part of the federal government was
initially intended to define the parameters of the Canadian nation and promote a specific
articulation of Canadian nationalism as inclusive and culturally egalitarian. Specifically,
the federal government understood the changing nature of the Canadian population as an
inevitable outcome of larger socio-economic forces.
Canada should set its immigration levels on the basis of long-term
objectives, rather than on that of short-term considerations…Given the
uncertainties involved in deciding both on an appropriate population size
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and on its fellow age composition, Canada should follow that course
which…is, a less restrictive policy than that currently in place…In
recommending this approach to immigration policy, this Commission is
fully aware of the cultural, linguistic, economic and racial implications
(Canada 1985, 668).
The threat of globalization, it would seem, played an important role in the initial
conceptualization of Canadian multiculturalism – as did Québec nationalism. In fact, the
original motivation for official multicultural policies as a protection against the dangers
of cultural homogenization:
…Central to the Government’s philosophy is the belief that cultural
diversity throughout the world is swiftly being eroded by the impact of
industrial technology, mass communications and urbanization. Much
attention has been given to the denaturing and depersonalization of man by
mass society, mass-produced culture and entertainment and the everincreasing development of large impersonal institutions.
One of man’s basic needs is a sense of belonging and a good deal of
contemporary social unrest, at all age levels, exists because this need has
not been met. Ethnic groups are not the only way in which the need for
belonging can be met, but they can be an important one in the development
of Canadian society…Ethnic loyalties need not, and usually do not detract
from wider loyalties of community and country. Canadian identity will not
be undermined by multiculturalism. Indeed, the Government sincerely
believes that cultural pluralism is the very essence of Canadian identity
(Canada 1973, 1-2).
Trudeau’s 1971 policy framework included two non-stated but implied nationalistic
goals. The first was to differentiate Canada from the United States with respect to its
national culture and independent nature. The second was to address the threat of
Québécois sovereignty by clearly defining Canada as a diverse nation within a singular
nationalist framework.
The first aspect of differentiation from the United States is more overt. Kelner and
Kallen (1974) point to numerous statements made by Trudeau concerning the nation-
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building nature of the 1971 Multicultural Policy. Of significance is the desire of the
Trudeau administration to distinguish Canadians from Americans through ideological
uniqueness, which could be represented by social policies reflecting the recognition of a
recognized cultural pluralism in contrast with the “melting pot” model of assimilation to
the south (Bibby 1990; Breton 1986). More to the extreme, scholars have pointed to past
animosity toward Americans due to perceived “economic and cultural imperialism”
(Richmond 1978, 120) as a broader cultural motivation for incorporating such a
diametrically different policy on diversity and culture.
The second implied goal of the 1971 multicultural framework was to reduce the
legitimacy claims of the Québec sovereignty movement.
He [Trudeau] repudiated dualism; the concept of two nations or of a
binational Canada; and even biculturalism, as advocated by the B&B
Commission…He was implicitly asking his fellow Quebecers to trade
their identity as a people against the promise of bilingualism.
He [Trudeau] advanced the concept of multiculturalism…thus reducing
the global culture of French-speaking Québec to one ethnic component of
the Canadian mosaic. They (Québécois) would have accepted
multiculturalism if it had not confused their own global culture with the
ethnic cultures of immigrants (Balthazar 1995, 47).
This was understood implicitly by the Québec government and national
population, but largely denied by federal government officials (Gendron and
Sarra-Bournet 1998; Maclure 2003; Vachon and Langlais 1983).
Public opinion in Québec about federal multicultural policy ranges from skeptical
to suspicious to openly hostile (Charbonneau and Maheu 1973; McRoberts 1997). The
announcement of the federal policy in 1971 by a Trudeau administration already critical
of Québécois nationalism motivated a string of protective measures in Québec.
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Figure 11 provides a brief chronology of Québec language legislation and
intercultural policy development in support of the following two sections.
2a. Québec Language Legislation
In 1974, Bill 22 (Loi sur le langue officielle80) was passed by the Québec National
Assembly. The primary purpose of the law was to grant French official language status.
The law also created an administrative body, Régie de la langue française81, to oversee
enforcement of language legislation and other requirements such as making French the
official language of provincial administration, legal contracts, provincial advertisement,
and encourage French as the primary language of business. The law contained protections
for English-speakers, including the ability to “opt-out” of French-only requirements at the
behest of both parties. The law was widely criticized by the Anglophone minority for its
promotion of French as an official provincial language while the federal policy required
both French and English as official languages. Many Francophones were disappointed in
the law due to its compromises in allowing Anglophones to opt-out of the dominant
culture and language.
The election of the PQ in 1976 provided additional opportunity to increase the
dominance of French throughout Québec. Bill 101 (Charte de la langue française82) was
passed in 1977 and eliminated any question of the linguistic or cultural nature of Québec.
The measure required that all public administrative, legal/judicial, educational, and
business entities use French as its operational language. All public advertisements were
required to be posted in French only. The most far-reaching aspect of Bill 101 was its
80

Official Language Law
Office of the French Language
82
Charter of the French Language
81
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Chronology of Chronology of the Québec Intercultural Policy Framework
Language Legislation
1969 – Loi pour promouvoir la langue française au Québec (Bill 63) (Law for the
Promotion of the French Language) is passed by the Québec National Assembly
giving parents the right to have their children educated in the French language.
1974 – Loi sue le langue officielle (Bill 22). The “Official Language Law” establishes
French as the single official language of Québec
1974 – Establishment of the Régie de la langue français (Office of the French Language)
1977 – Bill 101, Charte de la langue français (Charter of the French Language), is
passed requiring French as the legal, political, and public language of Québec. In
addition, the children of new arrivals (immigrants) to Québec were required to be
educated in French-language educational institutions.
1982 – Supreme Court of Canada rules that Loi 101 is discriminatory under the
multiculturalism and equality sections of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.
1984 – Bill 142 is passed ensuring that basic social services, including health care, are
available in English.
1991 – Bill 120 is passed, reaffirming the right of English-language social service
provision in the province.
1992 – Bill 20 is passed, again re-affirming the bilingual nature of social service
provision but also reaffirming the dominance of the French language in Québec.
1993 – Bill 86 allowed English language advertisement and business service provision,
granted that French be given a position of priority.
Intercultural Policies
1975 – Charte des droits et libertés de la personne (Charter of Human Rights and
Freedoms) is passed in response to the increasingly diverse nature of Québec
immigration and designed to encourage an equal socio-economic environment.
1981 – Autant de façons d’etre Québécois (Many Ways to be Québécois) is published
stating that Québec is legally an egalitarian society and officially recognizes the
right to diverse ethno-cultural communities and traditional adherence. This policy
statement also stresses the idea of “convergence” that requires the public language
and culture of the province be explicitly French and Québécois, respectively. In
other words, traditional (non-Québécois) culture is recognized and encouraged;
however, this recognition does not extend to public affirmation of these languages
and culture in a public context, particularly government and education.
1990 – Au Québec pour bâtir ensemble: énoncé de politique en matière d’immigration et
de l’intégration (We are Building Québec Together: Policy Announcement on
Matters of Immigration and Integration) is published affirming three main
defining features of Québec society: democracy (particularly the requirement that
all citizens participate in shared governance), cultural pluralism (or the
recognition of ethno-cultural diversity), and French as a common language.
Figure 11. Chronology of the Québec Intercultural Policy Framework
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focus on the public education system. The only students allowed to attend Englishlanguage institutions were those already in attendance, siblings, or the children of
existing Québec citizens who were both Anglophone. This meant that all new immigrants
and those with mixed-cultural parentage were required to receive a Francophone
education. The educational requirements of Bill 101 are arguably the most far-reaching
cultural protectionist legislation enacted by the Québec National Assembly.
In 1982, the federal government and all provinces, except Québec, signed the
Constitution Act and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Charter explicitly
recognized the multicultural character of Canadian society and gave the Supreme Court
legal authority to declare many portions of Bill 101 unconstitutional, which it did in
198283. Several legislative reforms were implemented in later years in response to the
legal rulings deeming Bill 101 unconstitutional. Bill 142, passed in 1986, provides
additional linguistic rights to Anglophones by making health and general social service
provision available in English. In fact, today most governmental institutions in Québec
offer at least reception services in both English and French, although French is practically
and legally the official language of the province. Further legislation, Bill 120 (1991) and
Bill 20 (1992), further solidified the right of Anglophone service provisions, but clearly
articulated the granting of English-language rights as a process governed by the
Francophone government and national population of Québec.
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This is an excellent example of the ambiguity surrounding federal-provincial relations in Canada. Québec
has, to this date, not signed either the 1982 Constitution Act or the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This
was of little consequence as the Supreme Court ruled on the legality of Bill 101 as if Québec was an
operational member of the Canadian Federation. In fact, Québec operates as an inclusive Canadian
province from receiving equalization payments to participating in national political, military, and cultural
institutions. It would seem that the inclusion of Québec as a member of the Canadian Federation is a given
despite the provincial refusal to officially recognize its subordinated place in Canada.
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Bill 86 was passed in 1993 and reduced the emphasis on reducing English as a
public language. English advertising and service provision was allowed with the
provision that French be given a priority position. This is largely accomplished through
order and size. French phrases are listed first (or above) English phrases and are generally
in a larger font size than the English phrases. English language education was made
available to the children of Anglophones, provided that the parents or child previously
received English-language education in Canada.
Québec enacted protectionist policies that would ensure the dominance of a
singular linguistic and cultural medium in the province. The promotion of a singular
cultural medium becomes increasingly problematic given the labor migration
requirements of global market integration. Increasing ethno-cultural diversification of
Québec immigration makes the autocratic promotion of a singular cultural nationalism
practically impossible. Thus, the protection of the French language and a distinctive
Québécois culture must occur in accordance with the recognition of cultural pluralism
and the multicultural realities of increased global market integration.
The provincial response to the Supreme Court ruling and the demands of global
market integration is telling. Québec refused to rescind protectionist language legislation,
but instead created a largely intercultural policy framework that would define Québec as
distinct within a larger Canadian legislative context. The intercultural distinction is an
important one and shows the unique manner in which Québec has developed a state
strategy to facilitate global market integration yet maintain a stable national populace.
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2b. Québec Interculturalism
While federal Canadian multiculturalism maintains equal protection and
recognition for all cultural, ethnic, and racial groups it does so within a bilingual
framework. In short, the federal government makes a clear distinction between language
and culture by maintaining a multicultural outlook that is designed to facilitate interethnic relations and immigrant accommodation but requiring economic and political
functions to operation within either an English or French linguistic context. This has led
some to question the reality of Canadian multiculturalism as simply providing a “choice
of two dominant cultures to assimilate to” (Kymlicka 1995, 14).
The initial multicultural policy framework comments specifically on the
multicultural yet bilingual social nature of Canada, although this is viewed through the
perspective of a singular national population and nationalist ethos:
We may have two official languages in this country, but we do not have
two official cultures (Canada 1973).
The province of Québec responded to this and many other claims of ethno-cultural
pluralism by the federal government by questioning both the distinction between
language and culture as well as the logic of multiculturalism, itself.
In Canada the “national” government recognizes linguistic rights to the
Francophones. But these are linguistic rights only and not cultural rights
(Québec 1984, 3)
The various ethno-cultural communities do not really inter-communicate.
This results in stratification whereby some groups are at the top of the
ladder and others at the bottom. The Canadian policy on multiculturalism
which seems to appeal to many New-Quebecers can only accentuate this
isolation, as well as the mistrust and conflict that result there from (Québec
1984, 6).
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The difficulty in implementing federal multiculturalism in Québec centers explicitly on
the federal position that Québec, while distinct linguistically, is not culturally distinct
from any other ethno-cultural group in Canada. This implied critique of Québécois
nationalism was not only deemed unacceptable by the Québec nation and state, it
contributed to the solidification of French as the official language of the province. That
is, federal multiculturalism and the reduction of Québécois culture to “equal status”
among Canadian ethno-cultural groups contributed to the election of the sovereigntist
Parti Québécois in 1976 and allowed French language legislation to be passed in the latter
half of the decade (Fitzmaurice 1984; See 2001; Vineberg 1987). Recently, the threat of
federal multiculturalism has been articulated within the context of cultural survival and
labor migration:
Indeed, the bilingualism policy allows them to integrate into the Englishspeaking community anywhere in Canada, and this includes Québec,
while the multicultural policy conceals the existence of a welcoming
community in which French is a common language. Their primary loyalty
is to the country that welcomed them, Canada, a country which
incidentally still makes its new immigrants swear allegiance to the Queen
when they become citizens. Some of them mistakenly fear that the same
problems that led them to leave their native countries will recur in their
new country, and for this reason mistrust Québec nationalism (IPSQ
1999).
The active promotion of Canadian mulitculturalism by the federal government, linked
with the financial resources expended by the federal government in failing to defeat the
PQ in 1976, was viewed in Québec as another attempt to dominate and reduce Québécois
culture. The socio-economics of increased labor migration and its connection to ethnocultural survival make this position both salient and immediate, as show by the previous
IPSQ quote.
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The issue that soon faced the Québec state was, however, not an attack on its
national sovereignty by the federal government. Rather the larger challenge was the
increasing ethno-cultural diversity in Québec as a result of global market integration. As
shown in the previous chapter, the ethnic and cultural face of Québec grew increasingly
diverse as a result of the larger global shift in labor source regions. The autonomy for
immigration selection and acculturation granted by the Canada-Québec Accord provided
Québec with a unique opportunity to produce a nationalist social policy of its own.
Québec’s focus on interculturalism is distinct from the Canadian model in its explicit
endorsement of French as the dominant language while recognizing and protecting
cultural pluralism.
Québec’s intercultural framework is more of a collection of legislation and
policies that simultaneously strengthens the dominant position of the French language
while facilitating the accommodation and integration of immigrants commonly referred
to as “neo-Québécois.” As is often the case, the impetus for this policy position is derived
from the ideological nationalism and structural state apparatus developed during the
Quiet Revolution. The recent history of the Quiet Revolution and the growth of the
Québec state contributed in part to Québec’s strong involvement in the process of global
market integration. In fact, it could be argued that the Québec state responded to
demographic and cultural changes in a timelier manner than their Canadian federal
counterparts.
From the 1960s on, Québec pressed the federal government for more control over
immigration to Québec, and in 1975 the National Assembly officially responded to the
challenges posed by this integrative process (ethno-cultural diversification) with the
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Québec Charte des droits et libertés de la personne84. This policy document officially
protects the rights of all citizens of Québec and protects individuals from discrimination
based on race, ethnicity, gender, age, and pregnancy (Québec 1975). This document was
modeled on the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and
predates the federal Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by seven years.
In 1981 the Québec state again addressed the diversification of Québec
immigration and demography with the Autant de façons d’être Québécois (Québec
1981)85. This document provided an overview of provincial cultural integration without
reverting to the assimilationist patterns of past Canadian efforts at national construction.
The policy position stresses “convergence86” of culture and community in the desire to
create a strong, stable, yet ethno-culturally diverse Québec national population (Québec
1981).
The provincial government adopted an official policy of interculturalism with the
publication of Au Québec pour bâtir ensemble: énoncé de politique en matière
d’immigration et de l’intégration (Québec 1990)87. This document established a clear
guiding framework for defining the nation of Québec. Three main points create this
general nationalist definition: the democratic nature of Québec, a pluralist society that is
protected by law, and finally that French be the “langue commune” (common language)
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Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms
“Many Ways to be Québécois.” Author’s Translation.
86
Cultural “convergence” in this context refers to the process of cultural integration. Specifically,
“convergence” occurs in Québec as diverse ethnicities and cultures maintain traditional cultural norms and
practices however do so within the integrative context of a common language (French).
87
“We are Building Québec Together: Policy Announcement on Matters of Immigration and Integration.”
Author’s Translation.
85
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of the province. Gagnon and Iacovino clearly describe the purpose of this document and
general intercultural framework.
This view contends that the incorporation of immigrants or minority
cultures into the larger political community is a reciprocal endeavor-a
“moral contract” between the host society and the particular cultural
collectivity with the aim of establishing a forum for the empowerment of
all citizens… (Gagnon 2002, 326-327).
Québec interculturalism recognizes the contemporary fact of cultural pluralism through
its very political existence. The Québec state must politically facilitate the integration of
an increasingly diverse labor migrant population if it (Québec) is to continue to benefit
from the economic growth opportunities assisted by global market integration. National
protectionist demands, however, require that the Québec state also enact high levels of
cultural protections to ensure a common national socio-cultural medium.
Intercultural policy clearly promotes the liberal ideal of social equality and the
multicultural ideals of diversity recognition, although the institutional framework
supporting these ideals is focused primarily on the Francophone social medium in which
these ideals reside.
The institutions supporting the intercultural framework are the Secrétariat à la
Politique linguistique under the Ministère de la Culture et des Communications88 and les
Relations civiques et Interculturelles under the Ministère de l’Immigration et des
Communautés culturelles89. It is important to note that the current institutional
framework supporting intercultural policies in Québec remain strongly supported by the
state. Contrary to Canadian multiculturalism, whose institutional support has been greatly

88
89

Language Policy Secretariat under the Ministry of Culture and Communications
Civic and Intercultural Relations under the Ministry of Immigration and Cultural Communities
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reduced, Québec continues to fund and support both support of French language
legislation oversight and intercultural programs designed to facilitate immigrant
“convergence.”
At first glance, it would appear that this understanding of interculturalism reflects
the goals and mechanisms of Canadian multiculturalism, although privileging French as
the language of common and official interaction. The most glaring difference between
Canadian multiculturalism and Québec interculturalism is the belief (in Québec) that
language is inexorably connected to culture.
But the logical consequence would be that a language is the expression of
a way of life. Therefore if French is the common language in Québec this
implies that French culture although not “abolishing” other cultures, would
become the “focus of convergence” for the various communities (Québec
1984, 4).
Clearly, Québec society, while embracing pluralism, is an enclave of Francophone
language and culture under the protection of the state.
This difference represents a clear ideological division between the two social
policies, but also mirrors each respective history. That is, both are experiencing a
demographic shift that is effectively diversifying the ethno-cultural nature of Canadian
and Québec societies. This fact is the common denominator between both state entities;
however the divergence of independent histories works to create independent policy
solutions. For Canadian nationalists, the greatest threat to national cohesion is Québec
sovereignty (Carens 1995; Doran 2001; McRoberts 1988; Richler 1992). Therefore, any
policy designed to address the increasing ethno-cultural diversity of the nation can also
be designed to reduce the threat of Québécois nationalism.
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For Québec nationalists, the greatest threat to an autonomous Québec is the threat
of cultural homogenization or colonization on the part of a dominant English Canada.
Therefore, any policy designed to address the increasing ethno-cultural diversity of
Québec can also be designed to strengthen French linguistic and cultural dominance and
authority. Both policies were driven by global market integration, however the
development of both policies are, by necessity, defined by distinct national histories and
different nationalist goals.
The interesting aspect of Québec’s intercultural framework is its relative stability
in comparison with Canadian multiculturalism, with respect to institutional support and to
policy revision. While federal multiculturalism has undergone significant growth,
reduction, reorientation, and redefinition, Québec’s broad intercultural framework has
remained constant. The only significant alteration to the policy position has been a
reduction in the universal dominance of French as a public language. This change (see
Bills 142, 120, and 20 in the previous section) has been limited to social service provision
and the production of relevant government documents in both French and English. Thus,
the dominance of French as the common language of Québec has not been seriously
threatened.
3. Conclusion
A focus on the commonalities and differences between multicultural and
intercultural policy frameworks is important. The similar political economic patterns of
increased integration into the global market economic system in addition to full
integration into the global labor supply system illustrate a common goal and therefore
similar social consequences of increasing integration. The differences, described in the
252

previous two sections, are numerous; however there is a trend of policy convergence that
seems to be occurring. This process of policy alteration and evolution can provide a more
telling picture of how states respond to the challenges of the neo-liberal global economic
system and, perhaps the power of that system.
3a. Policy Decline and the Role of National Populations
The decline of multicultural policy in Canada has been debated by those who
view this policy position as being successful in its political positions (Kymlicka, Jansen)
and those who view this policy as being an anti-liberal political position that hinders
social integration and exacerbates stratification (Barry, Bissoondath). Christian Joppke
addresses this “debate” by showing a distinct pattern of multicultural policy “retreat in
the liberal state” (Joppke 2004).
Joppke points to three indications of the decline or “retreat” of multicultural
policies: (1) a lack of public support for multicultural policies (but not necessarily
programs), (2) the practical failure of multicultural policies to reduce ethnic conflict or
socio-economic stratification based on factors of ethno-cultural diversity, and (3) “a new
assertiveness of the liberal state in imposing the liberal minimum on its dissenters”
(Joppke 2004, 244). A cursory assessment of these three factors would point to a direct
connection between the first two. Policy failure and popular support often coincide. The
third aspect of liberal retrenchment raises a more pertinent question with respect to the
relationship of these policies to the double movement of neo-liberal economic demands
and national protection.
The initial motivation for federal multicultural policy was clearly nationalist in its
intent. That is, it provided a political definition of Canadian nationalism as diverse,
253

multicultural, and egalitarian. This definition worked to elevate “Third Force” ethnocultural groups to positions of equal social standing while simultaneously de-emphasizing
the claims of ethno-cultural uniqueness and claims of sovereignty by Québécois
nationalists. The initial goals of multicultural policies as tools for building minority
community support structures and ideological national cohesion was altered by
demographic changes resulting from increased ethno-cultural diversification.
Multicultural policy shifted to address growing conflicts and tensions that accompanied
rapid ethno-cultural diversification, primarily with respect to non-discrimination
initiatives. The recent de-centralization and privatization of multiculturalism marks yet
another policy shift. As Joppke points out, the contemporary policy shift (to decentralized and privatized organization) is indicative of a global reduction, or “retreat,”
from multicultural policies. I would argue that this “retreat” on the part of the state is
reflective of double movement tension resulting from continued struggle between global
neo-liberal market pressures and national protections. A brief revisitation of Québec
interculturalism supports this claim.
The unique historical and demographic nature of Québec motivated the
development of an alternative policy to Canadian multiculturalism. The common
experience of ethno-cultural diversification as a result of migration shifts and national
population demands for domestic stability required some form of policy on the part of the
Québec state to maintain national stability. As previously mentioned, Québec’s
intercultural policy framework (comprised of language and cultural legislation) has
undergone limited changes in comparison with its federal counterpart. The changes that
have occurred are reductions in the promotion of French as a singular language in
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Québec, but not to the nature, scope, or definition of what it is to be a Québécois (or neoQuébécois) or how daily communication and co-habitation should function in the
province. Why has Québec’s intercultural policy framework remained relatively
unaltered? I believe that the answer is exposed with closer attention to the dynamics of
the double movement.
Global market integration is a desirable goal for both Canada and Québec, as
evidenced by their policy initiatives and support for neo-liberal economic policy reforms.
Both Canada and Québec are active participants in the global labor supply system and
have experienced rapid ethno-cultural diversification as a result of the systemic shift from
European to Global South sources for labor migration. Multicultural and intercultural
policies are largely responsible for promoting a comfortable atmosphere and stable
environment for these new arrivals and ensuring that the destabilizing potential of rapid
ethno-cultural diversification does not affect economic growth or productive capacity. In
this light, multi/intercultural policies are an outcome of national market integration into
the global market system. Several scholars have commented on the economic benefits of
multi/intercultural policies, particularly with respect to attracting business-class migrants
whose capital, skills, and education are highly valued by competing core states (AbuLaban 2003; Abu-Laban and Gabriel 2002; Li 2003).
Conversely, the reality of ethno-cultural diversification is uneven and often
conflictual. “Native” groups are often hostile to new residents whose language, religion,
traditions, values, and even appearance may differ from conventional national norms.
Added tension often arises in times of economic recession or depression when ethnocultural minorities are often targeted as “causes” or “contributors” to general conditions
255

of hardship. In addition to these ethno-cultural tensions national populations continue to
construct and negotiate national identities within the context of the neo-liberal nationstate90. The issue of liberalism is an important one, as the basic tenant of liberal political
ideology is egalitarianism. The promotion of equality, however, is problematic. There are
few regions where a particular group (often based on ethnicity or culture) has not
maintained some form of dominance or hierarchical authority. The “equalization” process
inherent in multicultural policies inevitably causes a backlash by those fearful of losing
their positions of prominence. The result is commonly an attack on these multicultural
policies as privileging a specific group or groups over traditionally dominant groups. This
is the case in Canada where attacks on multicultural policies are increasingly articulated
in nationalist language and context. The lack of a common cultural medium in Canada
and the promotion of a common nationalist discourse/identity by the state has resulted in
increased dissatisfaction by national popular groups (Barry 2001; Bibby 1995; 1990;
Bissoondath 1994; Frow 1999)
The demand of true economic neo-liberals for limited, if not non-existent, state
intervention is an added problem for multicultural policies. State spending on social
services, particularly those that make demands on business entities and economic
institutions, is an anathema to neo-liberal market ideology…the same market ideology
that currently maintains a dominant position in this era of globalization. As such,
multicultural programs that seek to attain social and economic equality outside of the
market system are, in effect, non-liberal. Thus, the national protections (of “native”
90

This is, of course, a limited view of national identify construction. This project is limited to the
discussion of the effects of global market integration on a specific type of nation-state: Western, advanced
capitalist, and republican/democratic. This project makes no theoretical claims outside of this limited
empirical scope.
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populations and immigrant populations) of multicultural policies run counter to the
demands and requirements of pure neo-liberal market ideology.
Interculturalism, on the other hand, has emerged relatively unscathed from both
neo-liberal and conservative critiques. The requirement that new arrivals in Québec
participate in Québec society through conformity to a common linguistic and cultural
medium is distinct from the policy requirements of federal multiculturalism (although not
from the reality of Canadian integration). This focus on a common medium of public
exchange provides a level of ideological stability and cohesion not possible in a pure
multicultural environment.
It would seem that the “retreat” of multicultural policies means that neo-liberal
market ideology has become supreme in the context of the double movement. If we
attribute some level of legitimate power to national populations, however, the dominance
of neo-liberal market ideology seems less obvious. National popular support for federal
multicultural policies has waned. Criticism of state multicultural policies reflect
previously mentioned failures in policy efficacy; however, a notable observation is that
attacks on multicultural policy are increasingly focused on the need to protect Canadian
national culture. The demands have largely centered on populist critiques of national
deterioration or the potential divisive outcomes of diversity recognition. That is, national
demands for a common cultural medium have grown as both ethno-cultural diversity and
multicultural policies have expanded. While the decline of neo-liberal criticism of
multicultural policies has contributed to the idea that multicultural ideology is “good for
business” (Abu-Laban 2003), national support for these programs has deteriorated:

257

Back in 1985, 56% of Canadians supported the mosaic and only 28% the
melting pot. But in 1995, 44% supported the mosaic and 40% the melting
pot – almost equal (Bibby 1995, 54).
The ambiguous definition of Canadian nationalism is increasingly attacked as a failure of
multicultural policy. These criticisms are heavily muted in Québec due to the emphasis of
a common cultural medium.
Interculturalism on the other hand is heavily criticized by neo-liberal proponents
on the grounds that the level of institutional support for these programs is unnecessary
and, in fact, a deterrent to increased economic growth (Boyer 2001; McMahon 2003;
Migué 1998; Paquet 1999). On the other hand, intercultural policy in Québec meets the
demands of its national population to maintain the traditional social dominance of French
language and culture. When compared with federal multicultural policy the ability of
Québec intercultural policy to maintain its core structure, responsibilities, and overall
framework allows us to conclude that it is better able to function in the context of the
double movement91, largely due to the strength of national demands for Québécois
cultural protection. Both policies are attempts by the state to address global market
integration and labor demand; however the emphasis on recognizing difference and the
promotion of state programs to institutionalize those differences has been received coldly
by both national populations and neo-liberal market proponents. Interculturalism, while
providing a level of state involvement that is not desirable for most neo-liberal
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Federal multiculturalism, as a political institution, grew throughout the 1970s and early 1980s to
ministerial status (Ministry of Multiculturalism), but was dismantled in the late 1980s and early 1990s and
subsumed under the Department of Canadian Heritage. Québec interculturalism is still institutionally strong
and supported by the Ministère de l’Immigration and Communautés culturelles and the Ministère de la
Culture et Communications.
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ideologues, facilitates global market integration and meets the protectionist demands of
its national population through cultural means.
The ability of a state-centered policy to negotiate the conflicts of the double
movement is clearly necessary for policy survival. The final chapter will expand on this
conclusion and integrate it into a larger examination of the initial theoretical propositions
of this project. We have examined the background and conditional motivations for
multicultural and intercultural policies, but we must now come full-circle in the attempt
to understand what these policies can tell us about the contemporary nation-state.
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Chapter Eight
Conclusions: The Importance of Culture in the Contemporary Nation-State

This dissertation concludes that the Canadian state is increasingly reliant on the
control or manipulation of national cultural structures to ensure stability. The Québec
state is equally reliant on culture, but its history of linking state-formation with an
organic (popular) national cultural definition provides enhanced stability. Stability occurs
when national populations feel sufficiently protected from pressures and changes brought
by increasing globalization (or the process of global market integration). Increased
Canadian state attention to culture is an outcome of global market integration, which has
reduced or eliminated state ability to control or protect national economic interests.
As state capacity to protect national populations through economic means
decreases, new means for meeting national protectionist demands must be found.
Attempts by the Canadian state to create a national culture can be easy observed as “topdown” approaches to national cultural definition. Québec is increasingly integrated into
the global market economy and experiences the same pressures to decrease state social
service spending and reduce economic protectionist capacity. Conversely, Québec’s
popular, or “bottom-up” definition of national culture was the central feature of the statebuilding project in Québec. The Québec national population, as the source of its national
cultural definitions, provides greater legitimating support for state protectionist policies
(interculturalism) focused on national culture. The Canadian state, on the other hand, has
seen its attempts to define national culture become less and less effective as legitimating
national support is withdrawn due to the “top-down” imposition of cultural definitions.
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Therefore, the Québec state can better meet the protectionist demands of its
national population and offers an explanation for Québec’s ability to resist global market
demands for a longer period of time and ensure policy stability to a greater degree than in
Canada. The Canadian and Québec cases show that increased globalization pressures
decrease economic protectionist capacities requiring the state to find alternative means to
ensure social stability. This dissertation argues that those means are increasingly found in
the use and manipulation of national cultural structures of meaning, symbols, and
definitions of nationalism.
This conclusion will be examined in further detail in the following section. The
purpose of this chapter is to first provide a conclusion linking the empirical project to the
methodological and theoretical issues of the dissertation. The first section examines the
previously stated conclusion within the general “double movement” framework of the
project. The second section examines the “double movement” as a potentially viable
methodological tool. I argue that the dissertation project provides a sound methodological
foundation for future research on the interrelationship between nation, state, and
globalization processes. These future research directions are presented in the final section
of this concluding chapter. I present several possible scenarios that reflect the
methodological orientation of this study. The section presents hypothetical scenarios that
require future comparative analysis in order to generate theoretical conclusions about
state capacity and function within the context of the “double movement.” This final
section offers examples of how this dissertation can be expanded as well as illustrating
the conceptual strength of a reconceptualized “double movement.”
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1. General Conclusions
This project concludes that the defining feature of the Canadian nation-state in the
era of globalization is its decreasing capacity to control national economic protections
and its increasing capacity to control national cultural protections. This section provides
more detail to the previously stated general conclusion and serves as a foundation for the
following two sections designed to provide analytical foundations for future research.
To reiterate, this project is structured by the Polanyian “double movement”
concept. This framework requires that any analysis understand socio-political
organization as defined by 1) external liberal market pressures and 2) internal national
protectionist pressures. The Canadian and Québec states provide local political mediation
between these two demands for the purpose of ensuring stability necessary for systemic
operation. We can therefore conclude the there are three empirical actors in the
contemporary “double movement:” the global economic system, state institutions, and
national populations. The dissertation allows us to draw specific conclusions about each
categorical actor as well as understand the cumulative process that leads to the previously
stated general conclusion.
1a. Globalization or Global Market Integration
We can conclude that globalization has inhibited the ability of Canada and
Québec to enact national economic protectionist measures. The realities of NAFTA and
WTO membership eliminate the ability to implement tariffs or other trade restrictions in
support of national economic interests. This is consistent with many theories of economic
globalization, particularly with respect to transnational capitalist theory (Robinson 2004;
Sklair 2001).
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Chapter Five established global market integration as a goal and active project of
both Canada and Québec. The requirements of global market integration limit state
capacity to enact economic protections such as tariffs or other trade restrictions. We can
conclude that both state entities are constrained in their ability to protect national
populations through economic policy means. The fact that social service provision and
funding in Canada is decreasing lends additional credence to this conclusion.
Health Canada, for example, has experienced declining federal funding despite
the lack of universal private health care alternatives. Generally, neoliberal ideology and
integration requirements discourage state spending for social service provision. This is
particularly true with respect to privatization that encourages market integration of all
aspects of social services, including health care, education, and pension management.
Specifically, the decline in health care funding in Canada is linked to encroaching market
pressures for privatization (Johnson 2002). The NAFTA agreement weakens the state’s
ability to protect its public health care system as certain sections or categories of health
care provision in Canada are subject to foreign investment and must conform to
adjudicative trade rules established in the agreement. This means that the increasing
privatization of Canadian health care is a direct result of global market integration.
By introducing foreign investment into areas of health care service
delivery that were previously delivered on a not-for-profit basis by the
public sector, private clinics and hospitals open the door to trade
challenges and foreign investor claims. These incursions may in turn have
profound impacts on the entire health care system (Canadian Health
Coalition 2002).
Québec, on the other hand, has a similar tradition of state social service provision that has
generally succeeded in avoiding neoliberal “reforms.” Recent events have challenged this
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resistive capacity and raise serious questions about whether Québec can continue to
maintain current levels of state spending, contrary to neoliberal demands.
The Canadian Supreme Court, in the case of Chaoulli v. Québec in June 2005,
ruled that Québec’s ban on private insurance for private health care services was
unconstitutional. This ruling gave the PLQ government the ability to draft legislation
requiring the privatization of portions of Québec’s formerly public health care system.
Representatives of Québec’s five law schools criticized this legislation as “going far
beyond what the Supreme Court ordered” (Brun et al. 2005). In fact, the representatives
argue that the judgment merely required that citizens be able to purchase insurance for
private care, not to privatize portions of the public system as the Charest (PQL)
government is doing (Brun et al. 2005).
The case of declining public health care provision and the rise of privatization in
Canada is consistent with the effects of global market integration. I would argue that the
intentional nature of this integrative process can be seen in the actions of both the
Canadian and Québec governments. In the case of Canada, ample budget surpluses are
available to augment funding short falls for Health Canada. Fuller (1998) argues that
these consistent decreases in federal health care funding, despite ample financial
resources, is the result of intentional efforts on the part of the state to weaken public
health care services. The purpose of intentionally under-funding Health Canada is to
contend that public health care is untenable and thus must allow for private health care
provision (i.e., global market integration).
Efforts by the Charest administration in Québec are similar in their intent. The
Québec state is actively opening the door to health care privatization in accordance with
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neoliberal/market demands by relying on judicial opinion that does not demand the
privatization of the provincial health care system. In both cases, state efforts to decrease
state spending and control over social service provision are an intentional act. The crisis
of health care provision in Canada and Québec is consistent with conclusions made in
this dissertation that increased global market integration decreases the state’s capacity to
enact national protectionist legislation (namely, social service provision) that is contrary
to neoliberal market demands.
1b. State Political Capacity and Responsibilities
If the state economic protectionist capacity is, in fact, reduced as a result of the
demands and requirements of the global economic system, what then is the purpose of the
contemporary nation-state? The role of the contemporary state is to ensure local stability
required to maintain a functional global economic system. This is consistent with
Polanyi’s descriptions of the “peace interest” promoted by international financial
institutions for international liberal market growth.
Trade was now dependent upon an international monetary system that
could not function in a general war. It demanded peace, and the Great
Powers were striving to maintain it. But the balance-of-power system, as
we have seen, could not by itself ensure peace. This was done by
international finance, the very existence of which embodied the principle
of the new dependence of trade upon peace (Polanyi 2001, 16).
The issue of stability is a central requisite of any global economic system. Without such a
cooperative medium trade and financial exchanges could not function as freely as they
currently do. This case demonstrates that in the pursuit of “double movement”
satisfaction, the state has moved into the realm of national cultural policy. The role of the
state in ensuring social stability has shifted from economic to cultural protection;
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however, the dynamics that govern the interaction between nation, state, and global
economic system remain constant. The complexities of the state in addressing economic
issues with cultural policies requires greater understanding. That is, although state
capacity to meet national protectionist demands through cultural means has increased, the
protectionist demand is still motivated by economic changes and demands of the global
economic system.
The existing Westphalian system of nation-states provides for local political
institutions of power that are able to legitimately control national populations and provide
local stability that facilitates global trade, financial capital flows, transnational
production, and consumptive patterns. The mechanics of the “double movement” ensure
that this facilitation of liberal market forces will result in a national protectionist outcry.
This demand for national protection was met in the post-war era with Keynesian statecentered strategies leading to the development of the Western welfare state. EspingAndersen supports this contention through his understanding that “the welfare state was
therefore also a political project of nation-building: the affirmation of liberal democracy
against the twin perils of fascism and bolshevism” (Esping-Andersen 1996, 2). The
welfare state, in accordance with the mechanics of the “double movement,” was the state
response to national discontent and the threat of anti-systemic alternatives (namely,
fascism and bolshevism). The “double movement” is a conservative mechanism in which
the goal is systemic maintenance and stability.
These conditions no longer exist and state capacity to respond to national
protectionist demands through economic means has decreased. Esping-Andersen
comments on this shift as well:
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The advanced Western nations’ welfare states were built to cater to an
economy dominated by industrial mass production. In the era of the
“Keynesian consensus” there was no perceived trade-off between social
security and economic growth, between equality and efficiency. This
consensus has disappeared because the underlying assumptions no longer
obtain (Esping-Andersen 1996, 3).
The core shift from industrial production to service provision is pervasive. The decline of
welfare state protectionism in Canada and Québec can be easily mapped through
neoliberal trade agreements signed in the 1980s and 1990s that were once shunned as
detrimental to national economic growth (Clarkson and McCall 1990).
The decline of economic protectionist capacities in Canada and Québec came at a
time of increasing ethno-cultural diversity (again, motivated by global market
integration). This demographic transition offers the state an opportunity to shift its focus
from national economic protection to national cultural protection. The institutionalization
of multicultural policy throughout the 1980s occurred as hostility to free-trade
agreements decreased (notably beginning CUFTA negotiations in 1984). As opposition to
neoliberal trade agreements continued to wane in the 1990s (NAFTA and WTO
leadership support was promoted by the Liberal Party, who formerly opposed free-trade
policies – at least as a political issue) so too did the institutional power of
multiculturalism in Canada. However, the continued diversification of urban Canada and
the increasing inability of the state to protect national populations through economic
means also promoted an increase in criticism of multiculturalism from a popular and
nationalist perspective. In other words, multiculturalism as a national cultural ideal is
increasingly attacked as being unable to promote a singular nationalist Canadian medium.
These attacks are nearly universal in their use of culture as a discursive tool of criticism.
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The original idea of multiculturalism as the “recognition of difference” is proving to be
an untenable position as Canadian popular demands for protection and stability take on
an increasingly nationalist tone, generally demanding a common cultural medium.
Québec’s response to global market integration is equally focused on culture, but
its approach has proven more stable in its ability to meet the protectionist demands of its
national population. I argue that this stability is the result of greater national legitimating
support for state protectionist policies such as interculturalism. That is, Québec is able to
meet the national protectionist demands of its national population in a more effective
manner than does the Canadian state. While global market pressures are equally
demanding of both Canadian and Québec state entities, Québec’s ability to resist such
pressures is due to higher levels of legitimacy in its use of national culture in protectionist
strategies.
Urban Québec is experiencing the same rate of diversification as the whole of
urban Canada; however the intercultural context to which Québec immigrants must
integrate creates the common cultural medium in demand throughout the rest of Canada.
Clearly, intercultural policies are designed to protect Francophone Québécois culture and
the fact that its policy framework is not generally challenged by Francophone Québécois
is telling.
Interestingly, the strength of the national population in Québec has allowed its
social service provision role to be maintained in contrast to the demands of neoliberal
proponents. The main points of attack against Québec intercultural policy have been from
neoliberal critics who view the program as providing excessive state support for national
protectionist measures. Again, this is consistent with the mechanics of the “double
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movement” in which liberal market pressures will increase in response to increased
national protectionist pressures. Recent neoliberal economic reforms undertaken by the
Charest administration have been deeply unpopular and have resulted in increased
national protectionist demands.
An example of this occurred in the spring 2005 when the Québec government
announced its plan to decrease state spending by converting provincial student bursary
grants into loans. This caused a vociferous reaction among public university students
throughout Québec, but the reaction was most vocal among CÉGEP92 students in Québec
urban areas93. The loan conversion plan resulted in a student strike (numbering 170,000
students) at ten Montréal area CÉGEP campuses. The strike lasted from February to May
and forced the capitulation of the Charest government who ultimately withdrew the
proposal and reinstituted the bursary funds. While the fact that student action forced the
government to rescind its neoliberal reform measure is significant, the rejection of a
government compromise is even more applicable to the conclusions of this dissertation.
On March 16, the Minister of Education, Jacques Fournier, offered to replace
the $103 million in converted grant funds with $95.5 million. Student leadership rejected
this offer due to the fact that the $95.5 million would come from federal government
educational funding. In the words of one student leader, “The present offer, in our view,
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CÉGEP, or Collège d’enseignement général et professionel, are the relative equivalent of junior colleges
or vocational colleges in the United States. The strengths and responsibilities of each CÉGEP campus are
unique and ranges from general education to fine arts to mechanical vocations to information technology.
In many cases, post-high school students are required to attend CÉGEP colleges before enrolling in a
provincial university. In other cases, a CÉGEP vocation or technical education is the goal.
93
Information concerning the CÉGEP strike was compiled from several sources including University
Affairs, “Charest Government Weakened by Québec Student Strike.” (Peggy Curran, May 2005); several
reports from daily news sources including the Gazette, Le Devoir, and the CBC from September 2004
through June 2005.
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is unacceptable because the extra money comes essentially from the federal government”
(Lampert 2005).
The rejection of a compromise effort deemed insufficient in its adherence to
national protectionist demands illustrates the importance of culture within the context of
the “double movement.” In other words, the economic compromise solution was rejected
on cultural grounds. This action coincides with the overall conclusion of this dissertation;
namely that culture has become increasingly important as a tool for meeting the demands
of the national population for social protection. The question that arises at this point is:
does the reliance on culture by the state in meeting challenges of an economic nature
prove effective? Developing conclusions of the capacities of the contemporary nation
will help answer this question.
1c. The Role of National Populations
The general conclusion of the dissertation, that culture is increasingly important
as a state legitimation mechanism, raises a serious question with respect to national
power. This dissertation concludes that Québec has been able to resist global market
integration demands in a more effective manner than has Canada. I argue that this is the
result of Québec’s use of a national cultural definition that is derived from national
popular definitions (“bottom-up”). Canadian definitions of national culture, demonstrated
by the case of multiculturalism, are not derived from national populations but are, in
many ways, “top-down” state dictates. This is problematic for the Canadian state due to
the fact that culture is becoming a more salient stabilization strategy. Culture requires
high levels of popular legitimacy in order to be effective. That is, culture is generally
developed as a local or grass-roots cohesive control that is most effective when
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understood and articulated by local populations which have direct affinity with respective
cultural norms (Geertz 1983; 1973; Scott 1990).
This fact was recognized by the Québec government in response the perceived
threat of Canadian multiculturalism:
…a State cannot afford to exist without a solidly established culture. If
there is no culture the State will “manufacture” one to serve its own
purposes (Québec 1984, 4).
This statement was made in response to the institutionalization of Canadian
multiculturalism. From the Québec perspective, the creation of a multicultural nationalist
ideal in contrast to a bicultural national history was an attempt to “manufacture” a
national culture (or at least a national cultural ideal) in support of the federal position on
Pan-Canadian nationalism. That is, the most effective way to undercut Québécois
nationalism was to “manufacture” a culture that ignored the “French Fact” and promoted
an equality of culture. This “equality” is of course within the context of the practical
linguistic reality that “Canada without Québec is an Anglophone country” (Québec 1984,
3).
This excursus illustrates the increasingly salient role of culture in establishing
power relationships and maintaining the controls necessary to ensure national stability.
The fact that multicultural and intercultural policies are attempts by the state to influence
and control national culture was established in Chapter Seven. The above quote supports
this contention. However, the comparative histories of multicultural and intercultural
policies are more telling with respect to the strength of national populations.
Canadian multiculturalism, from the perspective of Québec critics and this
dissertation, is increasingly under attack from the national population due in large part to
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its inability to respond to national protectionist demands. The multicultural policy was
intended to provide a unique and distinct foundation upon which Pan-Canadian
nationalism could be built. Increasing dissatisfaction with the policy as an institutional
response to demographic change promoted by globalization is centered on the
institutional failure to generate a singular Canadian national cultural ideal/vision. The fact
that Canada attempted to “manufacture” a cultural ideal that ultimately proved weak
without national legitimation is consistent with the previous claim that culture is, first and
foremost, a locally manufactured mechanism. Conversely, Québec interculturalism
utilizes existing national cultural definitions, norms, and symbols to support its
multicultural variant.
This comparative study shows that the state capacity to manipulate and
manufacture cultural definitions, norms, and symbols is contingent on a high level of
national legitimacy. We also conclude that state capacity to enact economic protections
has eroded thus motivating a shift to cultural protections to satisfy the “double
movement.” The shift of state capacity from economic to cultural spheres has resulted in
increased national power for legitimating state policies and actions. In other words, as
global market demands reduce state economic protectionist capacity, the state fulfills its
stabilization requirement through increased influence, control, and attempted
manipulation of national culture. This process results in increased potential for power in
national populations. With respect to the Canadian state, we can observe that this process
is fluid and requires constant alteration and adaptive capacity. Similarly, the stability of
Québec national protectionist programs are under increasingly effective attacks by global
market proponents.
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In effect, this dissertation project concludes that Castells’ conceptualization of
decreasing state power and increasing national power is correct. A similar conclusion is
reached in the work of Amy Chua (2003), Robert Kaplan (2000), and Thomas Sowell
(2002) in that struggles over ideology and nationalist definitions are the new battlefields
in this era of globalization. I would add that from the perspective of the “double
movement” the state retains significant power as an institution of management and
mediation. The novelty of the “double movement” approach is in its ability to illustrate
the mechanical processes that have resulted in this situation. Two specific questions are
raised as a result of these conclusions. First, are there problems with using the “double
movement” in an era of such significant political and economic change? Second, what are
the possible directions for the state?
2. Reconceptualizing the “Double Movement”
The cases of Canada and Québec illustrate the role of culture and the importance
of national populations in legitimizing culturally-oriented social policies. Respective
policies of multiculturalism and interculturalism represent attempts by both state entities
to ensure social stability by meeting the demands of national populations and global
market proponents. The use of the “double movement” concept through this dissertation
implies that a change has occurred in how states are able to these dual pressures.
As stated in Chapter Two, the Polanyian “double movement is a specific process:
liberal capitalism in the form of a laissez-faire market system encroaches on a respective
social group (i.e., national population) which in turn generates a national protectionist
demand which is satisfied through the enacting of national economic protections. That is,
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in Polanyi’s original conceptualization the “double movement” is an explicitly economic
process.
This dissertation concludes that state stability responsibilities inherent in the
“double movement” can no longer be met with respect to national economic protections.
Thus, an orthodox understanding and application of the “double movement” is
problematic. I argue that this shift in empirical conditions requires a reconceptualization
of the “double movement” while retaining its dynamic analytical capacities. This
dissertation argues that the capacity of the state to ensure stability by national populations
through economic means is reduced as global market integration increases. This does not
negate the need for state institutions to ensure the stability necessary for optimal global
market performance. Neither does it negate national demands for protection from the
adverse effect of global market integration.
The dynamic foundation of the “double movement” remains. The conditions in
which the process operates has changed, requiring more attention to the role of culture in
the process of state adaptation and capacity to ensure required stability. This dissertation
shows that the “double movement” continues to have significant methodological value,
although clearly an orthodox conceptualization can no longer be used.
A reoriented “double movement” would retain the economic focus on predatory
liberal market integration; however calls for national protection are increasingly reliant
on socio-cultural means. This process, I argue, is the result of state adaptation in response
to the pressures of the global economic system. That is, the role of the state, as the local
control institution for ensuring social stability, remains constant. The means or capacities
of the state to ensure social stability through explicit economic means is reduced as a
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result of global market integration (primarily the result of state adherence to neoliberal
political economic stipulations). This political handicap results in the state seeking
alternative means to ensure social stability – these means have been increasingly cultural.
Therefore, the discursive interrelationship between state and nation has shifted from one
of political economics to one of culture.
The implications of this shift will be briefly discussed in the following section. I
argue that such a reconceptualized “double movement” could have substantial
methodological value for future research. The analytical power of this approach is in its
ability to integrate locally specific processes of cultural change or resistance with the
macro socio-economic processes of a singular global economic system. It must be noted
that while the global market system is a singular systemic entity, the process of global
market integration by respective nation-states is an uneven process. Analytical
approaches to this uneven process of integration should be able to reflect local variations.
The diversity of local cultural differences and the alternative avenues for national
social protectionism using such cultural vehicles leads me to conclude that the “double
movement” is valuable as a methodological tool but not as a theoretical framework. In
other words, this reconceptualized understanding of the “double movement” views local
cultural variants and responses as playing a dominant role in the nation/state dichotomy.
That is, a general theory of “double movement” applicability is difficult given the relative
cultural diversity of each case. We can, however, conclude that the realms of state policy
capacity have expanded beyond traditional economic protections. This conclusion offers
a useful foundation upon which future comparative analyses can be built.

275

The value of this perspective from a methodological perspective does, however,
allow for future theoretical generalizations to be made. By using this reconceptualized
“double movement” methodological framework, we can then implement comparative
case studies that will then, in turn, lead to general theoretical conclusions. This
dissertation shows that this methodological approach is initially viable. The expansion of
such a methodology would entail a major comparative case study, perhaps within
regional political economic blocs (such as the EU or Latin America) or between
divergent cases such as comparative core/periphery studies. Through additional
comparative study we will be able to determine (1) whether culture plays an equally
significant role in determining national protectionist strategies and (2) work toward a
greater understanding of the contemporary state that is increasingly challenged by global
market integration processes. The goal of advancing this methodological project would
be to discover future potential directions for studies of the state and possibly develop a
greater understanding of efficacious policies that allow national populations to effectively
combat the predatory effects of globalization.
3. Future Directions
From the conclusions of this dissertation we can hypothesize four possible
outcomes that require additional study and theoretical development. This concluding
section is the culmination of the dissertation’s theoretical project and offers avenues for
future research on the state and the role of the “double movement” as an effective
methodological framework. The outcomes are presented in their hypothetical form. I will
add brief justification for their position as a potential outcome, but further analysis of
each potential outcome will be left for future work.
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1. The state will increase its ability and skill in controlling national cultural symbols
resulting in the increased domination of national populations through cultural
manipulation and control.
This outcome will occur due to alliance formation between national, state, and
global market proponents. For instance, state capacity and ability to manage and define
national culture is enhanced by cooperation from national groups who articulate a cultural
vision or definition that supports state efforts. Leadership from the state can influence
national culture, but this influence is most effective when it is supported by national
popular leadership.
A contemporary example of this process is found in the alliance between the
United States Republican Party and evangelical Christian groups in the late 1970s and
early 1980s. The cooperative efforts of organized national (evangelical) groups assisted
state efforts by the Reagan administration (1980-1988) to influence and manage national
culture through the active redefinition of American political symbols as having specific
affiliations and connotations. This example briefly illustrates the process of national
cultural control as facilitated by a specific national group with a specific cultural
definition that facilitates global market integration. In other words, the national cultural
group (evangelical Christians) gains increased power with respect to the state and in turn
promotes national compliance despite the presence of adverse effects of global market
integration (deindustrialization, agricultural decline). The state was then able to ensure
global systemic operation due to a stable national population that was controlled, in large
part, through the redefinition of national culture.
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This outcome results in contemporary stability in accordance with the HegelianMarxian concept of false consciousness and operates in much the same manner as
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. We can assume that this outcome is probable in core
states given the privileged position of its national populations with respect to abject and
pervasive poverty. The relative affluence of core states facilitates additional control
mechanisms in the form of mass media entertainment and material consumption
promotion, both of which require tacit affirmation of the benefits resulting from global
market integration and legitimate approval of existing control structures. This scenario
clearly presumes a dominant position with respect to the global economic system.
National populations, active in their own domination, are effectively controlled through
state approved cultural definitions, symbols, and affiliations. These state controls are
locally managed by co-operative national groups who stand to increase their power as
they support the state project of global market integration. In this scenario, long-term
stability is increasingly dependent on the state, its alliances with cooperative national
groups, and its ability to manage and control national cultural definitions.
2. The nation will gain greater understanding of cultural manipulative efforts on the part
of the state and react negatively to this process of cultural control.
The second possible outcome could result if the previously stated requisites
collapse. If state capacity to influence or control national cultural definitions and symbols
is reduced, national populations could increase their general power with respect to the
state and the global economic system. In this scenario national groups will recognize the
manipulative efforts of the state and react in a negative fashion weakening state control
capacities. This outcome would decrease the dominant position of the global economic
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system due to the potential inability of the state to control national populations and ensure
stability. The global economic system would have to address national protectionist
concerns on a more direct level due to the inability of state cultural controls to meet
protectionist demands.
An example of this process is arguably occurring in Latin America. Specifically,
the most recent Bolivian election saw the rise of Evo Morales, the first indigenous
Aymara president of Bolivia, who was elected on a platform of emphasizing indigenous
culture (as opposed to the Bolivian tradition of ignoring) and reasserting state control
over national economic protections. In short, the initial promise of the Morales era in
Bolivia is built on a rearticulation of national culture (from a political ideal of inclusivity,
“we are all Indians” with the reality being massive economic stratification based largely
on race – to a recognition of the racial basis for this economic stratification) which has
allowed the state political discourse to shift again toward issues of national economic
protection.
In this scenario, the national population has the opportunity to transcend state
cultural definitions and controls, reestablish these controls from a cultural perspective,
and potentially protect itself through economic means. This, of course, is contingent on
the group that is able to actively redefine national cultural controls and their interest in
reestablishing national economic protections from global market integration. The
opportunity for such a shift is possible.
3. The state will continue its relative decline in control capacities and be replaced with
regional or global governing structures to ensure local stability.
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This scenario is predicated on the observation that the Westphalian state system,
designed to originally maintain and control national economies and facilitate international
trade, is undergoing qualitative change. The ability for the state to control or protect
national economic interests is eroding in the face of neoliberal market demands. If
cultural controls prove ineffective in ensuring long-term local stability, global market
proponents will seek alternate forms of governance. Advocates of the global polity thesis
argue that this process is already underway (Meyer 1980; Meyer et al. 1997; Boli and
Thomas 1997). This theory argues that a global culture based on European models of
rationality, liberal democracy, and liberal capitalism is pervasive enough to allow a
common political discourse to occur. This common political discourse has the potential to
produced shared governance structures.
Obvious examples of this process are institutions such as the United Nations,
which has limited political and military authority granted through international
cooperative unions. Another example of regional governance structure could be the
European Union, which consists of several institutions of political control including the
European Parliament and the ministerial Council of the European Union.
I would argue that this scenario is least likely due to the increased importance of
national culture as a local control mechanism. Current levels of state-national cultural
integration make it much more difficult to argue for the relinquishment of state power to
supranational governance structures because national culture has been explicitly tied to
the existing state. A nation-state joined by shared culture will lose this developed
connection resulting in national instability. Resulting national instability will negatively
affect global economic operation and therefore represents a significant disincentive for
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creating supranational governance at this time. One can look to recent history to see the
function of the “double movement” in opposition to such an outcome.
The economic cooperation of the European Union has resulted in the world’s
strongest currency; however, the establishment of a singular constitutional system of
governance has not matched this economic cooperation. In fact, the most recent attempt
to ratify a European constitution was rejected by the national populations of France and
the Netherlands. One of the more successful strategies in mobilizing support for
constitutional reject was in appeals to national cultural sovereignty (Bordonaro 2005).
Thus, while supranational governance structures are possible, the power of respective
national populations and the ability of state and national actors to exploit cultural
definitions, symbols, and histories for resistive purposes makes large-scale
implementation unlikely. In fact, it seems more likely that attempts to implement regional
supranational governance structures could follow the pattern of the EU, with powerful
states or national populations resisting this impulse. Such a collapsed effort would likely
lead to a return to either of the first two scenarios presented here. The deciding factor, it
would seem, would be the strength of the state to manage and control national cultural
structures (scenario one). Conversely, such a political collapse (failed regional
governance) could present an opportunity for national populations to redefine or reestablish control over national cultural structures (scenario two).
4. The power of national populations will increase beyond state capacities to control
resulting in local instability. This instability could in turn result in increased regional or
even global conflict.
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This scenario is the direct result of instability generated by an unbalanced “double
movement.” Local destabilization has the potential to degenerate into large-scale conflict
due to the withdrawal of local structures of control and the inability of the global
economic system to enforce stability through existing supranational institutions. This
process can occur in two obvious ways.
First, the dominance of the global economic system grows beyond the ability of
state cultural controls to pacify national populations. In this instance, the control of
culture becomes irrelevant in the face of extreme economic inequalities and the inability
for culture to mask such adverse economic conditions. In other words, discursive conflict
centered on issues of national culture are overwhelmed by pervasive economic problems
such as unemployment, poverty, and accompanying detrimental social conditions. This
situation could result in social revolution or at least social instability that threatens global
economic operation. In other words, the expansion of global market predation creates an
imbalance in the “double movement” that overwhelms existing state protectionist
capacities motivating local instability.
Second, national power increases to the point that it overwhelms state control
mechanisms. Once control of the state is accomplished, the national group can choose to
function in the way similar to the Morales administration. That is, usurped state power
can be used to promote national economic health through diplomacy and renegotiated
agreements within the global economic system. The possibility also exists that the
dominant national group will chose not to protect its national populations within the
context of the global market economy, but instead choose to expand its power through
the forced acquisition of resources and capital of other nation-states.
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Both of these outcomes can result in regional or even global conflict possibly
promoting systemic collapse. This obviously is the most undesirable outcome, but
unfortunately not the least likely. The negative potential for regional or global conflict
seems more likely in peripheral regions due to their position within the global economic
system. Core states and national populations will be less likely to contribute to the
destabilization of a beneficial systemic arrangement. The motivation for systemic
destabilization is possibly more attractive to peripheral states. This of course is an
unproven hypothesis as one could argue that core state action taken in a unilateral fashion
could be viewed as being systemically destabilizing. If a core state does not act in
accordance with the systemic demands of the global market system, there could be
ramifications for national popular destabilization. It seems unlikely, however, that core
states will jeopardize their privileged position with anti-systemic actions on a large scale.
These possible outcomes are simply a few of the many directions for future
comparative research on the nation-state using a reconceputalized “double movement”
framework. This dissertation is designed to develop a greater understanding of the
capacities and roles of the contemporary state with respect to national protection and
global market integration.
Canadian multicultural policies and Québec intercultural policies offer the
opportunity to observe and analyze state action as the result of both global market
integration and in meeting national protectionist demands. The conclusions that are made
from this study require that additional attention be played to the role of culture in
understanding social policy strategies in Canada and Québec. The role of the Canadian
and Québec state in the contemporary era cannot be adequately understood without
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attention to the role of culture as a stabilization tool or strategy. The efficacy of these
strategies is also consistent with the “double movement” framework in that the ultimate
success of multicultural and intercultural policies is determined by national popular
legitimation as well as systemic global economic adherence.
The conclusions, that state capacity to protection national populations through
economic means has waned resulting in increased state capacity to address national
protectionist demands through cultural means, offer an opportunity to examine the
complex interrelationships between nation, state, and global economy in a
methodologically sound manner. I believe that this dissertation project provides a unique
and promising foundation upon which a substantial research agenda can be built.
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